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Erie is by no means simply a case. 
—John Hart Ely1 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 was the most important federalism de-
cision of the twentieth century.  Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court 
stated unequivocally that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law 
of the state. . . .  There is no federal general common law.”3  Although law 
schools generally teach Erie in Civil Procedure—not Constitutional Law—
and American lawyers most often think of it as simply governing the law 
applied by federal courts in their diversity jurisdiction, Erie’s core holding 
states a fundamental truth about the allocation of lawmaking power in our 
contemporary federal system.  Federal law must be grounded in the Consti-
tution or in statutes enacted by Congress; when neither source of law (nor 
any federal treaty) applies, state law governs. 
As we celebrate its 75th anniversary, however, Erie finds itself under 
siege.  The most obvious threat comes from a rising chorus of academic 
criticism.  Michael Greve sees Erie as not only “bereft of serious intellectu-
al or constitutional support” but also as a cornerstone of a “cartel” federal-
ism that suppresses beneficial competition among the states.4  Craig Green 
has described Erie’s rationale as a “myth” that must be “repressed,”5 and 
Suzanna Sherry has even gone so far as to brand Erie “the worst decision of 
all time.”6  Outside the ivory tower, Erie’s restrictive vision of federal law-
  
 1 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974).  Although 
Professor Ely’s landmark article generally defended the Erie decision, the statement quoted above was 
part of the “myth” that he was criticizing.  See id. at 697–98 (complaining that “the indiscriminate 
admixture of all questions respecting choices between federal and state law in diversity cases, under the 
single rubric of ‘the Erie doctrine’ or ‘the Erie problem,’ has served to make a major mystery out of 
what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tion”).  As will be evident, I am considerably more sympathetic to this mythology, as I think Erie does 
represent a fundamental point about the nature of our federal system. 
 2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3 Id. at 78. 
 4 MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 373, 378–79 (2012).  Professor 
Greve’s market-oriented critique resonates with criticism of Erie by representatives of the defense bar.  
See, e.g., Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, In Praise of Erie—And Its Eventual Demise, 10 J. L., 
ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013). 
 5 Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596 (2008) [hereinafter Green, 
Repressing]. 
 6 Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011) [hereinafter Sherry, Wrong].  Somewhat surprisingly, Professor Sher-
ry is not the first to engage in this particular hyperbole.  See Arthur John Keefe, In Praise of Joseph 
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making has been extensively circumvented by unfettered executive law-
making7 and expansive theories of federal common law.8 
Although Ed Purcell noted over a decade ago that the Erie literature 
had reached “staggering proportions,”9 Erie is worth revisiting.  Concluding 
that Erie reached the wrong result—or even the right result for the wrong 
reasons—would upset many foundational premises of modern American 
law.  By holding that state law ordinarily governs any question not touched 
by positive federal enactments, Erie articulated a view of federal law as 
fundamentally interstitial in its nature; where Congress has not acted, the 
laws of the several states remain “the great and immensely valuable reser-
voirs of underlying law in the United States, available for the resolution of 
controversies for which otherwise there would be no law.”10  This view has 
shifted the focus of federalism doctrine from what Congress can do to what 
it has done, paving the way for an extensive jurisprudence limiting national 
power not by way of constitutional prohibition but through “clear statement 
rules” and other canons of statutory construction.11  
  
Story, Swift v. Tyson and “The” True National Common Law, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 316, 316 (1969) (“I 
regard [Erie] as the worst [decision] by the Supreme Court in this Century, ranking with Dred Scott in 
the last.”); 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 916 (1953) (insisting that Erie “stands revealed . . . as one of the most grossly unconsti-
tutional governmental acts in the nation’s entire history”).  African-Americans subjected to Jim Crow 
laws under Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and the Japanese-Americans interned during 
World War II under Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), might be surprised by these 
assessments.  For a more measured critique of Erie, see generally Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013) [hereinafter Nelson, Erie]. 
 7 See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (stating that 
“[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes”); see generally Ernest A. 
Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008) (discussing preemption of state regulato-
ry authority by federal executive agencies). 
 8 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988) (fashioning a federal com-
mon law “military contractor’s defense” to block state tort suits against defense contractors); see gener-
ally Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639 (2008) 
(describing the creation and application of federal common law) [hereinafter Young, Federal Common 
Law]. 
 9 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 2 
(2000). 
 10 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 492 
(1954). 
 11 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (holding that Congress must speak 
clearly before altering the ordinary balance between the nation and the states); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229–36 (1947) (adopting a presumption against preemption of state law); see 
generally Ernest A. Young, The Story of Gregory v. Ashcroft: Clear Statement Rules and the Statutory 
Constitution of American Federalism, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 197, 206–24 (William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, eds., 2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 593 (1992). 
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Not only does Erie provide much of the structural underpinning for 
contemporary federalism doctrine, it also addresses—perhaps more than 
any other decision in the federal courts canon—foundational questions 
about the nature of law and the judicial function.12  Rejecting notions of a 
“transcendental body of law,” Justice Brandeis purported to adopt contem-
porary theories of legal positivism; “law in the sense in which courts speak 
of it today,” he insisted, “does not exist without some definite authority 
behind it.”13  Although the extent to which Erie necessarily implicated is-
sues of positivism and legal realism remains disputed,14 there is no doubt 
that those issues have, in fact, played out on Erie’s terrain.  Defending Erie 
will require an exploration of what exactly we think courts do when they 
decide legal questions. 
This article seeks primarily to rescue Erie from its academic critics.  
More ambitiously, I hope that by shoring up Erie’s intellectual foundations 
this essay may lend support to the vision of limited federal lawmaking that 
Erie embodied—that is, one in which the federal separation of powers rein-
forces federalism by limiting the occasions on which federal lawmaking 
may displace state law.15  That vision is of more than theoretical import.  Its 
implications may govern practical controversies ranging from the domestic 
force of customary international law to the preemptive effect of federal 
regulatory policies on state tort law.16  Likewise, in an era of resurgent dy-
namism at the state level,17 Erie’s respect for the preservation of state pre-
  
 12 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 201 (1982) (book 
review) (“Few pairs of decisions expose, manipulate, or challenge a wider range of American values 
than do Swift and Erie.”). 
 13 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 14 See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 673 (1998). 
 15 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 
TEXAS L. REV. 1321 (2001). 
 16 On customary international law, see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726–28 
(2004) (looking to Erie to constrain the scope of implied rights of action to enforce customary interna-
tional law); Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing 
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007).  On preemption of state tort law, see, e.g., Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 586–87 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that preemptive 
effect should be limited to products of the Article I lawmaking process); see also Brief of Public Law 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 
2466 (2013) (No. 12-142), 2013 WL 749936, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-
0142_resp_amcupls.authcheckdam.pdf (invoking Erie to govern federal courts’ construction of state law 
for purposes of preemption analysis). 
 17 See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, State Governments Viewed 
Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low (April 15, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-federal-rating-hits-new-low/ (“Even as 
public views of the federal government in Washington have fallen to another new low, the public con-
tinues to see their state and local governments in a favorable light. . . . 57% express a favorable view of 
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rogatives in the absence of a federal legislative consensus takes on renewed 
importance. 
The literature on Erie long ago passed the point at which anyone could 
offer a truly comprehensive assessment.  This essay focuses on the structur-
al side of Erie—in particular, on what Erie has to say about federal law-
making power.  It gives relatively short shrift to debates, primarily in civil 
procedure circles, about Erie’s day-to-day application.18  And even within 
the structural conversation, I have surely overlooked important contribu-
tions.  Such are the inherent risks of synthesis.  Nonetheless, it is worth 
pulling together the most prominent strands of criticism and seeing if they 
can be answered. 
I believe they can.  My defense of Erie proceeds in four parts.  Part I 
offers a refresher on the Erie decision and its rationale, as well as on the 
case that Erie overruled—Justice Joseph Story’s landmark decision in Swift 
v. Tyson.19  Part II considers Erie’s statutory and pragmatic arguments, re-
habilitating Erie’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act20 without in-
sisting that Justice Story got that statute wrong at the time Swift was decid-
ed.  Part III turns to the main event—Erie’s constitutional rationale.  That 
rationale, I submit, correctly wove together notions of federalism and sepa-
ration of powers by insisting that Congress, not the federal courts, must act 
in order to displace state law.  Finally, Part IV situates Erie within the 
broader context of contemporary federalism doctrine.  Erie is far from an 
anachronism, as some critics have suggested; rather, I argue that, federal-
ism-wise, we are living in the Age of Erie. 
I. THE ERIE AND SWIFT DECISIONS 
On a “dark night” in Pennsylvania, an Erie Railroad Company freight 
train struck Harry Tompkins, a twenty-seven-year-old factory worker who 
  
their state government – a five-point uptick from last year. By contrast, just 28% rate the federal gov-
ernment in Washington favorably. That is down five points from a year ago and the lowest percentage 
ever in a Pew Research Center survey.”); Carl E. Van Horn, Power, Politics, and Public Policy in the 
States, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 1 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 4th ed. 2006) (“Today, at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, state governments are at the cutting edge of political and public policy reform. . 
.  . From health care, education, and homeland security to stem cell research, the right to die, and elec-
tion reform, states are leading the way.”).  By contrast, as this article goes to press, the Federal Govern-
ment has once again experienced a government shutdown and come close to defaulting on its debt. 
 18 “Procedural” though they may be, those debates not infrequently turn on deeply-theorized 
views about Erie’s structural meaning.  See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865 (2013) [hereinafter Green, Twin Aims].  I hope the present discussion may 
be useful to these debates even if it does not engage them fully. 
 19 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 20 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
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was walking on a footpath alongside the train tracks.21  The impact severed 
Tompkins’s arm, and when he had recovered he filed a personal injury suit 
against the railroad.  Because Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania and 
the railroad was incorporated in New York, he had access to federal court 
on account of diversity of citizenship.  Edward Purcell has explained that 
Tompkins’s choice of federal rather than state court was in order “to avoid 
what appeared to be a settled and highly unfavorable rule of Pennsylvania 
common law,” which held that Tompkins was a trespasser on the railroad’s 
right-of-way and, as a result, the railroad owed him no duty of care.22  Simi-
larly, Tompkins filed in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York—rather than in a federal district court sitting in Penn-
sylvania—in order to take advantage of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ tendency to readily apply general common law rather than state law 
in diversity cases.23  Tompkins was, in a word, forum-shopping. 
The trial court accepted Tompkins’s argument that the general law, not 
state law, applied, and the jury awarded him $30,000 in damages.  The Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, agreeing that “it is well settled that the question of the 
responsibility of a railroad for injuries caused by its servants is one of gen-
eral law.”24  This meant that although the parties disagreed about whether 
Pennsylvania law really cut off the railroad’s duties to the plaintiff, the 
court “need not go into this matter since the defendant concedes that the 
great weight of authority in other states is to the contrary.”25  The court of 
appeals thus divined the content of this “general law” from an assortment of 
federal decisions from other federal circuits; state court decisions from 
Texas, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Missouri; and the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement of Torts.26  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
“[b]ecause of the importance of the question whether the federal court was 
free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law.”27 
Justice Louis Brandeis’s majority opinion opened by framing the 
“question for decision” as “whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson shall now be disapproved.”28  Erie thus cannot be understood apart 
from Swift, decided by Justice Story in 1842.29  That case arose out of a 
complicated series of credit transactions involving a shady land speculation 
  
 21 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938); PURCELL, supra note 9, at 95. 
 22 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 96. 
 23 See id. at 96–97.  The Third Circuit, by contrast “tended to push the district courts in its circuit 
to defer to local common law and apply divergent federal rules only sparingly.”  Id. at 96. 
 24 Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d. Cir. 1937).  Judge Swan wrote for a unanimous 
panel, which included Learned Hand. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). 
 28 Id. at 69. 
 29 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
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in Maine and some businessmen in New York City.30  Basically, Norton 
owed Swift some money on a previous debt.  Norton paid Swift by signing 
over to him a bill of exchange that Norton had received from Tyson in 
payment for some land.31  When Swift tried to collect the bill from Tyson, 
Tyson refused to pay on the ground that Norton defrauded him; it turned 
out that Norton didn’t really own the land he had purported to sell to Tyson.  
The substantive issue in the case boiled down to whether there was any 
consideration when Norton gave Swift the bill.  If there were, then Swift 
would be a bona fide holder and therefore not subject to any fraud defense 
that Tyson might raise.32 
Swift sued Tyson on the bill in the federal circuit court for the South-
ern District of New York.  Swift being from Maine and Tyson from New 
York, federal jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship.  The New York 
courts had generally held that settlement of a preexisting debt was not valid 
consideration, thus raising the question whether a federal court sitting in 
diversity was obligated to follow those courts or make its own independent 
judgment of the applicable commercial principles.33  Tyson argued that the 
federal courts were bound by § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—now 
known as the Rules of Decision Act—which provided that “[t]he laws of 
the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the 
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of 
decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.”34  Justice Joseph Story’s opinion for the Court rejected 
that argument, concluding that “the true interpretation of the 34th section 
limited its application to state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the posi-
tive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local 
tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality.”35 
Justice Story denied that the Rule of Decision Act applied “to ques-
tions of a more general nature . . . as, for example, to the construction of 
ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to questions 
  
 30 Tony Freyer has attempted to untangle the transactions in some detail in his extremely helpful 
book, see TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 4–6 (1981).  Herbert Hovenkamp has similarly undertaken to explain the significance of 
bills of exchange in antebellum commercial law, see Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 216–23.  One of the 
unpleasant realities confronting constitutional scholars drawn to the subject of Federal Jurisdiction is 
that the merits of a disconcerting proportion of the critical cases turn on dizzying questions of commer-
cial law. 
 31 George W. Tysen actually spelled his last name with an “e”, but the Court’s opinion misspelled 
it.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 204 n.20.  I will stick with the Court’s more familiar spelling here. 
 32 See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 15–16. 
 33 Id. at 16–18. 
 34 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1652 (2012)). 
 35 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
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of general commercial law.”36  On these more general questions, the federal 
court’s obligation was “to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal anal-
ogie, . . . the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law.”37  
Although “the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are enti-
tled to . . . the most deliberate attention and respect of this court,” the feder-
al courts were not bound to follow them.38  Having determined that the fed-
eral court was free “to express [its] own opinion of the true result of the 
commercial law,” Justice Story had “no hesitation in saying, that a pre-
existing debt does constitute a valuable consideration” so that Tyson could 
not assert Norton’s fraud as a ground for not paying Swift.39 
Nearly a century later, Justice Brandeis read Swift as holding “that 
federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law 
of the State as declared by its highest court,” and that “they are free to exer-
cise an independent judgment as to what the common law of the State is—
or should be.”40  Brandeis offered three distinct arguments for rejecting 
Swift’s conclusion.  First, he argued that Swift had misconstrued the Rules 
of Decision Act.  Although Swift had confined the Act to “state laws strictly 
local,”41 Justice Brandeis read it to govern “all matters except those in 
which some federal law is controlling.”42  Second, Brandeis said that 
“[e]xperience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its 
defects, political and social”; these defects included disuniformity of appli-
cable laws between federal and state courts sitting in the same jurisdiction, 
the difficulty of drawing a boundary “between the province of general law 
and that of local law,” and “grave discrimination by noncitizens against 
citizens” of particular states based on asymmetry of their access to federal 
court.43  Finally, Brandeis insisted that “the unconstitutionality of the course 
pursued [in Swift] has now been made clear”; “in applying the doctrine this 
Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which . . . are reserved by 
the Constitution to the several States.”44 
Each of these sets of arguments has proven controversial.  I discuss 
Justice Brandeis’s construction of the Rules of Decision Act in Part II, 
along with his pragmatic arguments about uniformity and discrimination.  
Part III addresses Brandeis’s constitutional argument, which I take to be 
grounded in principles of judicial federalism.  Let me kill any suspense at 
the outset: On each point, I think Justice Brandeis got it basically right. 
  
 36 Id. at 18–19. 
 37 Id. at 19. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). 
 41 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
 42 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72. 
 43 Id. at 74. 
 44 Id. at 77–78, 80. 
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II. THE STATUTORY AND PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS 
Although Justice Brandeis insisted that the dispositive arguments in 
Erie were constitutional in nature, he also made important statements about 
the governing statute, the Rules of Decision Act, and the pragmatic conse-
quences of interpreting it to permit federal courts to apply their own “gen-
eral law” rules of decision in diversity cases.  This part canvasses those 
arguments. 
A. The Rules of Decision Act 
Both friends and foes of Erie tend to discount its statutory argument, 
largely because Justice Brandeis relied prominently on a famously weak 
argument about Section 34’s drafting history.  I do not defend that particu-
lar argument, but I do contend that Section 34’s enacted text is best read to 
foreclose the “general federal common law” rejected in Erie.  That does not 
mean that Swift itself was wrong.  But as Ed Purcell has noted, “whatever 
the First Congress intended with Section 34, it surely did not intend the 
large-scale social practice that had evolved under Swift by the end of the 
nineteenth century.”45  Erie was thus right on the statutory question, even if 
some of Brandeis’s arguments are more persuasive than others. 
1. The Text of Section 34 
Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act provided: 
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the Unit-
ed States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at 
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
46
 
Justice Story’s opinion in Swift had construed the “laws of the several 
States” to include only “state laws strictly local, that is to say, . . . the posi-
tive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local 
tribunals,” as well as “rights and titles to things having a permanent locali-
ty, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable 
  
 45 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 306; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 215–16 (suggesting that 
both Swift and Erie were appropriate within the contexts of their respective times). 
 46 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).  The current version is codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the 
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).  The only arguably signifi-
cant change is the substitution of “civil actions” for the older “trials at common law.” 
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and intraterritorial in their nature and character.”47  The distinction was 
not—as law students are sometimes taught—between written and unwritten 
or judge-made law,48 but rather between “local” and “general” law, with 
both classes including bodies of law embodied in judicial decisions and 
statues conclusively falling in the former category.49 
In Erie, Justice Brandeis’s opinion rejected Story’s reading.  He noted 
that Swift’s interpretation of Section 34 had been criticized, both for incor-
rectly interpreting the intent of the First Congress and for “the soundness of 
the rule which it introduced.”50  But the dispositive factor, he said, was “the 
more recent research of a competent scholar”—Brandeis’s friend and coau-
thor Charles Warren—“which established that the construction given to 
[Section 34] by the Court was erroneous.”51 
Professor Warren had unearthed an earlier draft of the Judiciary Act, 
as well as a paper—apparently in the handwriting of Oliver Ellsworth—that 
contained a draft of the amendment that became Section 34.  This draft re-
ferred to “the Statute law of the several States in force for the time being 
and their unwritten or common law now in use, whether by adoption from 
the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the same, or other-
wise.”52  Although the provision was amended to employ the somewhat 
catchier “laws of the several States” language, Warren surmised that these 
changes were purely stylistic and that the later language was supposed to 
encompass the more specific categories laid out in Ellsworth’s draft.53  
Brandeis concluded from this that “the purpose of the section was merely to 
make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is 
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizen-
ship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, un-
written as well as written.”54 
Erie’s critics have, with considerable justification, jumped all over this 
argument.  The most obvious problem is that when Congress alters the orig-
inal draft of a measure and adopts somewhat different language, there are 
virtually always two possible explanations: (1) Congress meant to keep the 
original meaning and the changes are merely stylistic, and (2) Congress 
  
 47 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
 48 See, e.g., Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 132–33 (asserting that Swift “interpreted the Act as 
requiring the application of only state statutory law, and not state common law”). 
 49 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 655, 664–93 (2013). 
 50 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. 
L. REV. 49, 87 (1923). 
 53 See id. at 86–88. 
 54 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73.  Whatever one thinks of this particular argument, one cannot help but 
be a little wistful at the extent to which, in the 1930s, doctrinal and historical work was respected in the 
academy and actually relied upon by the Court.  Styles are different now, in both quarters. 
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meant to change the original meaning.  The mere fact that the language 
changed generally cannot assist us in choosing between these possibilities.55  
Critics like Suzanna Sherry have thus rightly pointed out that “[i]n the ab-
sence of any further evidence . . . there is no way to determine whether the 
change in . . . language was or was not intended to change the substantive 
meaning of the statute.”56  As Judge Friendly observed, “the debate only 
demonstrates on what quicksand any attempt to interpret so venerable a 
statute on the basis of an unexplained change from an earlier draft must 
rest.”57 
The question remains, however, whether Justice Brandeis’s reading of 
the Rules of Decision Act can stand without the support of Professor War-
ren’s drafting history.  I think that it can.  Fascination with Warren’s rum-
maging through the attic and cellars of the Capitol has distracted both 
Erie’s defenders and its critics from the text of the statute Congress actually 
adopted.  That text requires federal courts to apply the “laws of the several 
states” as “rules of decision” except in cases “where the Constitution, trea-
ties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide.”58  The 
  
 55 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 112–13 (concluding that Warren’s discovery was “incon-
clusive[]”); Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134; Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 954–55.  Professor Field 
has also pointed out that the earlier draft referred only to state statutes and common law rules in force at 
the time; hence, “[t]o accept Warren’s conclusion, one would have to believe that the omission of this 
language in the final version of the Act was only stylistic . . . with respect to the equation of statutory 
and common law, but not with respect to its application only to preexisting law.”  Martha A. Field, 
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 904 (1986) [hereinafter 
Field, Sources of Law]. 
 56 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 207 & n.38 (col-
lecting citations to contemporaneous criticism of Brandeis’s opinion on this point).  Professor Sherry is 
not quite right to say, with respect to “further evidence,” that “Warren had none.”  Sherry, Wrong, supra 
note 6, at 134.  As Professor Nelson points out, Warren did offer one further argument to support his 
conclusion: Ellsworth struck the word “statute” from the original draft, which had referred to the “Stat-
ute laws of the several states.”  See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 955 n.100 (discussing this point); 
Warren, supra note 52, at 86.  That does suggest that the adopted language did not address only statutes, 
but it hardly proves that all the other forms of law discussed in the original draft were included in the 
adopted text.  See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 955 n.100. 
 57 Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
383, 390 (1964).  
 58 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).  Louise Weinberg thinks that this 
language is irrelevant to the lawmaking powers of the federal courts for two reasons: First, that the 
Constitution—in particular, the Supremacy Clause—actually “requires” courts to make and apply feder-
al common law, and second, that Section 34 must be irrelevant to the federal common law issue because 
that law is supreme in both federal and state courts, while Section 34 applies only to federal courts.  See 
Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common 
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 862, 865, & 867 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act].  
But while the Supremacy Clause renders unconstitutional state laws that contravene federal ones, noth-
ing in the Clause generally empowers courts to fashion federal rules of decision; that Clause does not 
speak to federal judicial powers at all.  See generally Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 
1655–56.  And even if the Supremacy Clause could be said to countenance federal common lawmaking 
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text makes no distinction between state statutes and state unwritten law, and 
no one disputes that unwritten law was considered “law” in the late eight-
eenth century.59  Indeed, as I have already noted, Justice Story did not draw 
the line here in Swift.60 
What Story rejected was the proposition that “the word ‘laws,’ in [Sec-
tion 34], includes within the scope of its meaning, the decisions of the local 
tribunals.”61  He explained: 
In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts con-
stitute laws.  They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of them-
selves, laws.  They are often re-examined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves, 
whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect.  The 
laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by 
the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws.
62
 
Although this passage is sometimes read to distinguish between writ-
ten and unwritten law, that cannot be right.  Story alludes to “long-
established local customs,” even though those customs were likely to be 
unwritten, as laws.63  Moreover, if a state decision is only “evidence of what 
  
in certain instances, those instances are driven by a specific interpretation of underlying federal constitu-
tional or statutory norms.  See, e.g., Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (infer-
ring federal common lawmaking powers in foreign affairs cases from particularly strong federal inter-
ests and separation of powers principles unique to that context); Young, Federal Common Law, supra 
note 8, at 1674–78 (questioning inferences of lawmaking power from mere “interests” but pointing out 
that those interests are limited to particular contexts).  These instances, to the extent that they are legiti-
mate at all, are exceptions to the Rules of Decision Act’s mandate.   
As to the second point, it is fair to say that the Rules of Decision Act mirrors the language of the Su-
premacy Clause itself—that is, it limits the categories of federal law that can supplant state law.  So 
viewed, it makes sense that the Act is limited to the federal courts, both because Congress does not share 
the same responsibility to provide detailed rules for the operation of state courts that it has for federal 
courts, and because the Supremacy Clause itself applies the same principle directly to the state courts. 
See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2 (providing not only that federal law is not only “the supreme law of the 
land,” but also that “the judges in every state shall be bound thereby”). 
 59 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789); see also FREYER, supra note 30, at 
23–26 (explaining that antebellum lawyers accepted non-statutory commercial law principles as “law,” 
but noting that the debate concerned “whether commercial practice or judicial precedent was the surest 
guide” to that law’s meaning); id. at 35 (finding “little room for doubt that the ‘laws of the several 
states’ included statutes, decisions by state courts, and vaguely defined ‘local customs’”). 
 60 See text accompanying notes 35–36.  As Jack Goldsmith and Steven Walt have pointed out, 
“[i]t is doubtful that Swift represented a commitment to or belief in the ‘brooding omnipresence’ theory 
later attributed to it by Holmes and Erie.”  Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 682.  Justice Story was 
himself a legal positivist and would have had no doubt that courts deciding common law cases are 
making “law.”  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 224–25 (1982) 
(book review) (“Story himself had a positivistic view of the rule of law.”). 
 61 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON 
LAW 107 (1977) (“[T]here has been much misunderstanding generated by commentators who have 
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the laws are” in a case involving contracts or property, for example, it re-
mains the case that the underlying “laws” were generally unwritten.  Story 
is thus better read as distinguishing between the federal courts’ obligation 
to follow state law and their obligation to follow state courts.  Caleb Nelson 
has observed that when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was drafted, “people did 
not automatically treat the phrase ‘unwritten or common law’ as a synonym 
for ‘judicial decisions.’”64  Hence, even if Section 34 required federal judg-
es to apply state unwritten law in diversity cases, it would not necessarily 
require them to take the interpretation of that law by state courts as conclu-
sive of its meaning.65 
And yet this is not actually the line that the Swift Court drew either.  
The Court had made clear that it was obligated to follow not only state law, 
but also state court constructions of that law, in cases involving state stat-
utes.66  As Justice Story was well-aware, the Court had held fifteen years 
prior to Swift that it must also follow the state supreme courts on matters 
involving the unwritten law of testamentary disposition.67  Acknowledging 
that “many of the cases in which this Court has deemed itself bound to con-
form to State decisions, have arisen on the construction of statutes,” the 
Court had pointed out that “the same rule has been extended to other cases; 
and there can be no good reason assigned why it should not be, when it is 
applying settled rules of real property.”68  “This Court adopts the State deci-
sions,” the Court had said, “because they settle the law applicable to the 
case.”69  Hence, in Swift, Story acknowledged the federal courts’ obligation 
to follow the state courts’ construction of the local, as opposed to general, 
law—whether those laws were written or unwritten.70 
  
suggested that Swift provided for binding weight to be given by federal courts only to state cases con-
struing state statutes.  This, of course, was not true. . . .”); Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 925–26 (noting 
that, in Swift, “Justice Story took for granted that not only ‘the positive statutes of the state’ but also 
‘local customs having the force of laws’ supplied rules of decision for federal courts”). 
 64 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 955. 
 65 Id. at 955–56. 
 66 See, e.g., Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159–60 (1825); Green v. Neal’s Les-
see, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 554, 
n.2 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
 67 Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 153, 168–69 (1827).  Justice Story, who joined the Court 
in 1811, would have been part of the Court that decided Jackson. 
 68 Id. at 167. 
 69 Id. (emphasis added). 
 70 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 
554 (observing that Justice Story “drew a distinction between ‘local’ law (statutes and usages), on the 
one hand, and ‘general commercial law’ on the other”); BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 107 
(“Justice Story . . . did not simply hold that the Rules of Decision Act bound federal courts to follow 
state statutes and the decisions of the state courts construing those statutes.  He also pointed out that the 
Act was equally obligatory on all other ‘local’ matters, especially in matters affecting title to real prop-
erty.”); see also Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 925 (explaining that “[t]he ‘local’ law of a particular state 
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The critical point is that Justice Story thought this distinction—
between local and general law—captured the meaning of the Rules of Deci-
sion Act.71  Where that Act applied, in other words, the federal courts were 
obligated not only to follow state law, but also to follow the decisions of 
state courts construing that law.  And the reason appears to have been 
grounded in the different functions being performed by a state court in local 
and general cases. 
In cases “not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a 
fixed and permanent operation” but rather involving “questions of general 
commercial law,” Story observed, “the state tribunals are called upon to 
perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general 
reasoning and legal analogies . . . what is the just rule furnished by the prin-
ciples of commercial law to govern the case.”72  Although Story did not 
spell out what he viewed the state courts as doing in local cases, the impli-
cation is clear that state courts did not share “the like functions as our-
selves” in those cases—that is, that state courts bear a special authoritative 
relationship to local law that they do not share with the federal courts.  
Much of the confusion about Swift—and therefore about Erie—stems from 
misunderstanding the “like function” that state and federal courts exercised 
in general law cases. 
2. General and Local Law in the Nineteenth Century 
The “general law” applied in Swift raises conceptual difficulties for 
contemporary lawyers on two distinct grounds.  First, it was often thought 
to be customary law, which differs not only from statute law but also from 
common law as modern lawyers conceive it.73  Second, it was neither state 
nor federal in nature, and thus it raises conceptual difficulties for contempo-
rary lawyers accustomed to thinking that those are the only two choices.74  
Both these qualities eroded by the end of the nineteenth century, and that 
erosion set the stage for Erie.  But so long as they each held true, it is pos-
  
included both its written laws (such as the state constitution and statutes enacted by the state legislature) 
and at least a portion of its unwritten law (such as rules grounded in peculiar local customs and rules 
about the status of land and other things with a fixed locality in the state)”). 
 71 See FREYER, supra note 30, at 35–36 (“[Justice Story’s] construction of section 34 rested upon 
a distinction between general and local law which was familiar to antebellum lawyers and judges.”). 
 72 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19. 
 73 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 38 (noting that Justice Story “said that business necessity 
and usage were the best guides” to the content of the general commercial law).  On customary law, see 
generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW (2010). 
 74 See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006) 
[hereinafter Nelson, General Law] (noting the persistence of law that is neither state nor federal); Bellia 
& Clark, supra note 49, at 658 (rejecting the notion that “the Constitution prohibits federal courts from 
applying general law under any circumstances”). 
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sible to say that Swift was entirely consistent with the Rules of Decision 
Act—and with the Constitution as well.75 
Customary law is “bottom–up” law—that is, it arises out of the prac-
tices of predominantly private actors rather than a “top–down” normative 
command of the sovereign.76  It is true that for custom to become binding as 
law there must be an “extra ingredient,” such as a demonstration that pri-
vate actors follow the custom from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris), 
the endurance of the custom from “time immemorial,” or a conclusion that 
the custom is consistent with right reason.77  But the basic norms emerge 
from practice.  Hence, although Justice Story relied on a wide range of ju-
dicial authorities in Swift, the underlying commercial law principles rested 
on the customary practices of merchants.78 
Tony Freyer has demonstrated that American jurists disputed the rela-
tive importance of reason and practice under the general commercial law.79  
The important point for present purposes, however, is that a court enforcing 
a customary rule of commercial law is engaged in a quite different enter-
prise than, say, a court formulating a common law doctrine of products lia-
bility.  The former inquiry will focus on the practices and legitimate expec-
tations of the parties to the transaction,80 while the latter (if the question is 
an open one) will engage more normative policy considerations about opti-
mal deterrence, loss-spreading, and fairness.81 
  
 75 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 49, at 662 (rejecting “modern suggestions that the Swift 
Court misconstrued section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 or usurped state authority under the Consti-
tution”). 
 76 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 13 (“[T]he original source of customary law 
is the behavior of individuals.  It depends for its authority upon regular and continued practice and 
acceptance by individuals.”); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 449, 465 (2000) (“Customary law’s authority comes from the internalized normative beliefs of 
the political community and not from a defined process or ritual through which law is determined.”).  
 77 See BEDERMAN, supra note 73, at 3–4; Emily E. Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary 
is Customary International Law? 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 907–11 (2013). 
 78 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Erie-effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive 
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1791 (1997) (“The common law at issue in Swift was the law mer-
chant.  The law merchant was customary law.  Customary law was constituted by the usual or ordinary 
understandings of parties to a commercial transaction.”); Michael Conant, The Commerce Clause, the 
Supremacy Clause and the Law Merchant: Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of Commercial Law, 15 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 153, 156 (1984) (“The customary origin of the commercial law . . . . meant that courts 
did not . . . create descriptive categories of legal wrongs and remedies.  Rather, the merchants created 
the patterns of customary behavior that were most efficient . . . and the courts adopted rules to enforce 
these customs.”).  As one English jurist put it, “[t]he law merchant thus spoken of with reference to bills 
of exchange and other negotiable securities . . . is neither more nor less than the usages of merchants and 
traders . . . ratified by the decisions of Courts of law.”  Goodwin v. Robarts, L.R. 10 Exch. 337, 346 
(1875). 
 79 FREYER, supra note 30, at 23–25. 
 80 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 4. 
 81 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04 (1959) (asserting, in a 
products liability case, that “[p]ublic policy . . . finds expression” not only “in the Constitution” and “the 
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One might concede that a court is “making law” in either case.  Much 
as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle suggests that an observer cannot 
simply observe a phenomenon without altering what is being observed,82 a 
court cannot articulate a legal rule reflecting the practices of private actors 
without also, to at least some degree, shaping those practices.83  Moreover, 
customary law’s binding force must still derive from the decision of the 
legitimate legal authorities to apply it; in this sense, customary law is gen-
erally traceable to some sovereign’s command.84  Nonetheless, a critical 
distinction remains between the two modes of judging: it is the difference 
between trying to follow the practices of others and choosing the best prac-
tice by one’s own lights.85  That distinction exists even in contemporary 
practice prescribed by Erie itself, as federal courts must try to follow state 
law in diversity cases while enjoying greater autonomy in enclaves of fed-
eral common law.86 
  
statutory law,” but also “in judicial decisions”; “[t]he task of the judiciary” includes weighing policy 
considerations in order effectively “to protect the ordinary man against the loss of important rights”). 
 82 “According to Heisenberg, the more accurately you measure where a particle is, the less accu-
rately you are able to measure where it's going.”  Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional 
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1989) (citing 
WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE 47–48 
(1958)).  This principle “relies generally on two premises: first, that any observation necessarily requires 
intervention into the system being studied; and second, that we can never be certain that the intervention 
did not itself change the system in some unknown way.”  Id. at 18.  
 83 See id. at 20–23 (“[C]ourts must take account of how the very process of legal ‘observation’ 
(i.e., judging) shapes both the judges themselves and the materials being judged.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 365, 491-92 (2002) [hereinafter Young, CIL] (arguing that the Swift regime was consistent in 
theory with legal positivism); Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 695 (pointing out that many of 
Swift’s defenders justified the application of general law as authorized by Article III); BRIDWELL & 
WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 95–97, 110–11 (reading the Rules of Decision Act as a choice of law prin-
ciple mandating application of general law in commercial cases). 
 85 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 115 (arguing that, under Swift, “federal 
judges . . . ‘searched for’ the legal rules they enforced in the parties’ own conduct, rather than creating 
and imposing them from on high out of ‘competing social policies’”). 
 86 For a typical statement of a federal court’s obligation to follow—not construct—state law under 
Erie, see McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that a federal court 
deciding an issue of state law under Erie must follow any interpretation of state law articulated by the 
state supreme court and, if no such interpretation exists, “predict[] . . . how the state’s highest court 
would decide were it confronted with the problem”).  Commentators have disagreed as to the precise 
nature of this obligation.  Compare, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Law of the Several States: 
Positivism and Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997) (arguing that Erie fore-
closes federal courts from trying to predict how the state supreme court would resolve unsettled ques-
tions of state law), with Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 
237 (2006) (arguing federal courts should make their own judgment based on all available state law 
sources as to the content of state law).  But no one argues that federal courts in this situation exercise the 
same sort of lawmaking function that they might within an established enclave of federal common 
lawmaking authority. See, e.g., Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 
285 (1952) (“To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than com-
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Courts applying the general commercial law decided cases according 
to the custom of merchants in order to protect party expectations.  As Pro-
fessors Bridwell and Whitten explain, “[t]he primary function of a custom-
ary system [is] to preserve a context in which autonomous party behavior 
has its maximum possible range without defeating the widespread, legiti-
mate expectations of others.”87  As part of this regime, “a wide range of 
customary rules were designed to clarify or settle the intent of private con-
tracting parties when they had made no unequivocal, express agreement.”88  
Hence, “the critical feature of the Swift common law system was a deci-
sional process or function that was designed to vindicate the legitimate and 
discernable expectations of the parties to any given dispute.”89 
A strong scholarly consensus agrees that the general commercial law 
was not considered to be federal in nature,90 and that conclusion finds fur-
ther support in the Founding Generation’s refusal to incorporate the com-
mon law into the Constitution.91  In Wheaton v. Peters, the Marshall Court 
announced that “[i]t is clear, there can be no common law of the United 
States.”92  As Justice McClean explained,  
  
mon-law courts in fashioning rules . . . .”); Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 
51 CAL. L. REV. 661, 718 (1963) (“From the beginning admiralty judges have retained the inventiveness 
and initiative characteristic of common law courts in private law areas.”). 
 87 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 58; see also Conant, supra note 78, at 153–54; An-
drew P. Morriss, Hayek and Cowboys: Customary Law in the American West, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
35, 39 (2005) (describing Friedrich Hayek’s theory of customary law and observing that “[t]he key 
characteristic of a Hayekian legal institution’s generation of rules . . . rests on a connection between a 
rule and individual expectations regarding the outcome of an interaction.”). 
 88 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 58. 
 89 Id. at 4.  They explain that under this approach, “the federal courts were able to avoid ‘making’ 
law in the only sense in which the term ‘making’ is important to the parties in a lawsuit—that is, the 
application, ex post facto, of a rule or principle not within the legitimate anticipations of the parties to 
the transaction or event in question.”  Id. at 5. 
 90 See, e.g., William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1521–25 (1984); FREYER, supra note 
30, at 137–43; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 554–56, 655; Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitu-
tional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1292-93 (2007) [hereinafter Clark, Erie’s Source]; Stewart Jay, 
The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 832–33 (1989); see 
also Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 740 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment) (“General common law was not federal law under the Supremacy Clause.”).  Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s opinion, and although the majority opinion did not 
address this point directly, it did not appear to disagree. 
 91 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (rejecting the notion 
of federal common law crimes); see generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 131–42 (1996) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (chronicling the Framers’ reluctance to federalize the common law); HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 610–12; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1003, 1069-72 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part One]; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common 
Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1254–57 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part Two]. 
 92 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). 
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[t]here is no principle which pervades the union and has the authority of law, that is not em-
bodied in the constitution or laws of the Union.  The common law could be made a part of 
our federal system, only by legislative adoption.  When, therefore, a common law right is as-
serted, we must look to the state in which the controversy originated.
93
 
It was not necessary to apply state law, however, where “the states 
themselves purported to adhere to an extraterritorial body of customary 
principle.”94  As Justice Story noted in Swift, state judges in commercial 
cases were “called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves”—that 
is, to apply general law.95  General law was thus “shared law” among the 
federal and state courts.96  As Judge Fletcher has demonstrated, all Ameri-
can courts tried to interpret commercial custom in such a way as to main-
tain uniformity across jurisdictions, but no court exercised supreme inter-
pretive authority and courts did, from time to time, simply disagree about 
the content of general law.97  In the first half of the nineteenth century, this 
arrangement managed to maintain an impressive degree of uniformity in the 
commercial law despite the absence of “one court to rule them all” as it 
were.98 
The distinctively “national” aspect of the Swift regime derived not 
from any notion of federal supremacy, but rather from the federal courts’ 
ability to provide a neutral forum for litigation among citizens of different 
states.  As Professors Bridwell and Whitten explain, “[i]n a customary law 
system in which the purpose of a grant of subject matter jurisdiction is to 
protect nonresidents from local bias, the intentions and expectations of the 
parties to every dispute had to be determined by a tribunal independent of 
the apprehended local prejudice.”99  In addition to interpreting the meaning 
of the general law where it applied, the federal courts also provided an in-
dependent determination of whether that law had been superseded by local 
rules and, in some cases, whether local law was sufficiently settled to bind 
other courts.100 
  
 93 Id. 
 94 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 99. 
 95 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). 
 96 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 39–40 (noting that state judges shared independent authori-
ty to develop commercial law with the federal courts); Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1515 (“In marine 
insurance cases, deviations by individual state courts from the general law were sufficiently rare that 
these courts, even when they disagreed, considered themselves engaged in the joint endeavor of decid-
ing cases under a general common law.”). 
 97 See id., at 1539–42; see also FREYER, supra note 30, at 40. 
 98 See Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1562–63. 
 99 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 67; see also id. at 67–68 (pointing out that, because 
the purpose of the diversity grant was simply to provide a neutral forum, there was no need for federal 
court interpretations of the general law to preempt divergent interpretations of that law in the state 
courts). 
 100 See Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 298 (1832); BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra 
note 63, at 70–73. 
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As the last point suggests, however, states retained the power to “lo-
calize” the general law by promulgating distinctive rules of their own, even 
in the commercial area.101  And when the states did so, the federal courts 
respected that decision.  As Alfred Hill has explained, “even under Swift v. 
Tyson the federal courts recognized their duty to follow state law which was 
recognizable as such.”102  The result was that “once the state made it clear 
that its law in the particular matter was something other than the ‘general 
law,’ as when a statute was enacted, this manifestation of a new and distinc-
tively local law was followed by the federal courts without question, even 
when Congress did not direct them to do so.”103  States generally chose not 
to localize commercial rules, because “it would have constituted commer-
cial suicide for them to do so beyond certain boundaries.”104  But this prag-
matic judgment did not depend on any notion that the general commercial 
law was “supreme” in an Article VI sense.  Participation in the Swift regime 
was ultimately up to the state.105 
All of this history ought to shed some light on Section 34’s limitation 
of the obligation to follow state laws (and state court interpretations of 
those laws) to “cases where they apply.”  Some commentators have read 
this language as basically draining Section 34 of any determinate mean-
ing.106  But the phrase need not be tautological; instead, it may fairly be read 
  
 101 See id. at 70; see also Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1527–28 (“[S]tate courts and legislatures 
could, at least in theory, establish local law that federal courts would be obliged to follow in any area of 
law.  In practice, however, federal courts usually felt obliged to comply with state law only in subject 
areas of peculiarly local concern . . . .  Although federal courts sometimes found local law to be disposi-
tive in matters of more national concern, such as commercial law, such cases were relatively rare.”). 
 102 Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427, 443 (1958). 
 103 Id. 
 104 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 91. 
 105 Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested a more mandatory view of Swift.  He argues that  
[t]he theory that Justice Story developed . . . contained an implicit constitutional limitation 
on the state’s power to impose its law on a transaction that exceeded the geographic bounda-
ries of the state.  Such a limit was essential to the creation of a unified American economy 
out of balkanized and self-interested sovereigns. 
Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 223. Professor Hovenkamp admits that this constitutional limit was at 
best “implicit,” and his suggestion is inconsistent with the evidence just canvassed concerning the 
states’ power to localize the general law.  See also Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 
(1893) (acknowledging, with respect to a point of general law, that “[t]here is no question as to the 
power of the states to legislate and change the rules of the common law in this respect as in others”).  In 
any event, Hovenkamp’s view does not ground Swift in any notion that general norms were themselves 
federal in character, but rather in a sharp limit on state law’s extraterritorial effect.  As he acknowledges, 
those limits did not survive far into the twentieth century.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 223; see 
also Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 483 (1997) (describing the loosening of dormant Commerce Clause constraints on state law after 
1937).  Despite occasional decisions suggesting limits on extraterritorial state regulation, see, e.g., 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996), no one thinks that the states simply lack 
power to regulate commercial transactions that cross state lines. 
 106 See, e.g., Field, Sources of Law, supra note 55, at 903 (observing that “the last clause, ‘in cases 
where they apply,’ without any specification of what those cases might be, leaves the provision open to 
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as referring to the two boundaries of the general law.  In many areas, such 
as real property, the law had always been “localized”; in others a state 
might choose to abrogate its prior commitment to the general customary 
rules.  In either scenario, however, the question of state law’s scope was 
itself a question of state law.  Recall that Justice Story begins the critical 
passage in Swift not simply by noting the commercial nature of the question 
presented, but by observing the stance taken by the state’s courts: “[T]he 
courts of New York do not found their decisions upon . . . any local statute, 
or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from 
the general principles of commercial law.”107  In other words, Story did not 
derive the general law’s applicability in Swift from some categorical federal 
choice of law principle, but rather from the decision of the New York state 
courts to follow the general law in cases like Swift.  It is, on this view, al-
ways a matter of local law whether general law applies.108  Hence Section 
34’s language referred to state law rules about the choice between local and 
general law.109 
Professors Bridwell and Whitten offer a slightly different reading of 
Section 34 that nonetheless ends up in the same place.  They argue that 
the ‘in cases where they apply’ language of the Act was effectively treated as limiting the 
operation of state laws, both statutory and common law, to intraterritorial situations.  State 
laws would thus be treated as ‘rules of decision’ . . . only when traditional conflict of laws 
principles would permit them to control.
110
 
Under this reading, “[g]eneral commercial law disputes were treated 
independently by the federal courts because they were cases in which the 
states themselves purported to adhere to an extraterritorial body of custom-
ary principle.”111  The only difference between the Bridwell/Whitten view 
and the one I advanced in the previous paragraph is that they view Section 
34 as “a statute to be applied in strict accord with private international con-
flict of laws principles—that is, state law applied under the statute when 
  
very flexible interpretation”); Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act, supra note 58, at 867 (pointing out that 
“[n]othing in this neatly tautological legislation tells us state laws must be applied where they do not 
apply”). 
 107 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
 108 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 49, at 658 (“[W]hen federal courts applied general com-
mercial law, they did not displace state law, but rather acted in accord with a state’s choice to apply 
general commercial law.”); Hill, supra note 102, at 443 (“In equity no less than at common law the 
federal courts tended to apply state law which was cognizable as such, resorting to independent applica-
tions of the ‘general law’ insofar as the ‘general law’ was understood to be the law of the state.”). 
 109 That langague also presumably incorporated the Supremacy Clause’s principle that state law 
cannot apply where it has been displaced by a validly-enacted federal rule.  But as already explained, no 
such rules were present in cases like Swift or Erie. 
 110 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 99. 
 111 Id. 
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such conflict principles dictated that it apply, but not otherwise.”112  In other 
words, Section 34 referred not to state choice of law rules to determine 
when general law would apply, but rather incorporated general international 
conflicts rules for that purpose.  But this distinction makes little practical 
difference, because—as Bridwell and Whitten acknowledge—the general 
conflicts rules themselves permitted individual states to “localize” their law 
on particular points by departing from the general commercial law.113  At 
the end of the day, then, Section 34 required courts to look to state law to 
determine whether general law applied. 
This reading of Section 34 operates in tandem with Professors Brid-
well and Whitten’s interpretation of the Diversity Clause in Article III.  
They point out that the general willingness of states to apply the general 
commercial law “led citizens of other states to develop expectations that 
could only be protected by an independent federal determination of what 
the extraterritorial custom was.”114  States would not be permitted to local-
ize their law retroactively to the detriment of out-of-staters.115  But on this 
view, the issue was protection of private expectations against retroactive 
change, not a categorical limit on state departures from general law. 
The federal courts would gradually depart from Swift’s nuanced ap-
proach in the late nineteenth century, substituting general law for state law 
even in cases where the state courts would have applied the latter.116  In 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh, for example, the Court upheld a 
fellow-servant defense to tort liability in a diversity case, even though the 
state courts had expressed a different view of the law.117  The problem with 
such an extension is that whereas commercial law seeks to protect the ex-
pectations of private parties to a consensual transaction, tort law imposes 
normative rules of conduct grounded in sovereign authority.118  As Larry 
Lessig has explained, 
  
 112 Id. at 81.  Professors Bridwell and Whitten base this reading on Justice Story’s opinion on 
circuit in Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C. D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16,871), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom.  Clark v. Van Reimsdyk, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 153 (1815).  See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, 
supra note 63, at 79–82. 
 113 See id. at 86 (“The commercial conflict rules thus protected the general expectations of the 
commercial community, while permitting ‘localization’ of commercial law by both the sovereign and 
private parties.”). 
 114 Id. at 99. 
 115 See id. at 129. 
 116 See generally FREYER, supra note 30, at 51–75; see also GREVE, supra note 4, at 145; 
BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 115–22. 
 117 149 U.S. 368 (1893).  The Court had ventured to apply Swift to a tort case as early as 1862.  See 
Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418 (1862). 
 118 See, e.g., PAGE KEETON, ROBERT E. KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH & HENRY J. STEINER, 
TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 1989) (“Tort . . . is a body of legal princi-
ples aiming to control or regulate harmful behavior; to assign responsibility for injuries that arise in 
social interaction; and to provide recompense for victims with meritorious claims.”); BRIDWELL & 
WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 121 (“[T]ort law was vastly different in kind from the general customs of 
 
File: Young Proofs Created on:  1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM 
38 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY [VOL. 10:1 
[t]his change in scope in turn changed the nature of the common law practice: federal general 
common law was less the practice of gap-filling for parties to a commercial transaction, and 
more a practice of norm-enforcement, covering a substantial scope of sovereign authority. 
The common law was no longer reflective, or mirroring of private understandings; it had be-
come directive, or normative over those private understandings.
119
 
Baugh made clear that the Court’s criteria for which issues were gov-
erned by general law had expanded considerably: 
[T]he question is essentially one of general law.  It does not depend upon any statute; it does 
not spring from any local usage or custom; there is in it no rule of property, but it rests upon 
those considerations of right and justice which have been gathered into the great body of the 
rules and principles known as the “common law.”  There is no question as to the power of 
the States to legislate and change the rules of the common law in this respect as in others; but 
in the absence of such legislation the question is one determinable only by the general prin-
ciples of that law.  Further than that, it is a question in which the nation as a whole is inter-
ested. It enters into the commerce of the country.
120
 
Other cases went still further, applying general law to trump state stat-
utes and constitutional provisions,121 as well as state judicial decisions con-
struing quintessentially local property rights.122  The expansion of the gen-
eral law regime to areas in which the states had not accepted its applicabil-
ity raised serious questions under both the Rules of Decision Act and the 
Constitution itself.  But nothing in Swift itself is inconsistent with a reading 
of Section 34 that looks to state law to regulate the reach of general com-
mercial principles. 
3. Does the Rules of Decision Act Mandate Federal Common Law? 
Some revisionist scholars have argued that Swift was simply wrong 
about the meaning of Section 34—not because it construed the federal 
court’s powers of independent judgment too broadly, as Justice Brandeis 
thought, but because Swift failed to read Section 34 as a broad mandate “for 
federal courts sitting in diversity . . . to apply federal common law.”123  This 
argument, which relies on the work of the late Wilfred Ritz,124 focuses not 
on the word “laws” but on the meaning of “the several states.”  Professor 
  
the commercial world, and . . . it should have been treated as a local matter to be controlled by state law 
as defined in state decisions.”). 
 119 Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792. 
 120 149 U.S. at 378. 
 121 See, e.g., Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U.S. 494 (1875); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 
U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). 
 122 See, e.g., Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870). 
 123 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 135. 
 124 See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING 
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wyth Holt & H. H. LaRue eds., 1990). 
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Ritz pointed to usage by eighteenth century legal draftsman that frequently 
employed “the several states” to mean “the states as a group” rather than 
each state individually.125  That suggested that Section 34 should be read to 
require federal courts to apply “American law generally” rather than “the 
law of a particular state.”126  Adopting Ritz’s reading, Professor Sherry con-
cludes that “the instruction in Section 34 to apply ‘the laws of the several 
states’ directed courts not to the law of any individual state, but rather to the 
law of all states—in other words, to federally–developed common law.  The 
purpose was to ensure that American law, not British law, would apply in 
the federal courts.”127  Sherry’s view seems to be that this law was plainly 
federal—not “general”—in nature.128 
A wide range of Erie’s critics—and even some of its supporters—have 
endorsed Professor Ritz’s reasoning.129  It is therefore worth taking the time 
to consider both his argument and his evidence.  Putting it mildly, Ritz’s 
view has all kinds of problems.  Ritz claimed that the founding generation 
used “the phrase ‘the several states’ when referring to the states as a group 
and the phase ‘the respective states’ when referring to them individually.”130  
His evidence, however, is quite thin: As evidence of general usage, for ex-
  
 125 See id. at 83; see also Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 956–57 (summarizing Ritz’s argument). 
 126 RITZ, supra note 124, at 140–41. 
 127 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134.  
 128 It seems unlikely that Professor Ritz himself meant to go this far.  He states in his introduction 
that “Section 34 was not meant to be a major and fundamental section,” and that “thus downgraded, the 
section’s reference to ‘the laws of the several states’ probably was meant to say nothing more remarka-
ble than that the national courts should use American law, and not British law.”  RITZ, supra note 124, 
at 11.  If Section 34 were a delegation of broad authority to make federal common law, supreme within 
the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, that would make the Rules of Decision Act “a major and funda-
mental section” indeed.  Although Ritz is hardly clear on this point, it seems more likely that “American 
law” meant a form of general law that was simply distinct from British law. 
 129 In addition to Professor Sherry, see, e.g., GREVE, supra note 4, at 226 (relying on Ritz and 
William Crosskey to support the assertion that “Charles Warren’s purported evidence has been proven 
wrong to the point of certainty”); PURCELL, supra note 9, at 306 (citing Ritz as having “made a strong 
case that the framers could not have intended the section to have the meaning Brandeis attributed to it”); 
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave 
New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 81 (1993) (stating that “the validity of the histori-
cal orthodoxy has been exploded by the recent writings of Professor Wilfred Ritz and others”); George 
Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 
285, 286 (1993) (endorsing Ritz’s reasoning); Jay Tidmarsh, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 585, 615–16, 615 n.193, 616 n.194 (2006) (relying on Ritz’s conclusions); see also 
PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL–STATE RELATIONS 9–11 (7th ed, 2011) (offering an extended and uncritical summary of 
Ritz’s evidence and argument); Green, Twin Aims, supra note 18, at 1889 (also endorsing Ritz’s read-
ing, but concluding that it simply makes the Rules of Decision Act irrelevant to “the division of com-
mon lawmaking power between federal and state courts”). 
 130 RITZ, supra note 124, at 83.  Significantly, Professor Ritz admitted that “there is no hard-and-
fast rule requiring” this distinction and that even within the Judiciary Act itself, “[i]n some contexts 
either word may be appropriate and one may disagree as to which is the most felicitous.”  Id. at 83, 87.  
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ample, he cites a handful of isolated early state laws, as well as a couple of 
statements and actions by federal officials, but none establishes the sort of 
collective meaning that Ritz’s argument attributes to “several.”  Consider 
this order issued by the Continental Congress in 1777: 
Ordered, That the resolution of Congress of 10th of September last . . . be without delay 
transmitted to the executive powers of the several states, with a request, that they will order 
the same to be published in their respective gazettes for six months, successively.
131
 
What does this prove?  Certainly “respective” is used, as Ritz suggests, 
to refer to individual states.  But although “several” indicates all the states 
are to receive Congress’s order, it hardly refers to them in some undifferen-
tiated collective capacity.  There was not then, and is not now, any such 
thing as a collective “executive power” of the states for Congress to send 
messages to.132  The statement can only mean each state. 
Professor Ritz’s other evidence is similar.  He cites the federal Consti-
tution’s statement that “[t]he President shall be commander in chief . . . of 
the militia of the several states,”133 but this plainly means the militia of each 
state—there was no combined national militia.  He also relies upon the 
Commerce Clause’s reference to “commerce . . . among the several 
states,”134 but this must likewise convey a sense of the states as distinct enti-
ties.  Ritz goes out of his way to reject William Crosskey’s famous view 
that this provision empowered Congress to regulate both intrastate and in-
terstate commerce, reasoning that this would “read ‘the several states’ as 
though it were ‘the United States.’”135  But Professor Crosskey’s mistake is 
precisely the approach that Ritz prescribes for the Rules of Decision Act: 
both approaches read “several” not just to be collective, but also combined 
and undifferentiated.  At least in the present context, this is a simple catego-
ry mistake.  In common usage today, lawyers frequently use a phrase like 
“state law” collectively to refer to all state law, but no one thinks that 
phrase refers to some merged and undifferentiated “American” law distinct 
from the laws of each state.136 
  
 131 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 777–78 (Worthington Chauncey 
Ford ed. 1907) (quoted in RITZ, supra note 124, at 83) (Ritz’s italics). 
 132 The closest thing today would be the National Association of Attorneys General, but it is not an 
official body and in any event was not founded until 1907.  See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 133 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (cited in RITZ, supra note 124, at 84) (Ritz’s italics). 
 134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (cited in RITZ, supra note 124, at 85) (Ritz’s italics). 
 135 RITZ, supra note 124, at 85 (discussing 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 50–53 (1953)). 
 136 Again, the closest thing to this idea would be the work product of the various unofficial organi-
zations working to coordinate and harmonize state laws, such as the American Law Institution’s “re-
statement” projects or the model statutes promulgated by the Commission on Uniform State Laws.  
Caleb Nelson has demonstrated that these efforts may comprise part of a “general” law that is available 
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This usage is hardly unique to the present era.  As Caleb Nelson has 
demonstrated, dictionaries from the founding era use “several” to “convey[] 
a sense of ‘separation or partition.’”137  Professor Nelson has likewise 
shown that eighteenth century draftsmen frequently used “the several 
states” in its more differentiated connotation, both in statutes and in the 
Constitution itself.138  The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
for example, provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”139  Nelson 
concludes that 
[n]ot only is that reading [that “the adjective ‘several’ can be used to refer serially to each 
discrete unit in a composite group”] consistent with the drafting habits of the late eighteenth 
century, but I am not aware of any persuasive evidence that Ritz’s contrary reading of § 34 
even occurred to a single lawyer or judge in the early Republic.
140
 
In any event, Professor Ritz’s claims about eighteenth century usage—
even if true—do not support the inferences he draws from them.  Ritz says 
that in the Judiciary Act, “‘several’ is used to refer to a fungible group, or 
  
for incorporation by courts in various contexts.  See generally Nelson, General Law, supra note 74, at 
505–25.  But Professor Nelson never equates this sort of thing with “the laws of the several states” in the 
Rules of Decision Act.  See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 958–59 (refuting Ritz’s argument). 
 137 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 958 (citing 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF 
THE AMERICAN UNION 504–05 (2d ed. 1843)) (“The first good American law dictionary, originally 
published in 1839.”); see also 15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 97 (2d ed. 1991) (providing 
examples from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries to the effect that “several” can mean 
“[i]ndividually separate” when it qualifies a plural noun).  Even the title of Bouvier’s dictionary demon-
strates that lawyers in the early Republic did not invariably use “several” as Ritz insists. 
 138 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 958–59.  Professor Nelson cites a resolution of the First 
Congress that the Secretary of State should “procure from time to time such of the statutes of the several 
states as may not be in his office,” Res. of Sept. 23, 1789, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 97, as well as an appropria-
tion of money “[f]or paying salaries to the late loan officers of the several states,” Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 
ch. 4, § 5, 1 Stat. 104, 105.  See also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that “[t]he House of Repre-
sentatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States”).  If Professor Ritz were right, this provision would require each Member of the House to be 
elected at large in a national election.   
 139 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  Professor Ritz did read this language to mean “the privileges 
and immunities . . . that are common . . . to all the states.”  RITZ, supra note 124, at 85.  That reading 
would come close to collapsing the broad category of rights generally thought to be protected against 
state governmental discrimination under Article IV into the much narrower category of privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).  In any event, privileges and immunities claims brought under 
Article IV do not depend on showing that the privilege invoked is common to all the states.  See gener-
ally 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-37, at 1255–70 (3d ed. 2000). And 
even if they did, the basic protection for those rights would still stem from the laws of individual states, 
not some collective “American” law.  
 140 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 959.   
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as a collective reference, for example, ‘the courts of the several states.’”141  
That seems right so far as it goes: In Ritz’s example, the courts are fungible 
in the sense that no particular court is distinguished, and they are collective 
in that they are all included.  But that is not nearly enough to support his 
claim that “Section 34 is a direction to the national courts to apply Ameri-
can law, as distinguished from English law,”142 much less Professor Sher-
ry’s more aggressive assertion that Section 34 is a delegation of broad fed-
eral common lawmaking power,143  As a matter of semantics, a collective 
and fungible usage may nonetheless refer to a grouping of distinctive enti-
ties.  Moreover, for Ritz’s and Sherry’s claims to be true, there would have 
to be some sort of general American common law, distinct from the com-
mon law of England or other jurisdictions, and for Sherry at least that law 
would have to be federal within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.  
Both those propositions are demonstrably false. 
The common law that the several states received and adopted by posi-
tive acts or judicial decisions was avowedly English, and although it be-
came American upon reception it did so as the law of each particular 
state.144  The noncommercial common law varied considerably from state to 
state, which suggests there was no unified body of “American” common 
law principles available for federal courts to apply under Section 34.145  
Moreover, as Stewart Jay has recounted, the delegates at Philadelphia de-
bated whether to include in the Constitution a general reception similar to 
those adopted by the states, but decided not to do so.146  When the federal 
courts—and state courts, too—did apply legal principles not tied to the law 
of particular states, that general law was not distinctively American at all.147  
  
 141 RITZ, supra note 124, at 87.  
 142 Id. at 148. 
 143 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 135. 
 144 See, e.g., James Madison, Report on Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799–1800, 
Concerning Alien and Sedition Laws, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 373 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1906) (“The common law was not the same in any two of the Colonies," and that "in some the modifica-
tions were materially and extensively different.”). And at least one state opted out of the common law 
altogether.  See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. I (2013) (“[T]he sources of law . . . are legislation and cus-
tom.”). 
 145 See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 
10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 401 (1968) (“The assumption that colonial law was essentially the same 
in all colonies is wholly without foundation.”). 
 146 See generally Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1254–62 (discussing the Convention’s debates 
and concluding that “[i]t would have been untenable to maintain that the body of British common law 
had been adopted by the Constitution, or that the federal judiciary possessed a jurisdiction equivalent to 
that of the central courts in England”). 
 147 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 38 (“In determining commercial principles, federal courts 
were not to confine themselves to precedents of any local jurisdiction, but should scan the entire land-
scape of American, English, and civil law.”); Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1517 (observing that “[t]he law 
merchant . . . was the general law governing transactions among merchants in most of the trading na-
tions in the world”).  It was, indeed, one of the most prominent forms of customary international law. 
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As Justice Story observed in Swift, “[t]he law respecting negotiable instru-
ments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord 
Mansfield . . . to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, 
but of the commercial world.”148  This cosmopolitan character was critical, 
as the use of general law was meant to integrate American courts into the 
broader commercial world.149  Professor Ritz provides no explanation what-
soever as to why the Framers of the Judiciary Act would have wanted to 
thwart that development.150 
It is equally clear that the Rules of Decision Act was not understood to 
authorize a general federal common law.  As I have already noted, the Mar-
shall Court plainly rejected that notion in Wheaton v. Peters, stating une-
quivocally that “there can be no common law of the United States.”151  The 
overwhelming majority of scholars have concluded that the general law 
applied under Swift was not federal in character;152 state court decisions 
applying it were not appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court, and it generally 
did not preempt state decisions to “localize” the law on particular points.153  
Moreover, the Adams Administration’s effort to establish a federal common 
law of crimes led to a political crisis that emphatically rejected any such 
notion.154  The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries simply did not 
  
See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1245, 1280–83 (1996) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Common Law] (stating that the general commercial 
law was part of customary international law). 
 148 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842); see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 61 (“Com-
mercial law was also originally customary law, which was received by all nations, and whose principles 
were uniformly enforced throughout the civilized world.”).  The revisionists thus find themselves in the 
unenviable position of accusing Joseph Story of being insufficiently nationalist. 
 149 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 33–43; Paul B. Stephan, What Story Got Wrong—
Federalism, Localist Opportunism and International Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 1041, 1041–42 (2008). 
 150 Professor Ritz insisted, moreover, that for various reasons—the lack of American judicial 
decisions in print, the non-hierarchical organization of the state courts, and the role of the jury in finding 
the law as well as the facts—state common aw was “nonexistent” and even state statute law was “virtu-
ally inaccessible.”  RITZ, supra note 124, at 10.  If that is right, however, then there could have been no 
distinctively “American” law to apply under Section 34 either, because that law would have had to be 
distilled from the aggregate corpus of the several states. It seems more sensible to assume that the draft-
ers of the Judiciary Act anticipated a future in which “the laws of the several states” would be more 
readily available. 
 151 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834); see supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 152 See sources cited in supra note 90.  
 153 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1560–61; BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 7. 
 154 Professor Ritz argues that the most likely interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act is that it 
pertained only to criminal cases. See RITZ, supra note 124, at 11. On this view, Section 34 was “a tem-
porary measure to provide an applicable American law for national criminal prosecutions . . . pending 
the time that Congress would provide by statute for the definitiona and punishment of national crimes.”  
Id. at 148. As he points out, “[t]his interpretation seems to raise only one problem with Section 34.  It 
did not use the word ‘criminal’ in referring to its application.”  Id. at 147.  That strikes me as a rather 
large problem, as is his inability to cite any contemporary describing Section 34 as a purely criminal 
measure.  Moreover, Ritz insists that once the First Congress enacted the Crimes Act in 1790, 1 Stat. 
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furnish a hospitable climate for broad notions of federal common lawmak-
ing authority.155 
In view of all this, it is frankly surprising how many scholars seem to 
rely on Professor Ritz without considering the obvious weaknesses of his 
position.156  Once we set aside the revisionist Ritz/Sherry view, I suggest 
that the most plausible reading of the Rules of Decision Act is that it re-
quires federal courts to follow state law, including state choice-of-law rules 
that mandate application of general law, as in Swift, but also state rules 
mandating a departure from general law in favor of local policy, as in 
Erie.157  This argument will not persuade those who, like my friend Louise 
Weinberg, believe that “the [Rules of Decision] Act comes down to us as a 
relic of a prepositivist, prerealist time, with scant relevance for us today.”158  
  
112, Section 34’s “purpose had been served” and it “should have been repealed”; after 1790, “Section 
34 was a statute without any apparent reason or purpose.”  RITZ, supra note 124, at 149.  Frankly, it 
seems a little late in the day to simply read Section 34 out of the Judiciary Act. 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that this criminal-only interpretation represents Professor Ritz’s 
preferred reading of Section 34.  He proffers the reading upon which Professor Sherry relies—“that the 
section was intended as a direction to the national courts to apply American law in all judicial proceed-
ings at common law, both civil and criminal”—only as a “less likely” “alternative possibility.”  Id. at 
148.  As such, Ritz’s broader reading is an exceptionally weak reed to bear the weight of Sherry’s 
claims. 
 155 See, e.g., Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1233 (observing that “the common-law authority of 
federal courts was seen by the Republicans as a vital component in their quarrel with Federalists over 
the national union”; moreover, “the nature of jurisdictional theory at this time was unreceptive to the 
development of an understanding of ‘federal common law’ in the modern sense of the term”). 
 156 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 129, at 98 n.142, 105–06 (praising Ritz’s “brilliant new book” 
and repeating his conclusions about the meaning of “several” without any critical probing of the under-
lying evidence or reasoning); see also sources cited in note 129, supra.  None of these scholars appears 
to have taken even a peek under the hood of Professor Ritz’s argument.  Would they agree, for instance, 
with Ritz’s contention that Section 34’s reference to “trials at common law” means only “that part of a 
judicial proceeding that was held in open court and when witnesses were examined and their testimony 
taken”?  RITZ, supra note 124, at 143.  How exactly would that work?  Would federal courts apply a 
different law at summary judgment or on appeal?  At the end of the day, Ritz’s close textual analysis 
simply unravels the statute into an unworkable mess.  But those scholars who have adopted part of his 
reasoning need to provide some rationale for why they leave other implications aside.  Otherwise, it is in 
for a penny, in for a pound. 
 157 Additional textual arguments exist against Justice Brandeis’s reading, but they need not detain 
us long.  Professor Sherry argues that because “Section 34 was placed . . . among other sections dealing 
with all suits in any federal courts, and [it] was most likely a general direction about how federal courts 
should go about their adjudicatory business rather than a specific direction about the law applicable to 
state claims in diversity cases.”  Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134.  But it has long been accepted that 
Erie applies, at least presumptively, to all issues arising in federal court that are not governed by posi-
tive federal law, regardless of the basis for the federal court’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Maternally Yours 
v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540–41 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) (Friendly, J.) (“[T]he Erie doctrine 
applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its source in state 
law.”); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 563. 
 158 Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act, supra note 58, at 866. 
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But unless we are to engage in some sort of neo-Calabresian “sunsetting” of 
obsolescent statutes,159 we must find a way to make sense of the Act. 
B. Uniformity and Discrimination 
Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie also emphasized that “[e]xperience 
in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had revealed its defects, political 
and social.”160  These difficulties had to do with the lack of legal uniformity 
that Swift engendered, as well as the discriminatory impact of that situation 
on parties with asymmetrical access to federal court.  Erie’s modern critics, 
by contrast, complain that Erie swapped one form of disuniformity for an-
other, more damaging one—in particular, one with a particularly vexatious 
tendency to discriminate against out-of-state businesses.161  It is certainly 
true that Erie did not put an end to concerns about uniformity.  However, 
my conclusion here is that any more effective cure for those concerns 
would be worse than the disease. 
Erie aimed to promote what we have come to call vertical uniformi-
ty—that is, to ensure that the same law would apply to similar suits brought 
within a particular state, whether those suits were brought in state or federal 
court.162  In so doing, Justice Brandeis hoped to minimize forum-shopping 
by out-of-state parties for the most advantageous substantive law.163  As 
Professor Sherry points out, however, “Erie simply replaced the vertical 
forum-shopping of Swift with horizontal forum-shopping.”164  She explains 
that “[i]nstead of choosing between state and federal courts in order to ob-
tain the benefit of state or federal law, litigants now choose among courts 
(state and federal) located in different states in order to obtain the benefit of 
a particular state’s law.”165 
To some extent, horizontal disuniformity is inevitable in a federal sys-
tem—indeed, it is the essence of a federal system.166  Different states get to 
  
 159 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 59–65 (1982). 
 160 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). 
 161 See GREVE, supra note 4, at 234–35; Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 138. 
 162 See 304 U.S. at 74–75 (complaining that Swift “made rights enjoyed under the unwritten ‘gen-
eral law’ vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court” and that 
this doctrine “rendered impossible equal protection of the law”). 
 163 Out-of-staters had an advantage in forum-shopping because the federal removal statute barred a 
defendant sued in its home state’s courts from removing the case to federal court.  See, e.g., Ely, supra 
note 1, at 712 n.111 (providing a particularly lucid account of the discrimination argument). 
 164 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 138. 
 165 Id. at 138–39.  But see Ely, supra note 1, at 715 n.125 (suggesting reasons why vertical forum-
shopping may be more likely than the horizontal kind). 
 166 The Court acknowledged as much in holding that federal courts must apply the choice of law 
rules of the state in which they sit: 
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is at-
tributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the 
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have different laws, and these disuniformities are generally thought to be a 
feature, not a bug, in the system.167  The question is how much federalism 
we want.  If we think that these disuniformities are undesirable in the con-
text of diversity litigation, there are at least two possible ways to minimize 
them.  But neither option, in my view, is likely to solve the problem. 
The first alternative emphasizes the importance of uniform choice of 
law rules that, in principle, would guarantee that the same law would gov-
ern a case regardless of which state it was brought in.  The editors of the 
Hart & Wechsler casebook, for example, laid blame for the horizontal dis-
uniformity problem not at Erie’s door, but rather at the door of Klaxon Co. 
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,168 which the Court decided three 
years later.169  Klaxon held that a federal court sitting in diversity must ap-
ply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.170  The argument is 
that Klaxon facilitates horizontal forum-shopping because litigants can get 
different choice of law rules by suing in federal courts sitting in different 
states, and those different choice of law rules will presumably yield differ-
ent substantive law.171  The critics contend that, if federal courts applied a 
uniform set of federal choice of law principles, then any federal court 
would end up applying the same state’s substantive law to a dispute, regard-
less of the federal court’s location.172  The disuniformities resulting from 
Klaxon, moreover, are often not party-neutral: as Michael Greve has ex-
plained, “Erie guaranteed plaintiffs their choice of a state law, to the exclu-
sion of federal general common law.  Klaxon effectively guaranteed them 
the state law of their chosen forum” and thus “reinforces Erie’s proplaintiff 
orientation.”173 
  
Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.  It is not 
for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general law’ 
of conflict of laws. 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 167 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484 (1987) (exploring policy benefits of state-by-state legal diversity); Richard A. Epstein, Exit 
Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992) (explaining the benefit of state policy 
diversity making exit rights possible); Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Dis-
tinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (exploring the extent to which states in fact adopt divergent legal regimes as a measure of 
the health of our federal system). 
 168 313 U.S. 487 (1941).   
 169 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 566–67. 
 170 313 U.S. at 496–97. 
 171 See, e.g., LOW, JEFFRIES, & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 12–13. 
 172 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 129, at 121; Hart, supra note 10, at 513–15.  As Professor Ely 
points out, Professor Hart’s proposal would cause vertical disuniformity problems of its own. See Ely, 
supra note 1, at 714–15 n.125; see also Donald F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and 
the Federal Courts, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1963) (defending Klaxon). 
 173 GREVE, supra note 4, at 233.  There is, as Professor Greve points out, another important piece 
of the puzzle—that is, expansive rules of personal jurisdiction that allow plaintiffs to choose among a 
wide variety of states in which to bring suit against defendants operating in interstate commerce.  See, 
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An important premise of the anti-Klaxon argument is that, although 
federal courts generally lack constitutional power to make substantive law, 
they do not lack such power to formulate federal choice of law rules.174  
That seems right.  If there is any constitutionally acceptable scope for fed-
eral common law, it would include the unavoidable task of reconciling the 
claims of different jurisdictions’ substantive law within a federal system.175  
And there may be certain benefits to allowing the federal courts to do so.176  
But there is no guarantee that federal choice of law rules would solve the 
horizontal disuniformity problem.  Much would depend on the content of 
the choice of law rules that the federal courts adopted.  Under current doc-
trine, the Constitution would have relatively little to say about what precise 
sorts of conflicts rules the federal courts could adopt.177  But if the federal 
courts followed the general tendency of the state jurisprudence, as they of-
ten do, then it is likely that they would adopt some form of interest analysis.  
And under interest analysis, courts are more likely than not to apply forum 
law.178 
  
e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that the Due Process Clause 
requires only that a defendant have “minimum contacts” with a particular jurisdiction).  Greve argues 
that “[t]he rules of Klaxon and International Shoe, operating in tandem, expose parties in interstate 
commerce to suit virtually anywhere, in a forum and under a state law of the plaintiff’s choosing.”  
GREVE, supra note 4, at 234.  Of course, Greve’s point also raises the possibility that the deleterious 
impact on interstate business that he laments could be redressed by rethinking International Shoe rather 
than Erie or Klaxon. 
 174 See Hart, supra note 10, at 517–25. 
 175 See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 282 (1992); but see GREVE, supra note 4, at 
235 (noting that “the justices who decided Klaxon . . . viewed it as a natural extension” of Erie, and 
offering arguments that “on balance, that is the better view”); Ely, supra note 1, at 715 n.125 (arguing 
that Klaxon was compelled by the Rules of Decision Act); William H. Danne, Jr., Comment, A Resur-
gence of the Klaxon Controversy—Contemporary Legal Trends Revitalize an Old Principle, 12 VILL. L. 
REV. 603, 610 (1967) (arguing that, under contemporary approaches to choice of law, “a forum state's 
choice of law rule is but a delimitation of the policy underlying the pertinent local law and a determina-
tion of the extent to which that policy is to be given extraterritorial application,” and that “[o]nce a 
choice of law rule is considered as part and parcel of a substantive law, the assumed gap between the 
Erie principle and the Klaxon rule appears to vanish, and the latter tends to become as constitutionally 
compelled as the former”).  Although Mr. Danne’s point strikes me as a neglected and important one, I 
am less pessimistic about courts’ ability to distinguish between choice of law rules and the substantive 
law, especially because I am also inclined to favor territorial choice of law rules that merge less fully 
with the underlying substantive norms. 
 176 See Hart, supra note 10, at 513–15 (arguing that the federal courts are uniquely suited for this 
task). 
 177 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–23 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 307–09 (1981); Laycock, supra note 175, at 257–58. 
 178 There are three primary options in contemporary choice of law: interest analysis, the Restate-
ment (Second) approach, and a more old-fashioned reliance on territorial rules.  See Laycock, supra note 
175, at 252–59.  Interest analysis seeks to balance the claims of each potentially-interested state in 
applying its own law to the dispute in question.  In practice, however, this approach heavily favors 
allowing the forum to apply its own law.  See, e.g., John B. Corr, The Frailty of Interest Analysis, 11 
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If that is right, then abandoning Klaxon will not solve the horizontal 
uniformity problem.  If the federal courts apply interest analysis—along 
with its preference for forum law—then the state in which the plaintiff’s 
chosen federal court sits will still be a critical factor in determining which 
state’s law applies to a given dispute.  Consider the facts of Klaxon itself.  
Stentor, a New York corporation, transferred its business to Klaxon, a Del-
aware corporation, with the latter promising to use its best efforts to pro-
mote the sale of Stentor’s device and to give Stentor a share of the profits.  
Ten years later, Stentor sued in a federal district court sitting in Delaware, 
alleging breach of that agreement.  Jurisdiction rested on diversity of citi-
zenship.  After Stentor won a jury verdict, it moved for addition of pre-
judgment interest under New York law—a right that it would not have un-
der Delaware law.  The court of appeals had concluded that, under its inde-
pendent view of the applicable conflicts principles, New York’s statute 
would apply; the parties disagreed about whether, under Delaware choice of 
law rules, the Delaware courts would refuse to apply the New York pre-
judgment interest statute.179 
My point is simply that a federal set of choice of law rules might be 
uniform in their content but nonuniform in the outcomes that they generate.  
If the federal courts in Klaxon had adopted some form of interest analysis, 
then each of the various federal district courts in which Stentor could have 
filed would have applied forum law.  The federal district court in Delaware 
would most likely have applied Delaware law to the prejudgment interest 
question, while if Stentor had filed in federal district court in New York, 
that federal court would most likely have applied New York law.  The 
plaintiff’s forum choice would remain critical even under a uniform federal 
choice of law rule. 
This fact does tend to mitigate the vertical disuniformity that the Klax-
on Court feared from applying different choice of law rules in federal and 
  
GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 301 (2002) (noting that, despite scholarly criticism, “the strong bias in favor 
of forum law remains a fact of life in courts applying the various forms of interest analysis”); Aaron D. 
Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 104, 121 (1973) 
(concluding that interest analysis generally results in the application of forum law).  The Restatement 
has been criticized for attempting to be all things to all people, and it tried to pair a general incorporation 
of interest analysis with more specific territory-based presumptions for particular kinds of cases.  See 
Laycock, supra note 175, at 253.  Much of the time, analysis under the Restatement collapses back into 
interest analysis.  See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, 
Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 362 (1997) (noting that, “in reading opinions 
purporting to follow the second Restatement, one cannot help but be struck by how often the courts shift 
into undiluted interest analysis”); see generally Corr, supra, at 299 (“[I]n the area of conflict of laws, 
interest analysis is now the predominant approach.”).  Hence, a new federal choice of law regime would 
lack a strong preference for forum law only if it followed the minority of states that have clung to a 
territory-based regime.   
 179 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 495–96, 497 (1941). 
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state courts within the same jurisdiction.180  After all, in my example, the 
federal and state courts in each state would most likely end up choosing the 
same law most of the time.  Except, that is, in those brave states that have 
held on or returned to a more territorial set of choice of law rules.  No one 
desiring rationality in conflicts jurisprudence ought to want to discourage 
that development.181  But the bottom line is that, without reforming the 
choice of law rules that courts actually apply, postulating one set of federal 
common law choice of law principles will not solve the horizontal uni-
formity problem.182  And as long as plaintiffs can alter the applicable law by 
filing in one federal court rather than another, the “proplaintiff” discrimina-
tion that Professor Greve laments will persist. 
The second, and more effective, way to deal with horizontal disuni-
formities engendered by Erie would be to federalize the law applied in di-
versity cases.  That seems to be the upshot of Professor Sherry’s reading of 
the Rules of Decision Act, which views that statute as a broad mandate to 
apply federal—not general—common law in cases in federal court.183  And 
it is at least the implication of Professor Greve’s position, which argues that 
interstate commercial enterprises should be able to count on one law appli-
cable to their far-flung operations, no matter in what state they end up being 
sued.184  After all, those enterprises can always be sued, without right of 
removal, in state court in their own home jurisdictions.  The only way to 
truly provide one uniform rule of decision—one law to rule them all—
would be to federalize the rule. 
One can see what this might look like by turning to maritime law, 
where the Supreme Court confronted an issue similar to Erie’s two decades 
earlier and came out the opposite way.  It is settled that “early Americans 
understood admiralty and maritime law to be of the same genus of ‘general 
  
 180 See id. at 496 (worrying that, if federal courts applied their own choice of law rules, “the acci-
dent of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate 
state and federal courts sitting side by side”). 
 181 See Laycock, supra note 175, at 337 (arguing for a return to territorial rules). 
 182 Donald Cavers made a somewhat similar point in his report on Klaxon to the American Law 
Institute.  He noted that, if Klaxon were rejected based on the need to achieve horizontal uniformity 
among federal courts sitting in different states, that would create pressure for those courts to return to 
the sort of territorial choice of law rules in the first Restatement.  Donald F. Cavers, Memorandum on 
Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in ALI STUDY ON THE 
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154, 186–88 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1963).  Because Professor Cavers viewed interest analysis as preferable to territorial rules, he saw this as 
a reason to stick with Klaxon. See id.  My concern, by contrast, is that federal courts in a post-Klaxon 
world would not return to a territorial view of choice of law, leaving us with basically the same horizon-
tal uniformity problem that currently inspires Klaxon’s critics. 
 183 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 135; see also supra Section II.A.3 (criticizing this argu-
ment). 
 184 See GREVE, supra note 4, at 134–36; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1368–69 (2006) (arguing for a similar result through 
federal preemption of state law). 
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law’ as the ‘law merchant’ applied in diversity” in Swift.185  In Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, the Court considered whether state law, applied in 
state court, could modify the principles of the general maritime law.186  Jen-
sen was a longshoreman killed while loading a vessel in port, and his next 
of kin sought to recover under a state workers’ compensation statute.  The 
Supreme Court said that he could not.  Despite acknowledging that “the 
general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legis-
lation . . . to some extent,” Justice McReynolds’s majority opinion held that 
“no such legislation is valid if it . . . works material prejudice to the charac-
teristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper 
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international or interstate rela-
tions.”187   The upshot was that “in the absence of some controlling statute 
the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part 
of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.”188  This holding elicited Justice Holmes’s famous comment 
that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky”189—one 
of the better one-liners in American jurisprudence—but Holmes remains in 
dissent to this day as far as admiralty law is concerned. 
Jensen and Erie both illustrate the difficulty in maintaining a viable 
category of “general” law—neither state nor federal in nature—at the dawn 
of the twentieth century.  The two cases reached diametrically opposed so-
lutions, however: Jensen federalized the general maritime law, rendering 
that law supreme not only in cases in federal court but also in state court as 
well.  Erie, on the other hand, assimilated the general common law to state 
law, holding that it could not supplant state law even in cases in federal 
court.190  If Professors Sherry and Greve had their way, the nonwatery world 
would look much like Jensen. 
Although Jensen’s solution may seem attractive to Erie’s critics, there 
are several reasons to treat it as a cautionary tale.191  First, the Jensen rule 
has never been clean, and “courts have faced vexing questions in trying to 
define what matters are governed by uniform federal admiralty law and in 
  
 185 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 655; see also Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 
147, at 1280–81; Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 318–22 (1999). 
 186 244 U.S. 205, 207 (1917). 
 187 Id. at 216. 
 188 Id. at 215; see also Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 383–84 (1918) (holding, in 
a case in diversity jurisdiction, that federal maritime law preempted state tort remedies). 
 189 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 190 See generally Hart, supra note 10, at 531 (arguing that Jensen embodied “[t]he same logic of 
federalism which underlay Erie”). 
 191 I set aside until Part III the small difficulty that Jensen’s solution is unconstitutional, for the 
same reasons that Erie is constitutionally required.  See generally Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 
185. 
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what areas state law remains free to operate”192—a dilemma that David Cur-
rie aptly described as the “Devil’s Own Mess.”193  Extending Jensen’s rule 
to the much broader class of cases implicated in Erie would exacerbate 
these problems beyond all measure; indeed, it is difficult even to define the 
class of cases that would have to be federalized.  The category could not be 
confined to the commercial law cases contemplated by Swift, because the 
general law overflowed those banks by the end of the nineteenth century; 
similarly, it could not be limited to common law cases, because a truly fed-
eral general common law would trump state statutes as well.194  Federal 
maritime law works, to the extent that it does, because the jurisdictional 
scope of maritime law is narrow and comparatively well-defined, the in-
stances of conflict with state policy are relatively few, and the critical issues 
of admiralty law tend now to be governed by federal statutes.195  None of 
those things are true in the broader world of Erie itself. 
In any event, federalizing the law applied in diversity cases would cut 
the general common law loose from its historical moorings, which have 
always treated that law as non-federal in nature.196  One may doubt, moreo-
ver, whether horizontal uniformity would be fully achieved even under such 
a draconian solution.  After all, how uniform is federal law, really?  We 
have thirteen circuits with open and notorious differences in the law that 
each applies, and it seems doubtful that the Supreme Court would expand 
its docket sufficiently to unify federal law on the vastly broader set of fed-
eral questions that Jensen-izing Erie would entail.197  Moreover, one signifi-
  
 192 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 656; see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 
452 (1994) (“It would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state 
regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent 
within our admiralty jurisprudence.”); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish Co., 32 F.3d 623, 628 
(1st Cir. 1994) (Boudin, J.) (“[T]he Supreme Court's past decisions yield no single, comprehensive test 
as to where harmony is required and when uniformity must be maintained. Rather, the decisions howev-
er couched reflect a balancing of the state and federal interests in any given case.”). 
 193 David Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess”, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 
158.  The definitive treatment, surveying the evolution of the Jensen test and identifying the troubles 
with each formulation, is David R. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 
J. MAR. L. & COM 325 (1995).  In recent years, the Court has repeatedly questioned or distinguished 
Jensen.  See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996); Miller, 510 U.S. 
at 450–52; see also id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“In my view, Jensen 
is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York . . . would be in a 
case under the Due Process Clause.”). 
 194 Indeed, in Jensen itself, the maritime law trumped a state statute.  See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216–
18.  
 195 See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (noting that “maritime tort law is 
now dominated by federal statute”); Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 350–51. 
 196 See generally Fletcher, supra note 90; see also GREVE, supra note 4, at 144. 
 197 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (2008) (concluding that 
“standardizing federal law is no longer possible as a practical matter”); John Harrison, Federal Appel-
late Jurisdiction over Questions of State Law in State Courts, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 353, 357 (2004) (“Fed-
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cant unifying force in federal statutory interpretation—construction of those 
statutes by federal agencies—would not exist for this new class of federal 
questions.  For all these reasons, I suspect that the horizontal uniformity 
envisioned by contemporary advocates of a general federal common law is 
largely a mirage. 
The real reason not to federalize the law in diversity cases, of course, 
is that it would be unconstitutional.198  But before I take up Erie’s constitu-
tional arguments, I want to consider a possible reconceptualization of Erie. 
C. Erie, Chevron, and Deference to State Judges on State Law Questions 
So far I have characterized the commercial law applied under Swift as 
“general” law—neither state nor federal in character.  But as several schol-
ars have pointed out, another conceptualization is possible.199  Federal 
courts operating under Swift occasionally described the general commercial 
law as a species of state law, but one on which they owed no deference to 
the interpretations issued by the state courts.200  In Chicago, Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Railway. Co. v. Solan,201 for instance, the Supreme Court said that 
[t]he question [in this case] . . . is . . . one of those questions not of merely local law, but of 
commercial law or general jurisprudence, upon which this court, in the absence of express 
statute regulating the subject, will exercise its own judgment, uncontrolled by the decisions 
of the courts of the State in which the cause of action arises.  But the law to be applied is 




eral law is notoriously non-uniform among the different circuits, and the Supreme Court is apparently 
sufficiently indifferent to this fact that it leaves many inter-circuit conflicts unresolved.”). 
 198 See Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 614 (1938) 
(“The need for uniformity has never been allowed to operate as a basis of power in Congress, which was 
not granted in the Constitution, and it is hard to see why it should supply power, otherwise not granted, 
to the Federal judiciary.”). 
 199 See Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, and the Constitution—A Neglected 
Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 175 (2006); John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the 
Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 526 (2000) [hereinafter Harrison, Power of Congress]; Nelson, 
Erie, supra note 6, at 927–29. 
 200 Even prior to Erie, some observers were skeptical of such claims.  See, e.g., Comment, What is 
“General Law” within the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson?, 38 YALE L.J. 88, 91 (1928) (“Though the courts 
in making such independent judgments assert that there is no federal common law, and claim instead 
that they are expressing the state’s own common law, it seems clear that they are in fact looking to some 
‘transcendental body of law’ when they apply the Swift v. Tyson rule.”). 
 201 169 U.S. 133 (1898). 
 202 Id. at 136; see also PURCELL, supra note 9, at 185 (“According to long-established doctrine, 
Swift authorized the federal courts only to make an ‘independent judgment’ on common law principles 
as to what was properly ‘state’ law.”).   
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It is not completely clear in Solan and similar cases what the Court 
meant by “the law of the State.”  The Court’s language seems perfectly 
consistent with saying that the general law had become “the law of the 
state” by virtue of a state choice of law rule.203  For example, when Profes-
sor Hill observed that “in theory the federal courts deemed themselves to be 
applying state law during the era of Swift v. Tyson,”204 he seems to have 
meant that the State had made a decision to adopt the general law on the 
relevant points—not that the law applied in such cases was a body of state 
law other than the general law.205  Professor Purcell’s discussion is also 
consistent with this notion; when he says that the common law under Swift 
“was properly ‘state’ law,” he means that it was “not ‘the creation of the 
federal [lawmaking] power,’” that it did not preempt state law under the 
Supremacy Clause, and that it “did not give rise to ‘federal questions’ for 
purposes of either original jurisdiction or Supreme Court review.”206  The 
“general” law described by Judge Fletcher and others shared all these char-
acteristics.207  As the remainder of this section explains, I do not think it 
ultimately makes any difference which way we phrase the matter.  The im-
portant point, common to both perspectives, is simply that the general law 
never applied of its own force, but always because of a state’s decision to 
follow it. 
If we take the common law under Swift to be state law, then the dis-
tinction between Swift and Erie lies in the degree of deference that federal 
courts owe to state courts on the proper construction of state law.208  Erie 
rejected the notion that there is any category of cases in which federal 
courts may exercise independent judgment as to state law (although later 
cases restricted Erie’s mandate of deference to decisions of the state’s high-
est court).209  This notion turns out to lie at the heart of Erie’s constitutional 
argument, and I will thus return to it in Part III.  The present section asks 
whether there is anything to be said for the no-deference rule from a prag-
matic standpoint. 
The problem is that, if the concession that state law is being applied is 
to mean anything, then the boundary between local and general law must 
itself be a question of state law—and a question, moreover, of the local 
  
 203 See supra text accompanying notes 101–104 (arguing that this is the right way to think about 
it). 
 204 Hill, supra note 102, at 444. 
 205 See also id. at 443 (observing that in cases under Swift “the law of the state on a particular 
matter was the common law in what was considered to be its more general aspect” and that this was 
why “a federal court deemed itself as competent as a state court to ‘find’ and ‘declare’ the legal princi-
ple applicable to the case”). 
 206 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 185. 
 207 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 208 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 941–42, 950. 
 209 See, e.g., King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1948); HART 
& WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 570 (collecting authorities). 
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kind.  It might be possible—although doubtful—to interpret the statutory 
grant of diversity jurisdiction to imply a mandate to apply the general 
commercial law, much as the admiralty grant was long interpreted as a 
mandate to apply the general maritime law.210  But if the law involved is 
really state law, then it is surely up to the state to determine its content and 
scope of application. 
The only way to make sense of the notion of a “general” law that is 
nonetheless state law is to say that, on matters of a general character, state 
law aims to mirror a broader set of norms applied in multiple jurisdictions.  
In practical effect, this would be much like a state choice-of-law rule to 
apply general law in a certain set of cases.211  But either way, it would be up 
to the state to determine how broadly this mirroring was to take place—for 
example, whether it would be confined to commercial cases or extended to 
the law of torts.212  And the recurring, difficult question would be whether, 
in cases where state court decisions seemed to depart from the tendency in 
other jurisdictions, that discrepancy should be treated simply as an error, 
undeserving of deference from the federal courts, or a deliberate limitation 
imposed by the state on the scope of its general law.213 
One can imagine situations in which federal courts could plausibly an-
swer this question without deference to state courts.  If, for example, the 
legislature adopted the general law by statute in certain areas, such as trans-
actions involving commercial paper, then federal courts could conceivably 
make an independent judgment about the text of the statute.  But even under 
Swift, the federal courts deferred to state constructions of state statutes,214 
and in any event, state legislatures generally do not legislate such rules so 
explicitly.  The question then is, whether federal courts should defer to state 
courts in the murkier setting in which the issue actually arises. 
I submit that they should, for reasons similar to those that undergird 
the federal rule mandating judicial deference to administrative agencies’ 
constructions of the federal statutes they administer.  In Chevron U.S.A., 
  
 210 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 653.  The trouble, of course, is that the diversi-
ty grant says no such thing (nor does the admiralty grant).  It says nothing about the law to be applied in 
diversity cases, and it certainly contains nothing suggesting a distinction between general and local law. 
 211 See supra note 107–113 and accompanying text. 
 212 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 91 (discussing the states’ power to “localize” 
questions of general law under Swift). 
 213 As Professors Bridwell and Whitten discuss, the Supreme Court did exercise some degree of 
independent judgment in determining whether state courts had taken a consistent position on whether a 
question had been localized.  See id. at 88.  That function is analogous to the Court’s occasional (and 
generally quite deferential) review of state courts’ decision of state law questions that are antecedent to a 
question of federal law.  See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 462–63; Stacey L. Dogan 
& Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 120–25 (2011) (discussing this form of review).   
 214 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938); supra notes 47, 66 and accompanying 
text. 
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Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,215 the Court held that fed-
eral courts must defer to federal administrative agency interpretations of the 
statutes they administer, so long as the statute in question is ambiguous and 
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.  The Court has developed three 
distinct justifications for this rule: that the agency has relatively more ex-
pertise and experience with a statute that it administers than does a review-
ing court;216 that the agency is more democratically accountable than a 
court;217 and that an ambiguous statute may be viewed as a congressional 
delegation of authority to the agency to fill in the gaps in the statute’s 
meaning.218  Each of these justifications finds a persuasive analogy in the 
Erie context.  The third—that agencies have been delegated interpretive 
authority by the legislature—speaks to Erie’s constitutional underpinnings, 
and I accordingly address it in Part III.  But the other two—expertise and 
accountability—provide pragmatic justifications for Erie’s rule of defer-
ence. 
First, state courts have superior experience and expertise concerning 
state law, much as federal agencies have expertise with respect to the stat-
utes they administer.  To be sure, our federal system does not draw any 
essential link between the source of law and the court that interprets; in 
other words, state courts are presumptively appropriate fora for interpreting 
federal law,219 and federal courts similarly may, and frequently do, interpret 
state law.  But state courts surely have a comparative advantage in constru-
ing state law, based on the frequency with which it is litigated in state 
court.220  This advantage may be particularly pronounced on the sort of state 
law questions I have been considering, which require a court to assess the 
overall shape of state law in an area and assess the degree to which the state 
as decided to go its own way and depart from the “general” jurisprudence. 
  
 215 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 216 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 
2135 (2002) (noting this as "the leading alternative theory for Chevron" but ultimately finding it unsatis-
factory). 
 217 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (1984) (insisting that “federal judges–who have no constituency–
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do”); see generally Cynthia R. 
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 452, 466–67 (1989) (discussing the delegation and democratic accountability justifications for 
Chevron). 
 218 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 
197–98 (2006) (arguing that the delegation rationale has won out). 
 219 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459–60 (1990) (holding that state courts presumptive-
ly have jurisdiction to hear federal law claims unless Congress clearly states its intention to exclude 
them). 
 220 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–500 (1941) (acknowledg-
ing the superior expertise and authority of the state courts to construe state law).  This is likely to be true 
even on issues where a state had, by hypothesis, chosen to follow the drift of “general” jurisprudence.  
Chances are that the states will see more of those cases than the federal courts and therefore develop 
greater expertise. 
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Second, state courts are plainly more accountable than federal judges 
to the state electorate.  This is true on both the front and the back end.  State 
judges are much more likely to be appointed or elected with an eye to their 
views and expertise concerning state law than federal judges, whose nomi-
nation and confirmation will tend to focus on federal issues and concerns.  
And of course many state judges, unlike all federal judges, are elected and 
can be voted out of office if they make a mess of state law.  Certainly state 
judges compare favorably to the rather attenuated form of democratic ac-
countability motivating deference to unelected federal agency officials un-
der Chevron.221 
Finally, it seems unlikely that a regime limiting deference to state 
judges on general questions of state law would achieve significant practical 
advantages over Erie’s regime.  One factor that put pressure on the Swift 
regime in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the federal 
expansion of Swift’s general law beyond the commercial context to cover 
matters such as tort and noncommercial contracts, as well as the concomi-
tant decision by many states to depart from the general law, particularly in 
these collateral areas.222  If general law is really state law, at bottom, then it 
will surely be relatively narrow in scope—most likely confined to Swift’s 
original commercial law bounds.  But that is not really the area giving rise 
to horizontal uniformity concerns today; after all, the modern analog to 
Swift is the Uniform Commercial Code, under which states have been able 
to achieve a significant measure of uniformity.223  What interstate business-
es worry about are questions of tort, consumer protection law, and the like, 
and the only way to return these questions to a general law basis is likely to 
be through the main force of federal preemption.224 
Even if we could somehow fiat the states’ adoption of a system of 
general law in these areas, the Supreme Court would lack the appellate ju-
risdiction (or the inclination) to unify conflicts among the state supreme 
courts and the federal circuits on these matters.225  It seems likely we would 
be trading one patchwork for another.  As Swift’s most prominent contem-
porary defender acknowledges, “[t]he fact remains that the Swift regime 
  
 221 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of Elective 
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 224 (1993). 
 222 See FREYER, supra note 30, at 43–75; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 556–58. 
 223 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1952); see also Stephan, supra note 149, at 1049 (noting that 
the UCC represents “a cooperative strategy of legal harmonization” by the states). 
 224 See, e.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 184, at 1431–32. 
 225 See Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1561–62 (noting the Supreme Court’s lack of appellate jurisdic-
tion over state court decisions on matters of general law).  The sharp decline in Supreme Court review 
of state court decisions on questions of federal law since Congress expanded the Court’s certiorari 
discretion in 1988, see Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-
First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335 (2002), suggests that the Court would probably not review many 
state court decisions on general law matters even if it had jurisdiction to do so. 
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proved unstable even in the nineteenth century and is unlikely to fare any 
better under modern circumstances.”226 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Justice Brandeis concluded his discussion of the statutory and prag-
matic issues in Erie by stating that “[i]f only a question of statutory con-
struction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine 
so widely applied throughout nearly a century.  But the unconstitutionality 
of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.”227  
For Erie’s many critics, however, “the unconstitutionality of the course 
pursued” in Swift has been anything but clear.228  Part of the problem is that 
both critics and defenders of Erie disagree about the nature of Erie’s consti-
tutional rationale.229  In my view, Erie cannot be fairly read to rest on the 
proposition that the rule at issue fell outside Congress’s power; rather, it 
rested—and rightly so—on the proposition that the Constitution vests no 
general lawmaking powers in the federal courts.  Although recent students 
of Erie have identified important and instructive difficulties with this ra-
tionale, I conclude that it remains eminently defensible. 
Before turning to that rationale, however, I begin by clarifying the role 
played by Justice Brandeis’s discussion of some basic issues in jurispru-
dence. 
A. Erie and Positivism 
Much of Justice Brandeis’s constitutional discussion in Erie suggests 
that the case turns on a basic disagreement, not just about the Constitution, 
  
 226 GREVE, supra note 4, at 373. 
 227 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 77–78 (1938). 
 228 See, e.g., Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 602 (arguing that “none of [Brandeis’s constitu-
tional arguments] provides adequate constitutional support for Erie's result”); Hill, supra note 102, at 
427, n.3 (citing numerous articles suggesting that “the constitutional basis of Erie has been widely 
regarded as dictum, and rather dubious dictum at best”). 
 229 See, e.g., LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 10–15 (1994) (collecting scholarly arguments about Erie’s constitu-
tional basis, ranging from equal protection to federalism to separation of powers to due process).  There 
is even disagreement as to whether the Court really relied on the Constitutional ground, Clark, Erie’s 
Source, supra note 90, at 1298 n.66 (noting Chief Justice Stone’s opinion that Erie’s constitutional 
ground is dicta), although it is hard to take that particular disagreement all that seriously.  See, e.g., 19 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4505 (2d ed. 1996) (noting the opinion’s explicit reliance on the Constitution); Hill, supra 
note 102, at 439 (“[I]t is difficult to view as dictum the Court’s statement of a legal proposition without 
which, we are assured in the opinion, and have no reason to doubt, the case would have been decided the 
other way.”). 
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but rather about the nature of law and judicial decision making.  “The falla-
cy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson,” he said, 
is made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes.  The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is “a 
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and 
until changed by statute,” that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what 
the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are entitled to an in-
dependent judgment on matters of general law.”
230
 
This was wrong, Holmes had written, because 
law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite au-
thority behind it.  The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common 
law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority 
of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else.
231
 
It followed that “the authority and only authority is the State, and if 
that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its 
Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.”232  Brande-
is thus concluded, again quoting Holmes, that “the doctrine of Swift v. Ty-
son is ‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United 
States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make 
us hesitate to correct.’”233 
Many subsequent courts and commentators accepted the description of 
Swift by Justices Holmes and Brandeis.  Justice Frankfurter, for example, 
  
 230 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also FREYER, supra 
note 30, at 131–53 (documenting the influence of the positivist critique of Swift on Justice Brandeis’s 
opinion in Erie).  Justice Holmes was hardly the only positivist critic of Swift.  See, e.g., William R. 
Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 908 
(1988) (“In the late nineteenth century, the Field brothers, David and Stephen, launched devastating 
positivist attacks on Swift, and their self-evident criticism was vigorously reiterated by Professor [John 
Chipman] Gray, Justice Holmes, and others.”); see also id. at 922–24 (outlining these attacks). 
 231 Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533–34. 
 232 Id. at 535. 
 233 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533).  Professor Purcell 
argues that Justice Brandeis’s embrace of positivism in Erie was a limited one: “In Erie Brandeis incor-
porated the narrowly positivist elements of Holmes’s jurisprudence that equated judicial decisions with 
‘law’ and law with the power of an identified sovereign.”  PURCELL, supra note 9, at 181.  He did not, 
however, “adopt any broader skeptical, positivist, or ‘realist’ legal philosophy,” such as “the proposition 
that law means only what the courts would enforce or that any rule the courts enforced was immune 
from meaningful philosophical and moral critique.”  Id. at 182.  According to Purcell,  
Erie’s narrow positivism was grounded ultimately not in any distinctively Holmesian or real-
ist jurisprudence, or any other general legal philosophy, but in Brandeis’s practical under-
standing of the structural and operational requirements of American constitutional federalism 
in an age of burgeoning multistate activities. 
Id.; see also id. at 185. 
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portrayed the Swift regime as one in which “[l]aw was conceived as a 
‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which decisions were merely evi-
dence and not themselves the controlling formulations.  Accordingly, feder-
al courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore 
Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law.”234  
Similarly, William Casto has written that “[u]nder Swift . . . judges were 
considered the living oracles of a preexisting natural law.”235  This model 
“pictured common-law judges as oracles who discovered preexisting meta-
physical legal principles and declared the principles’ applicability in partic-
ular cases.  Under this view, the metaphysical principles were the law, and 
judicial precedents were merely evidence of the law.”236 
When Swift is seen in this light, “Erie is often regarded as a victory of 
legal positivism over natural law.”237  As Professor Casto put it, “The gen-
eral acceptance of positivism in this century virtually dictated the overrul-
ing of Swift v. Tyson and the creation of the Erie doctrine in 1938.”238  This 
positivist reading has become highly controversial in recent years, however.  
The debate has to do both with the logic of Justice Brandeis’s argument and 
the accuracy of his portrayal of Swift.239  With respect to the former, Craig 
Green points out that “[e]ven if Holmes’s argument were true, Swift’s al-
leged ‘fallacy’ did not violate the Constitution.  Positivism was popular in 
the early twentieth century and remains so today.  Yet the Constitution re-
  
 234 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 
205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Jackson, supra note 198, at 612 (“Swift v. Tyson rests 
on the philosophic premise that a court . . . does not make the law but merely finds or declares the law, 
and so its decisions simply constitute evidence of what the law is, which another court is free to reject in 
favor of better evidence to be found elsewhere.”). 
 235 Casto, supra note 230, at 908. 
 236 Id. at 911. 
 237 Jay Tidmarsh, Foreword: Erie’s Gift, 44 AKRON L. REV. 897, 900 (2011); see also Susan 
Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 854–55 (2011) (book 
review) (observing that “the received legal wisdom about Swift and Erie has it that Swift was based on a 
misunderstanding about the nature of law,” but arguing that the true story is “far more complicated”). 
 238 Casto, supra note 230, at 907–08. 
 239 Craig Green suggests that the positivist problem in Swift and Erie simply evaporates because 
“judicial lawmaking does not violate legal positivism.  On the contrary, many positivists have acknowl-
edged that, when judges decide cases, that is positive law.”  Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 605 
(citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608–09 
(1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961)).  That is true so far as it goes, but it conflates 
an external perspective with the internal perspective of the judge deciding cases.  From the external 
perspective, one can readily construct a positivist account of judge-made law: judicial decisions are 
social facts, and they derive their legal force from the community’s acceptance of them as law.  But the 
question is more difficult from the internal perspective of the judge, who typically must ground her own 
decision in some other source—either a delegation of authority to make law or some other positive law 
that she interprets and applies.  The interesting question about Swift is how the judges thought about 
what they were doing in diversity cases. 
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quires no more adherence to trendy legal theory than to Spencer’s sociolo-
gy.”240 
It is certainly true that Swift could not be unconstitutional solely be-
cause it was jurisprudentially mistaken.  Positivism holds, however, that 
legal principles must be grounded in authority—not their logical truth or 
some transcendent source such as natural law.  Hence, “what counts as law 
in any society is fundamentally a matter of social fact.”241  Discussing the 
general maritime law, for example, Justice Holmes insisted that 
however ancient may be the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from 
which it has been drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from its having 
been accepted and adopted by the United States.  There is no mystic over-law to which even 
the United States must bow.
242
 
This positivist perspective thus forced courts applying the general 
common law to search for some sort of legal authorization to do so.  In oth-
er words, “[t]his [positivist] strand of Erie requires federal courts to identify 
the sovereign source for every rule of decision.”243  Failure to do so could 
amount to a constitutional problem.244 
It is not clear, however, that Joseph Story would have denied any of 
this.  As Susan Bandes points out, “neither Justice Story nor subsequent 
Justices who expanded the reach of Swift experienced themselves as com-
muning with a brooding omnipresence.”245  Two critical aspects of Story’s 
analysis in Swift rendered that decision completely consistent with the posi-
tivist theory that law must be grounded in social facts.  First, the general 
commercial law was customary in its origin.246  Its rules were derived from 
  
 240 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 604 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 241 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT 355, 356 (2001); see also Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 677–78 (“Natural 
law and related theories, in their simple forms, hold that law depends on conformity to moral principle.  
Positivism, by contrast, holds that law depends on social practices of one sort or another.”).  This is the 
“social thesis,” which forms the core of legal positivism alongside the “separation thesis” distinguishing 
between law and moral norms.  See id. 
 242 The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922). 
 243 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852 (1997) (quoting Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 79 (1938)). 
 244 See Lessig, supra note 78, at 1793 (explaining that positivism requires that law be grounded in 
social authority, and that this forced courts to confront the constitutional basis for the general common 
law). 
 245 Bandes, supra note 237, at 855. 
 246 Or at least it was viewed that way.  See supra note 78.  My friend Emily Kadens has argued 
that, in the Middle Ages, the law merchant was not, in fact, customary—rather, it arose from contract 
and statute.  See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153 
(2012).  But even if that finding were to call into question the actual nature of the law merchant in 
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the actual practices of merchants—a social fact—not from some notion of 
natural law.  Second, Story emphasized that the New York courts applied 
the general common law to commercial disputes.247  If positivism required a 
governmental imprimatur rather than simply a social one, state law supplied 
it in commercial cases. 
It is probably fair to say that current conventional wisdom has come to 
reject interpretations of Swift as inherently antipositivist.248  I think that 
conventional wisdom is basically right, but that Erie nonetheless adopted a 
considerably different view of what judges do in diversity cases than Swift 
had articulated, primarily because the judicial role under Swift itself had 
changed over the intervening years.  This change, I argue, was critical to 
setting up Justice Brandeis’s arguments about federalism.  In this sense, it 
remains true that “[t]he positivist belief that judges make law is a sine qua 
non to [Erie’s] constitutional argument.”249 
Under Swift, federal and state courts decided a relatively narrow range 
of commercial cases under a shared body of “general” principles.  For a 
variety of reasons, American courts were able to maintain a remarkable 
degree of uniformity in this area notwithstanding the lack of a single sover-
eign or court with authority to unify the law in cases of divergence.250  In 
particular, commercial law was an area that affected primarily sophisticated 
merchants, for whom it was often more important that the rules be settled 
than that they be settled right.251  Moreover, any state choosing to depart 
from general law principles in the commercial field would have placed it-
  
nineteenth century America, the important point for present purposes is how courts and commentators 
perceived that law in thinking about the sources of law in diversity cases. 
 247 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842); supra notes 107–108 and accompanying 
text. 
 248 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14 (concluding that jurisprudential legal positivism 
was in fact logically irrelevant to the holding of Erie); Michael Stephen Green, Erie’s Suppressed Prem-
ise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1127–35 (2011) [hereinafter Green, Suppressed Premise] (same); Lessig, 
supra note 78, at 1790–92 (characterizing the original application of general commercial law under 
Swift as unproblematic from a positivist perspective). 
 249 Casto, supra note 230, at 928.  George Rutherglen makes a curious claim that Justice Brande-
is’s positivism left him without a basis for overruling Swift.  Professor Rutherglen asserts that Brandeis 
“appeal[ed] to principles of federalism whose source and weight could not be identified simply by 
tracing them back to the Constitution,” and that “[h]aving made this appeal outside of recognized legal 
sources, Brandeis could not criticize the federal general common law of Swift v. Tyson for lacking such 
a source.”  Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 291.  I doubt this jurisprudential “gotcha” works, however.  
“Positivist” is not a synonym for “textualist,” and principles of federalism and separation of powers are 
surely “recognized legal sources,” regardless of how much people may differ about their meaning. 
 250 See Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1549. 
 251 Id. at 1562–63; see also H. Parker Sharp & Joseph B. Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine 
of Swift v. Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367, 371 (1929) (arguing that “[u]niformity is especially desir-
able in the case of negotiable instruments” that “circulate freely from state to state,” and that “[i]t would 
greatly impede their marketability if prospective purchasers were bound to ascertain whether the instru-
ments had become subject to any peculiar local rules”). 
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self at a potentially disastrous disadvantage in an increasingly competitive 
national market.252 
As Tony Freyer has documented, however, “[b]etween 1842 and the 
end of the nineteenth century the Swift doctrine underwent a gradual but 
fundamental transformation.”253  The Court slowly but steadily expanded 
the scope of general law into new areas previously governed by local prin-
ciples; as then-Solicitor General Robert Jackson put it, Swift’s rule “grew 
by what it fed on.”254  “By the 1880s,” Professor Freyer notes, “the general 
law included 26 distinct doctrines.  The two main categories of cases in 
which this enlargement took place involved tort liability in accidents and 
recovery on defaulted municipal bonds.”255  These were not areas where 
interested parties valued certainty over content.256  Moreover, these expan-
sions brought the general law increasingly into conflict not only with state 
court decisions but also with state statutes.  In Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 
for example, the Court famously refused to follow a state court’s construc-
tion of the state constitution that would have invalidated the state bonds at 
issue.257  “We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law,” the Court 
bellowed, “because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the 
sacrifice.”258 
This expansion of the general law seems to have been driven—or at 
least accompanied—by a shift in Swift’s underlying rationale.259  Although 
Swift and other early decisions had emphasized the customary nature of the 
general commercial law and the importance of the parties’ expectations in 
interstate commercial transactions, later decisions relied on a more expan-
  
 252 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 91. 
 253 FREYER, supra note 30, at 45. 
 254 Jackson, supra note 198, at 611; see also Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792.  At the same time, the 
general common law as interpreted by the federal courts was becoming considerably more friendly to 
business interests than was state law.  See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 66-67. 
 255 FREYER, supra note 30, at 58; see also Comment, supra note 200, at 91–92 (“Confining them-
selves at first to a sort of law merchant of usages common to the commercial world the federal courts 
have applied their own rules in an increasing field, without regard to the non-statutory law of a state, 
feeling dictated . . . by the importance of national certainty of the law in the broader field of general 
jurisprudence”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sharp & Brennan, supra note 251, at 376 (noting, in 
1929, that “[f]or the most part, in negligence cases federal courts are not bound by state decisions”). 
 256 See generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987) (describing the controversy over the state bond cases). 
 257 68 U.S. 175, 206–07 (1863). 
 258 Id.  Professor Freyer notes that “[d]uring the 30 years after the Dubuque decision, approximate-
ly 300 bond cases came to the Supreme Court (more than on any other single issue), while many others 
were settled in the lower federal courts without appeal.”  FREYER, supra note 30, at 60. 
 259 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792 (“As the practice of the common law became less 
reflective and more directive, theories of the common law as custom yielded to theories of the common 
law as science. The theories that fit the emerging practice saw the common law as normative, and these 
in turn displaced theories that insisted that the common law was simply reflective.”). 
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sive need for national uniformity.260  This shift did not render the later deci-
sions antipositivist; Swift’s late-century defenders relied on indubitably 
positivist sources—typically the Diversity Clause of Article III.261  But the 
shift away from customary law to normative lawmaking put the question of 
legislative authority front and center. 
I submit that what happened to Swift was not that it could no longer be 
justified once legal positivism became well established, but rather that the 
twin positivist sources of Swift’s authority eroded as the general law ex-
panded beyond its commercial law origins.  Justice Story could ground the 
general commercial law in the customary practices of merchants as well as 
the states’ decision, acknowledged by the state courts, to follow the general 
commercial law rather than localize the rules governing such transactions.  
But the common law principles articulated in the new bond and tort cases, 
for example, did not arise from the customary practices of parties to con-
sensual transactions, and in many instances the states had made a deliberate 
decision to localize the relevant legal principles.  The federal courts thus 
needed a new basis of positive authority for applying general law in this 
broader universe of cases.  “As the federal judiciary continued to enlarge 
the body of general law,” Professor Freyer relates, “a fundamental question 
arose as to the proper balance of power between the state and federal gov-
ernments.”262  Erie thus raised a question of federalism that Swift had not.263 
Although there is fairly widespread agreement today that Erie’s posi-
tivism requires courts “to identify the sovereign source for every rule of 
decision,”264 disagreement persists about the available options.  Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith maintain that “[b]ecause the appropriate ‘sover-
eigns’ under the U.S. Constitution are the federal government and the 
states, all law applied by federal courts must be either federal law or state 
law.”265  Similarly, Louise Weinberg has written that “[a]t the heart of 
[Erie] was the positivistic insight that American law must be either federal 
or state law.  There could be no overarching or hybrid third option.”266  I 
have criticized this view at greater length elsewhere,267 and a number of 
  
 260 See Casto, supra note 230, at 915–18; Comment, supra note 200, at 92. 
 261 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 682–83; BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, 
at 95, 147 n.17. 
 262 FREYER, supra note 30, at 71. 
 263 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 36–37 (explaining why pro-states’ rights justices on the 
Court did not object to Story’s holding in Swift); see generally Lessig, supra note 78, at 1793–94 (ex-
plaining that as the general common law became normative rather than reflective of customary practic-
es, it became more difficult for federal judges to justify their role in shaping that law). 
 264 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 243, at 852. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 820 (1989). 
 267 See Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 492–96 (arguing that there is nothing antipositivist about 
general law so long as that law is adopted and empowered by positivist means—that is, social ac-
ceptance or governmental authorization). 
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recent commentators have noted the role that “general” law continues to 
play in our legal system.268  Nothing in Erie or in legal positivism generally 
would preclude state or federal courts from continuing to follow the general 
law in diversity cases, so long as state law mandated that choice as it did 
under Swift.269  The reason that federal courts generally may not apply the 
general law presently is simply that states generally do not make that 
choice. 
B. Erie and Federalism 
Positivism, as I have said, required courts to locate some ground of le-
gal authority to construe and apply the common law.  By the time of Erie, 
application of the general law could, for the most part, no longer rest on the 
states’ acquiescence or on the notion that courts were simply enforcing the 
customary understandings of parties to interstate transactions.  The federal 
courts thus needed some sort of federal authority to displace state law in 
diversity cases.  Positivism did not, strictly speaking, require rejection of 
Swift—but it did mean that Erie had to be a case about federalism. 
Erie’s federalism rationale, however, is frequently misunderstood. 
1. Legislative Power and Dual Federalism 
Misinterpretation of Erie’s constitutional rationale stems from two 
statements: one at the beginning and one at the end of Justice Brandeis’s 
constitutional discussion.  Brandeis opened with the canonical statement of 
Erie’s holding: “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or 
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the 
State. . . .  There is no federal general common law.”270  He then made a 
somewhat confusing reference to Congress’s power, despite the fact that no 
federal statute purported to govern the merits of the case: “Congress has no 
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State, 
whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law 
or a part of the law of torts.”271  Brandeis compounded the confusion when 
he added, at the end of the section, “that in applying the doctrine [of Swift] 
  
 268 See Nelson, General Law, supra note 74; Bellia & Clark, supra note 49; see also Young, CIL, 
supra note 84, at 467–74 (arguing that American courts should treat customary international law as 
“general” law unless it is incorporated into federal law by Congress). 
 269 See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 295 (concluding that “the federal courts could appeal to 
the general common law if state law allowed them to do so”). 
 270 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 271 Id. 
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this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion 
are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.”272 
This language has suggested to some that Erie rested on a pure ques-
tion of federalism.  Craig Green, for example, purports to find two suppos-
edly distinct federalism rationales in Justice Brandeis’s opinion: a highly-
implausible “states’ rights” interpretation and a slightly more tenable 
“enumerated powers” reading.273  The gravamen of each argument, howev-
er, is to characterize Erie as a case about limits on the power of the federal 
government as a whole, rather than about limits specific to the powers of 
the federal courts.274  Likewise, Suzanna Sherry appears to read Brandeis as 
relying entirely on a lack of congressional power to reach the conduct at 
issue in the case.275 
This reading, if correct, would have important implications for current 
debates about federal judicial power to recognize and enforce norms, such 
as principles of customary international law, that are not embodied in feder-
al positive law.  Harold Koh has argued, for example, that “given both 
Congress’s enumerated authority to define and punish offenses against the 
law of nations and its affirmative exercise of that power in a range of stat-
utes, no one could similarly claim that federal courts lacked power to make 
federal common law rules with respect to international law.”276  More 
broadly, the enumerated powers reading would support an extremely capa-
cious view of federal common law generally.  Current enumerated powers 
doctrine, after all, gives Congress extremely broad legislative powers.277  If 
Erie were about federal legislative jurisdiction, then that entire field would 
now be open to federal judicial lawmaking. 
If this were the rationale, then Erie’s critics would be right to criticize 
it.  As Professor Sherry notes, “[i]t is doubtful that Erie’s federalism limita-
tion on congressional power was correct when it was decided, and doctrinal 
developments have made it even less valid.”278  As the critics read it, Erie is 
a relic of “dual federalism”—the regime of federalism doctrine that domi-
nated the Court’s jurisprudence for the first century and a half of our histo-
ry.279  Dual federalism contemplated “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally 
  
 272 Id. at 80; see also, e.g., Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 142 (plucking these two statements out 
as the key expression of the Court’s rationale). 
 273 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 607–14. 
 274 See also PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172–73. 
 275 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 142–44; see also Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1571–73 (2008) (reading Erie similarly). 
 276 Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1831 
(1998). 
 277 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 278 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 143. 
 279 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 607–09.  Even Professor Purcell’s reading takes Erie 
into this territory.  See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 168 (“The federal common law was illegitimate, 
Brandeis believed, because it was base on the fallacy that the scope of congressional power had no 
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limiting fields of power—that of the national government and of the States. 
The two authorities confront each other as equals across a precise constitu-
tional line, defining their respective jurisdictions.”280  Consistent with this 
model, the critics interpret Erie to hold that matters like the tort duty at is-
sue in that case fell within an exclusive zone of state authority.281 
The problem, of course, is that this view of federalism has become un-
tenable.282  The Court rejected dual federalism as part of its New Deal revo-
lution, which largely abandoned the notion of judicially enforced limits on 
the Commerce Clause.283  Erie was decided in 1938, a year after the Court’s 
1937 “switch in time.”  But even before the Court switched, it had made 
clear that Congress had extensive power to regulate even intrastate matters 
pertaining to the railroads as instrumentalities of interstate commerce.284  It 
is thus difficult to say that Congress would have lacked constitutional pow-
er to specify by statute a duty of care for railroads towards persons walking 
along their rights-of-way.  Indeed, Michael Greve seems right to contend 
“that Congress could reenact, and could have reenacted even in 1938, the 
entire corpus juris of general common law that was declared unconstitu-
tional in Erie.”285  This, for Erie’s critics, is enough to dispose of Erie’s 
federalism rationale.286 
  
relevance to the reach of the federal judicial power.”); id. at 173 (“[Congress’s lack] of power . . . turned 
on the absence of congressional authority as determined by reference to the constitutional grant of 
powers to the national government.”). 
 280 Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie A. Earle, ed., 1968); see also ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 
183 (2011) (“The dual federalism paradigm understands federal and state governments to operate in 
different spheres of authority.”). 
 281 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 144–45. 
 282 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 701 (concluding that “the enclave theory does not accurately 
reflect the Constitution’s plan for allocating power between the federal and state governments”). 
 283 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1937); see also Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942); see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federal-
ism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950) (recounting dual federalism’s collapse); Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Dual Federalism, NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (forthcoming 2013) 
[hereinafter Young, Puzzling Persistance] (complaining that many contemporary commentators confuse 
any federalism-protective doctrine with the old dual federalism model). 
 284 See Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 354–
55 (1914) (holding that the federal government could regulate intrastate railroad rates where necessary 
to regulating interstate rates); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974) (“[E]ven by then contemporary standards, Congress would have 
been seen as having power to prescribe a substantive rule of liability for the specific accident in Erie.”). 
 285 GREVE, supra note 4, at 227. Interestingly, then-Solicitor General Robert Jackson did cite this 
sort of federalism problem as a reason for getting rid of Swift.  Writing in 1938, Jackson argued that 
Swift created an anomaly because questions like insurance contracts or torts were “held to be within 
Federal judicial power, but not within Federal congressional power.”  Jackson, supra note 198, at 614.  
If contemporary observers thought that all or most of the realm covered by general common law had 
come within Congress’s legislative power as a result of the Court’s expansive reading of the Commerce 
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It is highly unlikely, however, that this was the Court’s actual ra-
tionale.  As Professor Green acknowledges, Justice Brandeis was hardly a 
proponent of dual federalism.287  It would have been exceptionally odd to 
find him aggressively seeking to roll back the Shreveport Rate Case’s more 
expansive view of national power.  Unsurprisingly, Brandeis said no such 
thing.288  His opinion is completely consistent with notions of judicial fed-
eralism—that is, limits on the lawmaking power of courts that impose no 
parallel limits on the power of Congress.  I discuss the judicial federalism 
rationale in the next section. 
2. Judicial Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legal Process 
Vision 
Contemporary federalism doctrine—and most contemporary federal-
ism theory as well—largely accepts that Congress shares broad, largely 
concurrent regulatory powers with the States.289  The principal limits on 
national authority thus arise from the difficulty of enacting federal legisla-
tion and the states’ political representation in that process.290  From this 
standpoint, it is critical that “the states, and their interests as such, are repre-
sented in the Congress but not in the federal courts,”291 and no less signifi-
cant that the federal courts may formulate rules of decision far more readily 
  
Clause in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), one would have expected Jackson, 
of all people, to note that fact. 
 286 See, e.g., Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 143 (“Erie’s reliance on federalism is utterly incon-
sistent with both contemporaneous and subsequent cases on congressional power.”). 
 287 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 607; see also PURCELL, supra note 9, at 134–35 (noting that 
although Justice Brandeis valued decentralization, he shared the post-1937 majority’s “sense of excite-
ment and vindication” at “jettison[ing] doctrine identified with the ‘old Court’”). 
 288 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 702 (“The opinion Justice Brandeis wrote for the Erie Court in 
1938 was a creature of its time [(a year after NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . . . and three years 
before United States v. Darby)] and it understood all this [that there were no exclusive enclaves of state 
authority] perfectly well.”).  As Professor Ely points out, some later courts did appear to make this 
mistake.  See id. at 705; see also, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 
(1956) (suggesting that if the Federal Arbitration Act were to apply in diversity actions, it would uncon-
stitutionally invade the “local law field”).  It might be best to understand Bernhardt’s reference to the 
field of local law as an application of the “presumption against preemption” in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947), which applies most strongly when Congress legislates “in a field 
which the States have traditionally occupied.”  Id. at 230. 
 289 See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption 
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 279–80 (2012) [hereinafter Young, Ordinary Diet]. 
 290 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (emphasiz-
ing the political representation of the states in Congress); Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 
1339–42 (emphasizing the procedural difficulty of enacting federal law). 
 291 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1685. 
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than Congress can enact laws.292  Hence the principle of judicial federalism.  
As Paul Mishkin put it, 
That Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substan-
tive policy does not imply an equal range of power for federal judges.  Principles related to 
the separation of powers impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to en-
gage in lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress).
293
 
As in other areas of federalism doctrine,294 then, separation of powers 
reinforces the limits on national power by constraining courts from displac-
ing state law even where similar action by Congress would be permissi-
ble.295 
This judicial federalism theory of Erie fits well into a broader vision of 
federalism commonly associated with the Legal Process school of jurispru-
dence.296  That vision, articulated in the first edition of the famous Hart & 
Wechsler casebook, portrayed federal law as broad in its potential scope but 
interstitial in its actual manifestation: 
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature.  It rarely occupies a legal field completely, 
totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the states.  This was plainly true in 
  
 292 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1362 
(2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers]; see also Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 313–16 
(identifying other institutional factors pressing federal courts to make law); Gasaway & Parrish, supra 
note 4, at 967 (arguing that because the common law is “comprehensive” and “integrated” it must pro-
vide answers to all conceivable questions arising between two parties). 
 293 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1683; see also Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1414; 
Hill, supra note 102, at 441 (raising the “rather obvious point” that “even if a particular area is one in 
which the federal government has power to make independent law, it does not follow that a federal court 
also has power to do so, for the power of the federal courts does not correspond in all respects with the 
power of the federal government as a whole”). 
 294 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Congress’s power to act 
against the states pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting Congress’s 
ability to second-guess the Court’s interpretation of constitutional rights); Solid Waste Auth. of N. Cook 
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (refusing to defer to agency rule that pressed 
the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power). 
 295 See Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (“Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on the federal 
court’s power to displace state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate which 
neither the general language of article III nor the jurisdictional statute provides.”).  In this essay, I will 
generally use the labels “judicial federalism,” “separation of powers,” and “Legal Process” interchange-
ably to describe what I view to be the best account of Erie’s constitutional rationale. 
 296 On the Legal Process school, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and 
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 964–67 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frick-
ey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li–
cxxxvi (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); NEIL DUXBURY,  PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205–99 (1995). 
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the beginning when the federal legislative product (including the Constitution) was extreme-
ly small.  It is significantly true today, despite the volume of Congressional enactments, and 
even within areas where Congress has been very active.  Federal legislation, on the whole, 
has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives.  It builds 
upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as 
necessary for the special purpose.  Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total 
corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background 
of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
297
 
As the current editors of Hart & Wechsler note, “the expansion of fed-
eral legislation and administrative regulation . . . has accelerated,” so that 
“at present federal law appears to be more primary than interstitial in nu-
merous areas.”298  Nonetheless, they suggest—I think correctly—that “the 
First Edition’s thesis [remains] accurate over an extremely broad range of 
applications.”299 
Erie’s constitutional holding—that federal judicial lawmaking authori-
ty is not coextensive with Congress’s, and that in fact federal courts gener-
ally lack common lawmaking powers—fits comfortably within this frame-
work.  Indeed, I argue in Part IV that Erie is the paradigm case of contem-
porary federalism doctrine.  What is “reserved” to the States, on the Legal 
Process view, is regulatory authority over matters upon which Congress has 
been unwilling or unable to legislate.300  In that sense, the late nineteenth 
century expansion of the Swift doctrine had indeed “invaded rights . . . re-
served by the Constitution to the several States”301—in particular, the right 
to govern matters not preempted by federal legislation.  Similarly, Justice 
Brandeis’s statement that “Congress has no power to declare substantive 
rules of common law applicable in a State” is best read as a somewhat in-
artful way of saying that Congress may not confer a general common law-
making power on the federal courts.302  Congress can declare only statute 
law, made through the Article I lawmaking process.  As Professor Clark has 
explained, 
  
 297 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 459 (quoting the first edition, published in 1953); see 
also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (citing and endorsing this view); Hart, 
supra note 10, at 525-35 (developing the casebook’s view); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 80-86 (1966) (adopting the interstitial 
view); Hill, supra note 102, at 442 (“[T]here are vast reaches within the scope of the commerce power 
which have always been deemed to be subject to the sovereign power of the states until pre-emted for 
the federal prerogative by action of Congress . . . . Until such pre-emption takes place the federal courts 
have always understood that the law of the states furnishes the rule of decision.”). 
 298 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 459–60. 
 299 Id. 
 300 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 10, at 526. 
 301 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). 
 302 This view finds considerable support in the Framers’ considered decision not to include a gen-
eral reception of the common law in the federal constitution.  See Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1312; 
compare id., with infra note 513 (discussing state provisions receiving the common law). 
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Erie's constitutional holding is best understood as an attempt to enforce federal lawmaking 
procedures and the political safeguards of federalism they incorporate.  In other words, Erie 
reflects the idea that the Constitution not only limits the powers granted to the federal gov-
ernment, but also constrains the manner in which the federal government may exercise those 
powers to displace state law.
303
 
The Legal Process vision of federal law as interstitial has several im-
portant implications for federalism doctrine.  The primary limits on federal 
authority, on this view, arise from the political representation of the states 
in Congress and the procedural difficulty of making federal law.  Herbert 
Wechsler, a key expositor of the Legal Process approach, emphasized the 
former in his work on the “political safeguards of federalism,”304 and the 
Supreme Court adopted that notion—for some purposes, at least—in the 
Garcia case.305  Brad Clark’s more recent work has emphasized the latter, 
more procedural checks.306  Both political and procedural limits on federal 
authority militate in favor of judicial doctrines that channel federal lawmak-
ing to Congress, rather than administrative agencies and federal courts.  
Agencies and courts, after all, lack built-in state representation and can 
make federal law considerably more easily than Congress can.307  The polit-
  
 303 Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1414; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common 
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill, Common Law].  
Ed Purcell has argued that the judicial federalism aspect of Erie was merely prudential—not constitu-
tional—in nature.  See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173.  I have argued against that reading in Young, 
CIL, supra note 84, at 410–13. 
 304 Wechsler, supra note 290; see also JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW 
STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009) (exploring the operation of 
political safeguards in practice). 
 305 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, (1985).  The Garcia/Wechsler 
“political safeguards” argument has been controversial.  Compare, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court should abandon judicial review of feder-
alism issues and rely entirely on political safeguards); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into 
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (criticizing Wechsler’s original 
account but arguing that alternative mechanisms, especially political parties, provide important protec-
tion for states), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & John Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Federalism Theories, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1459 (2001) (criticizing old and new versions of the political 
safeguards theory); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 106–33 (2001) (same).  My own view is that while the states’ representation 
in Congress does not provide sufficient protection for states to substitute for judicial review, it is a 
significant check on national power and judicial review should be geared to maximize the effect of 
political and procedural checks. See, e.g., Young, Two Cheers, supra note 292, at 1365–66; Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 65–91, 123–29 (2004) [hereinafter 
Young, Two Federalisms].  As I discuss in Part IV, the Erie doctrine fits well with that approach. 
 306 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1681 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Procedural Safeguards]; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 292, at 
1361–64. 
 307 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1433; Young, Executive Preemption, supra 
note 7, at 878. 
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ical/procedural perspective likewise favors doctrines that raise the salience 
and political costs of measures that encroach on state authority, such as the 
presumption against preemption and the various clear statement rules.308 
To be sure, the notion that Congress must always make federal law is 
often honored in the breach.  In particular, Congress has delegated—and the 
courts have allowed it to delegate309—broad lawmaking authority to admin-
istrative agencies.310  One might contend that Congress has likewise dele-
gated broad lawmaking powers to the federal courts, either in the statutory 
grant of diversity jurisdiction or (if one buys the Sherry/Ritz reading dis-
cussed earlier311) in the Rules of Decision Act itself.  Against such a read-
ing, Aaron Nielson has argued Erie should be read to rest on the nondelega-
tion doctrine.312  “In light of the broad, unchanneled power exercised by 
federal courts under Swift v. Tyson’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision 
Act,” he insists, “Erie . . . can and should be understood as a nondelegation 
case.”313 
The nondelegation reading of Erie is best read to make two distinct 
claims: Congress can’t delegate a general lawmaking power to the federal 
courts, and in any event Congress hasn’t delegated such a power.  One ob-
vious rejoinder to the first claim is that the nondelegation doctrine is dead; 
the Supreme Court has not struck down a federal statute on nondelegation 
grounds since 1935.314  But although the Court has proven extremely reluc-
  
 308 See generally Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 265; Matthew Stephenson, The Price of 
Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 
118 Yale L.J. 2 (2008). 
 309 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (rejecting a 
nondelegation challenge to a provision of the Clean Air Act and observing that “we have ‘almost never 
felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be 
left to those executing or applying the law’”) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 416 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 310 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (White, J., dissenting) (“For some time, the 
sheer amount of law . . . made by the [administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking 
engaged in by Congress through the traditional process.”).  Delegation is not an entirely new phenome-
non.  See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 411 (2008) (“From the early days of the Republic, Congress 
voluntarily has . . . ‘delegated’ . . . substantial lawmaking powers to members of both the executive and 
judicial branches.”).  It is undeniable, however, that the volume and scope of delegations has vastly 
increased since the advent of the modern regulatory state in the mid-twentieth century. 
 311 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 312 Aaron Nielson, Erie as Nondelegation, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2011). 
 313 Id. at 241–42. 
 314 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down a 
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) on nondelegation grounds); Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down a different NIRA provision on similar grounds).  As 
Cass Sunstein puts it, “the conventional [nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad 
ones (and counting).”  Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000); 
see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241 
(1994) (lamenting the “virtually complete abandonment of the nondelegation principle”). 
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tant to draw firm lines fixing the outer limits of permissible delegations, it 
has always treated the underlying constitutional principle as sound.315  As 
my colleague Margaret Lemos has observed, “the basic notion that the Con-
stitution imposes some restrictions on Congress’s ability to delegate law-
making authority is deeply entrenched in constitutional law and widely ac-
cepted in constitutional commentary.”316 
Moreover, “the constitutional principles underlying the [nondelega-
tion] doctrine apply with full force to delegations to courts.”317  In fact, they 
ought to apply with greater force.  Federal courts lack even the minimal 
democratic accountability of executive agencies, and the usual legislative 
checks on agency action—such as oversight hearings, funding control, and 
judicial review for compliance with statutory mandates—are attenuated or 
absent when Congress delegates to courts.318  Moreover, as Professor 
Neilson points out, one of the Court’s earliest nondelegation cases con-
cerned a judicial delegation.319  In Wayman v. Southard,320 the Court upheld 
the Process Act, which required federal courts to apply state procedural 
rules in common law actions but authorized them to make “such alterations 
and additions as the said courts . . . shall in their discretion seem expedi-
ent.”321  But Chief Justice Marshall firmly observed that “[i]t will not be 
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribu-
nals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”322 
A general delegation of federal common lawmaking power—even if 
confined to diversity cases—would fail any conceivable notion of nondele-
  
 315 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (reaffirming that 
“when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legisla-
tive act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform’”) 
(quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); Loving v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (rejecting—but taking seriously—a nondelegation challenge to aspects of 
the military capital punishment scheme); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the 
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1408 (2000) 
(suggesting that the Court’s decision in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), actually 
relied on a nondelegation rationale). 
 316 Lemos, supra note 310, at 413; see also Nielson, supra note 312, at 263; Cass R. Sunstein, Is 
the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 311 (1999) (contending that “the doctrine is 
properly held in reserve for extreme cases—that it serves as a genuine, but judicially underenforced, 
constitutional norm—and that it operates as a legitimate tool of statutory construction”). 
 317 Lemos, supra note 310, at 405. 
 318 See Nielson, supra note 312, at 266–98; Lemos, supra note 310, at 409; Young, Federal Com-
mon Law, supra note 8, at 1667; Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 21–22. 
 319 See Nielson, supra note 312, at 270. 
 320 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
 321 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792).  The act also authorized the Supreme 
Court to make “such regulations as [it] shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any 
circuit or district court.”  Id. 
 322 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42–43. 
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gation.323  Unlike Professor Nielson, I do not think a delegation of authority 
to apply the general commercial law construed in Swift v. Tyson would nec-
essarily have been unconstitutional.  That law, after all, was relatively nar-
row in scope and, more importantly, its principles were dictated by the cus-
tomary practices of merchants;324 directing the courts to follow those prac-
tices in order to vindicate party expectations would provide an intelligible 
principle to guide and cabin judicial discretion.  But as I have already dis-
cussed, the general common law had overflowed the banks of Swift by the 
end of the nineteenth century, becoming both far broader in scope and far 
more normative in character.325  No intelligible principle specified by Con-
gress limited judicial discretion in general law cases by the time the Court 
sat to decide Erie. 
Even if Congress could delegate such broad authority, moreover, it 
plainly has not done so.326  I have already explained why the Rules of Deci-
sion Act cannot be read as such a delegation, and that forecloses any such 
reading of the diversity statute as well; after all, why would the Rules of 
Decision Act prescribe state law in diversity cases if Congress intended to 
delegate federal common lawmaking power in those cases?327  Contempo-
rary nondelegation jurisprudence adds considerable force to this conclusion.  
Although the Court has not struck down a delegation as unconstitutional in 
nearly eighty years, it not infrequently invokes delegation concerns in the 
context of statutory construction.328  Given this strong presumption against 
inferring broad statutory delegations from ambiguous text—not to mention 
the breadth of the delegation that would have to be inferred—neither the 
Rules of Decision Act nor the diversity statute should be construed as au-
thorizing federal courts to make federal common law.329 
  
 323 See Nielson, supra note 312, at 275–76. 
 324 See supra notes 73–89 and accompanying text. 
 325 See supra notes 253–60 and accompanying text. 
 326 See Ely, supra note 1, at 707 n.77 (“Congress has made clear its disinclination to delegate 
anything remotely resembling the entirety of its constitutional power to federal courts.”). 
 327 Professor Ritz argued that the Rules of Decision Act simply had nothing to do with diversity 
jurisdiction.  See RITZ, supra note 124, at 163.  The more common argument is that the Act applies only 
to diversity.  See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 275, at 1573.  But that’s not what the Act says either. 
 328 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645–46 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); Nat’l Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341–43 (1974); Sunstein, Non-
delegation Canons, supra note 314, at 322.  It is probably fair to say that the modern nondelegation 
doctrine is enforced entirely through statutory construction—particularly through clear statement rules 
that disfavor broad delegations and delegations of authority to tread upon constitutional rights.  See 
Bressman, supra note 315, at 1409 (“The Court has used clear-statement rules and the canon of avoid-
ance as surrogates for the nondelegation doctrine.”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Re-
sistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1603–06 (2000) (argu-
ing that clear statement rules supply the best method of enforcing certain constitutional values and that 
nondelegation is an example). 
 329 In Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981), the Court read 
Erie as making clear that “[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give 
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I want to stress that both of these judicial federalism arguments—that 
Congress couldn’t delegate sufficiently broad common lawmaking authori-
ty to support judicial practice in the latter days of the Swift era, and that it 
hasn’t delegated such authority—are constitutional arguments.  As Paul 
Mishkin explained, 
It makes no difference . . . whether the core of Erie be perceived as ‘Constitutional’ in the 
sense that Congress could not validly enact a statute entirely contrary to the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, or merely ‘constitutional’ in the sense that it rests upon premises related to the 
basic nature of our federal system which are presupposed to govern in the absence of clear 
congressional determination to change and reallocate power within that system.
330
 
Our Constitution leaves much to be worked out by statute, practice, 
and convention, and the result is that much of our government structure is 
“constituted” by law that is not constitutionally entrenched.331  Both sorts of 
  
rise to authority to formulate federal common law.”  Two frequently cited exceptions to this principle 
involve interstate disputes and admiralty cases.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 653–54 
(noting these exceptions, but suggesting that “lawmaking authority in these areas rests on factors other 
than a jurisdictional grant”).  Commentators have said that the federal courts’ federal common lawmak-
ing authority in interstate disputes “springs of necessity from the structure of the Constitution.”  Henry 
P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 11-12 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law]; see also Clark, Federal 
Common Law, supra note 147, 1322–31 (grounding federal courts’ authority in the structural principle 
that states enter the Union on an “equal footing”).  And I have argued elsewhere that the admiralty 
statute similarly cannot be read as a broad delegation of federal common lawmaking authority.  See 
Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469, 
485–507 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Just Water].  The only other prominent example of judicial law-
making authority implied from a jurisdictional grant is the Lincoln Mills case, which inferred such 
authority from a bare grant of jurisdiction to resolve collective bargaining disputes under the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA).  See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 
(1957).  The majority opinion in that case, however, relied heavily on evidence that Congress intended 
the grant in the LMRA to be more than a bare jurisdictional grant and instead to embody a specific 
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.  Id. at 450–56; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, 
at 664 (suggesting that “federal common lawmaking in Lincoln Mills [is] best viewed as rooted in the 
need to carry out the substantive policies of the federal labor laws rather than as an implication from the 
jurisdictional grant”); Young, Just Water, supra, at 496–98 (identifying other problems with Lincoln 
Mills as a template for congressional delegations of lawmaking authority). 
 330 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1686; see also id. (“It is true in fact that Congress generally does 
not ignore such principles; in any event, it is sound policy not to take constitutional principles as likely 
undercut by Congress (even if it should have ultimate power to do so) when Congress has not squarely 
and unmistakably taken the decision to do so.”); Field, Sources of Law, supra note 55, at 920 (“stating 
that even if Erie did not rest on strictly constitutional grounds, the scheme we have inherited from Erie 
and developed since has become such a fundamental part of our way of thinking about the boundary 
between state and federal power that many of our suppositions, constitutional and otherwise, are built 
upon it, so that Erie, together with Murdock v. Memphis, has “created our current view of what ‘state 
law’ is”). 
 331 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 
(2007); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). 
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law, moreover, serve fundamental constitutional values of federalism and 
separation of powers.332  This is particularly true of the nondelegation prin-
ciple.  In modern administrative law, the relatively strict judicial enforce-
ment of statutory boundaries to delegated authority has largely come to 
stand in for judicial enforcement of limits on excessive delegation grounded 
in Article I.333  Given that evolution, Congress’s decision not to delegate 
broad federal common lawmaking authority to the federal courts has consti-
tutional significance; it means, after all, that it would be unconstitutional 
for the courts to assert such unbounded authority on their own.334 
Our experience under Erie confirms that the manner of federal law-
making makes a practical difference.  Professor Mishkin noted, for exam-
ple, that “central judicially appointed committees . . . proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence broadly abrogating state laws on privilege, and . . . these 
passed through the Supreme Court, to be intercepted only in the Con-
gress.”335  He concluded that “this weighting of state interests in the Con-
gress, more significantly than in the Court (or judicial appointees), was a 
fulfillment of the institutional structure established in the Constitution.”336 
The most important implication of this judicial federalism reading of 
Erie is that federal common law is always constitutionally problematic.337  
“Problematic” is not the same thing as “unconstitutional”; as Judge Friendly 
famously pointed out, Erie cleared the way for legitimate forms of federal 
common law.338  But federal judge-made law always requires special justifi-
  
 332 See Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay 
for Phil Frickey, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1384–85 (2010). 
 333 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in 
light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been allowed 
largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory 
directives have been issued.”); Farina, supra note 217, at 597–98. 
 334 Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding the Bush Administration’s use of 
military commissions to try suspected terrorists unconstitutional because it was not authorized by Con-
gress). 
 335 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1685. 
 336 Id. 
 337 Craig Green asserts that “Brandeis’s conclusion, ‘[t]here is no federal general common law’ . . . 
had nothing to do with separation of powers or new-myth aversion to federal common law.”  Green, 
Repressing, supra note 5, at 616.  But this, like much of Professor Green’s argument, is badly overstat-
ed.  It is true that “‘[f]ederal general common law’ is different from ‘federal common law,’” id., in the 
sense that the former would be a subset of the latter.  But Erie’s statement—that except for cases gov-
erned by statutes and constitutional provisions state law applies—pertains to both.  It means that judicial 
lawmaking must be tied to constitutional meaning or Congress’s intent, as Judge Friendly—upon whom 
Green relies—acknowledged.  See Friendly, supra note 57, at 407.  Calling the separation of powers 
argument against federal common law “wordplay” and a “mistake,” as Green does, Green, Repressing, 
supra note 5, at 617, is not an argument. 
 338 Friendly, supra note 57, at 405. 
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cation under Erie.339  It must be tied to the specific forms of federal law that 
Erie mentioned—federal statutes or constitutional provisions, and we might 
reasonably add treaties in respect of the Supremacy Clause’s clear com-
mand.  If a federal common law rule cannot be connected to some source in 
federal positive law, then it is unconstitutional.340  And it is no answer to say 
that Congress can override federal common law rules if it likes.  Our feder-
alism protects state authority in large part through placing burdens of over-
coming inertia on federal actors, which ordinarily may act with the force of 
supreme federal law only when those burdens have been overcome.341 
Like everything else about Erie, however, this Legal Process under-
standing of the case has come under widespread attack.  I consider various 
objections in the next section. 
C. Objections 
This section considers four distinct objections to the judicial federal-
ism understanding of Erie.  First, a number of commentators—most im-
portantly, Ed Purcell in his wonderful book on Erie—have argued that the 
Legal Process writers reinterpreted Erie in a way that was unfaithful to Jus-
tice Brandeis’s “original understanding” of the case.  Second, Susan Bandes 
and other critics of the Legal Process school have argued that its assump-
tions are outdated and overly formalistic.  Third, Suzanna Sherry and 
Louise Weinberg have both made a narrower argument that any reading of 
Erie based on separation of powers must fail because the founding genera-
tion assumed that legislative and judicial powers are coextensive.  And fi-
nally, Michael Greve has argued that the judicial federalism argument 
proves too much, because it would require us to reject other forms of non-
legislative federal lawmaking that are pervasive in the modern administra-
tive state.  None of these objections, in my view, makes much of a dent in 
Erie’s constitutional argument. 
1. Erie’s Original Meaning 
Erie’s critics have generally acknowledged that the most plausible 
constitutional rationale incorporates not only federalism but also separation 
  
 339 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state 
courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply 
their own rules of decision.”); Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 3 (arguing that federal common 
law is legitimate only where it arises from textual interpretation of federal enactments, congressional 
delegation, or preemptive federal interests). 
 340 See, e.g., Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1663–65. 
 341 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1687–88 
(warning against reliance on congressional inaction). 
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of powers.342  They often insist, however, that this rationale “finds no sup-
port in the decision itself.”343  It’s not clear what turns on this insistence; if 
Erie’s principle can be shown to rest on firm constitutional ground, the crit-
ical enterprise would amount to little more than correcting Brandeis’s opin-
ion.344  In any event, these “originalist” critiques of Erie’s separation of 
powers rationale misconstrue both the opinion and its author. 
The “originalist” case against a separation of powers reading for Erie 
has both a textualist and an intentionalist strain.  For the textualists, Craig 
Green insists that “Erie’s new myth [the separation of powers reading] 
lacks support in Brandeis’s opinion.  Indeed, the Court’s words fail to iden-
tify any separation-of-powers issue at all.”345  But this assertion is wrong.  
Justice Brandeis’s initial statement—“Except in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
case is the law of the State”346—echoes the Supremacy Clause’s command 
that only “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in pursuance thereof” are “the supreme law of the land.”347  More 
than any other provision, the Supremacy Clause ties separation of powers 
and federalism together: only laws made according to the rigorous lawmak-
ing procedures specified in the Constitution have the authority to oust the 
  
 342 See, e.g., GREVE, supra note 4, at 375 (“The most promising defense of Erie is some combina-
tion of separation of powers and federalism arguments.”); Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 288 (observing 
that the judicial federalism argument “is the best current account of Erie as a fundamental principle of 
federalism”).  This is the dominant interpretation among Erie’s supporters.  See, e.g., Clark, Erie’s 
Source, supra note 90; Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 15–19; Mishkin, supra note 284, at 
1683; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2004). 
 343 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 145; see also GREVE, supra note 4, at 228 (asserting that the 
judicial federalism reading “is hard to square with Brandeis’s opinion”); Green, Twin Aims, supra note 
18, at 1878 (calling the judicial federalism reading a “new Erie”). 
 344 Cf. Bandes, supra note 237, at 844 (questioning the “occasional tendency to portray Erie as 
belonging to Brandeis, and thus to portray those who deviated from Brandeis’s vision—whether on the 
Court or on future Courts interpreting it—as betraying the true Erie”). 
 345 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 617. 
 346 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 347 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Of course, the Supremacy Clause also includes in this list “all trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States.”  Id.  International law 
scholars have long suggested that the Court never meant to apply Erie to foreign relations matters.  See, 
e.g., Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939) (“Mr. Justice Brandeis was surely not thinking of international law when he 
wrote his dictum.”); see also Koh, supra note 276, at 1832–38 (endorsing Professor Jessup’s view).  I 
have argued against this suggestion at length elsewhere.  See Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 404–34.  
The contemporary Court has made clear that Erie remains relevant in foreign relations cases even while 
disagreeing as to its precise import.  See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726-27 (2004) (hold-
ing that, in light of Erie, federal courts should recognize an implied right of action to enforce customary 
international law only in relatively narrow circumstances); id. at 740–43 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and in the judgment) (arguing that Erie forbids recognition of any implied right to enforce customary 
international law); see generally Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 16 (discussing Erie’s contin-
uing importance to foreign relations cases). 
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presumptive authority of the states.  Brandeis built his opinion around that 
principle.348 
Although Justice Brandeis’s opinion did not anticipate the analytic 
terms of contemporary process federalism, his constitutional analysis put 
the focus squarely where that theory suggests it belongs: on the way that 
supreme federal law is made.  “[N]o clause in the Constitution,” he wrote, 
“purports to confer such a power [“to declare substantive rules of common 
law applicable in a State”] upon the federal courts.”349  I have already ar-
gued, moreover, that Justice Brandeis’s Legal Positivist argument—which 
makes up the bulk of the Court’s constitutional analysis—is also directed to 
the issue of lawmaking authority.  Brandeis needed to deflate the notion 
that Swift entailed the mere application by federal courts of a “transcenden-
  
 348 See, e.g., Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 329, 11–12 (“[Erie] recognizes 
that federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant congres-
sional power.  Rather, the Court must point to some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional 
provision, as authority for the creation of substantive federal law.”).  Professor Green acknowledges that 
this key language—“Erie’s statement that, ‘[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or 
by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the States’”—is about separation of 
powers.  Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).  “By [its] terms,” Green 
admits, “this language does support new-myth limits on federal courts’ lawmaking authority.”  Id.  He 
does not agree with Justice Brandeis’s conclusion on this point, arguing that “if the sentence were 
accurate, it would bar federal common law altogether—and therein lies its error.”  Id.  But that is quite 
different from asserting that the opinion fails to deal with separation of powers altogether. 
  In any event, Professor Green is wrong to characterize the quoted language from Erie as wholly 
foreclosing federal common law.  If Green were right, then Judge Friendly would have badly misread 
Justice Brandeis’s opinion when he said it opened the way for a “new federal common law.”  Friendly, 
supra note 57, at 405.  Brandeis said that state law applies “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by acts of Congress,” Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, and a great deal of federal common law arises 
because a matter is “governed . . . by acts of Congress” but Congress has not filled in the details.  See, 
e.g., Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 40–46 (discussing “delegated” federal common lawmak-
ing).  Even Professor Merrill’s somewhat more tenuous category of “preemptive” federal common 
lawmaking, see id. at 36–40, is probably best justified on the theory that it arises in areas “governed by 
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress.”  See Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 
1660–65; see also Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 294 (“The defining characteristic of federal common 
law as it exists today is that it is based upon federal statutes or the Constitution without being plainly 
determined by them.”).  As Professor Purcell explains, Brandeis took precisely this approach in justify-
ing a federal common law of interstate disputes in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch 
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), which he decided on the same day as Erie.  See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 188.  
Hence, much of the federal common law that does exist can be squared with a judicial federalism read-
ing of Erie, although different commentators may disagree about particular areas.  See, e.g., Young, 
Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 336–37 (arguing that much federal maritime law is unconstitu-
tional because it cannot be tied to statutes).  Green is simply adopting a categorical reading of Brandeis 
in order to dismiss what Brandeis says.  Significantly, Green barely engages the extensive literature on 
federal common law. 
 349 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also LOW, JEFFRIES, & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 13 (“This lan-
guage suggests that Erie is based, at least in part, on separation of powers.”). 
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tal body of law outside of any particular State,”350 rather than lawmaking.  
This was because if Swift required federal lawmaking and depended on a 
federal sovereign source, it could stand only if it were somehow reconcila-
ble with the institutional mechanisms for supplanting state law specified in 
the Constitution.351 
There is also an “intentionalist” strand to the argument that a judicial 
federalism reading misconstrues Erie.  For Edward Purcell, “Erie was a 
constitutional statement of the political ideals of early twentieth-century 
Progressivism.”352  He explains that 
Brandeis’s constitutional theory was not based on any particular limitation on congressional 
power, nor was it based on a commitment to decentralization as such.  Rather, it was ground-
ed on two related principles.  The first, which Brandeis regarded as inherent in the constitu-
tional structure, was that legislative and judicial powers were coextensive.  The second, 
which he regarded as a prudential but nevertheless essential corollary, was that federal judi-
cial power was also limited to those areas—not involving constitutional rights—where Con-
gress had chosen to act.  Absent compelling reason, the federal courts should not make law 
even in areas within the national legislative power unless and until Congress made the initial 
decision to assert national authority in that area.
353
 
This view hardly denies that Erie was about separation of powers—in 
fact, Purcell argues that Erie “rested not on the distinction between local 
and national authority but, rather, on the relationship between federal judi-
cial and legislative power.”354  And Purcell’s second principle precisely 
duplicates the judicial federalism interpretation of Erie.  The only differ-
ence is that Purcell interprets this “essential corollary” as “prudential” ra-
ther than constitutional in nature. 
It is unclear how much this distinction between prudential and consti-
tutional separation of powers matters.355  The ordinary import of the distinc-
tion in other doctrinal areas is that Congress may override prudential rules 
but not constitutional ones.356  But where the rule in question is itself one 
that judicial authority to displace state law depends on action by Congress, 
it matters considerably less whether we call that rule constitutional or not.  
In any event, one searches the Erie opinion in vain for language indicating 
  
 350 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 
533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 351 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 11 (“[I]n a federal system in which both 
national and local judges believe that their legitimate function is to ‘make’ law in a legislative sense, 
sources of sovereign authority become critical.”). 
 352 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172. 
 353 Id. 
 354 Id. at 165. 
 355 See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text (suggesting that it matters little whether the rule 
of Erie is constitutionally entrenched). 
 356 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 128 (discussing the difference between consti-
tutional and prudential standing doctrines). 
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that its restriction on judicial power is prudential.  Even Professor Purcell 
describes the separation of powers aspect of Brandeis’s as “essential” and 
“critical,”357 and the reasons he gives for that conclusion strongly suggest 
that the principle is in fact constitutional.358  In particular, Purcell notes that 
Brandeis believed in a fundamental principle of “legislative primacy,” such 
that “congressional abstention in any area within its authority represented a 
political judgment by the representative branch that states should exercise 
control in that area, and courts should defer to that judgment.”359  This prin-
ciple fits comfortably with accounts of Erie grounded in constitutional 
principles of judicial federalism—that is, that Erie “enforce[d] federal law-
making procedures and the political safeguards of federalism they incorpo-
rate.”360 
Professor Purcell also voices a broader criticism of the judicial federal-
ism rationale when he says that Erie “was not designed primarily to protect 
‘federalism’ or special enclaves of state law.  Rather, its more vital concern 
lay in broader ideas about judicial lawmaking and separation of powers.”361  
This is a problem, however, only if we assume—as many of Erie’s critics 
do362—that federalism and separation of powers have little to do with one 
another.  Not only does Purcell equate “federalism” generally with the spe-
cific dual federalist model of “special enclaves of state law,” but he also 
seems to think that “broader ideas about judicial lawmaking and separation 
of powers” is a wholly separate rationale from concerns about federalism.363  
These concerns have been linked from the beginning.  The Constitution 
protects federalism primarily by limiting federal lawmaking.364  And Madi-
son tied federalism and separation of powers together in Federalist 51 as 
  
 357 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172–73. 
 358 I have canvassed them in detail in Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 412–14. 
 359 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173–74. 
 360 Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1414. 
 361 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 3. 
 362 See, e.g., Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 615 (contrasting “Erie’s old myth as a ‘corner-
stone[] of our federalism’” with a “new myth” that “focus[es] on separation of powers”) (quoting Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 363 In related areas, commentators have well understood the close relationship between federalism 
and separation of powers.   The Court’s much more recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997), for example, struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond the scope of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments.  As many have pointed out, the federal-
ism issue in that case—the scope of Congress’s enumerated power to supplant state law—was intimately 
bound up with separation of powers concerns about the respective role of Congress and the Court in 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpreta-
tion: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). Just as it makes no sense to 
claim that Boerne was a federalism decision rather than one about separation of powers, so too with 
Erie. 
 364 See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 292, 
at 1352. 
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part of the Constitution’s “double security” for the rights of its citizens.365  
Brandeis broke no new ground by intertwining these concerns in Erie.366 
Professors Bridwell and Whitten suggest that the separation of powers 
concern was not unknown prior to Erie.367  Rather, two factors allowed fed-
eral courts to apply the general law under Swift without intruding on legisla-
tive prerogatives.  First, in cases under the general law merchant or the mar-
itime law, “the preexistence of a system of relatively certain customary or 
common law . . . . provid[ed] a background against which to judge party 
behavior, and which the federal courts might utilize to avoid the conclusion 
that they were ‘making’ law in a legislative sense.”368  Second, the “purpos-
es of the jurisdictional grant” also, in some situations, required federal 
courts to exercise judgment independent of the state courts about the mean-
ing of this preexisting law.  In diversity cases, most importantly, “protection 
of the noncitizen required the federal court to exercise a relative degree of 
independence.”369  Even in the nineteenth century, then, American lawyers 
recognized that the potential for congressional lawmaking on a particular 
subject did not necessarily imply a similar capacity in the courts. 
It is no doubt true, as Professor Purcell contends, that subsequent in-
terpreters—including subsequent courts as well as Legal Process thinkers 
like Henry Hart and Paul Mishkin—altered the meaning of Erie in ways 
that departed from Justice Brandeis’s specific early-twentieth-century Pro-
gressive vision.370  But, as Purcell recognizes, that is inevitable in a judicial 
system that proceeds by common law elaboration of relatively open-ended 
constitutional and statutory texts.371  If our understanding of Erie—and in 
  
 365 See FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., Wesleyan University 
Press 1961); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 611 (noting Madison’s combined use of 
federalism and separation of powers arguments in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts). 
 366 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77–78 (1873) (eschewing broad judi-
cial recognition of unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, based in part on concerns 
that such construction would expand the legislative powers of Congress vis-à-vis the states).  Martha 
Field’s suggestion that “federal common law poses a more serious threat to federalism than it does to 
separation of powers” rests on a similar assumption, although it points in the opposite direction by 
suggesting that separation of powers principles should not limit judicial lawmaking.  See Martha A. 
Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303, 305 (1992). 
 367 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 29–31. 
 368 Id. at 30. 
 369 Id.  These factors help to explain one of the great puzzles in the history of federal common 
law—that is, why the federal courts refused from an early date to entertain common law criminal prose-
cutions, while exercising a robust general law decision-making power in civil commercial cases.  Com-
pare, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (rejecting federal com-
mon law crimes), with Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (applying general law to civil com-
mercial dispute).  Neither of these factors applied so readily in the criminal context, and although there 
was some preexisting law on common law crimes, criminal law involved an inevitably sovereign exer-
cise of power.  See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 47. 
 370 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 247–49. 
 371 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 303. 
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particular, its notion of judicial federalism—has evolved over time, that is 
part of the genius of our system of precedent.  But what is remarkable, giv-
en the chorus of criticism, is how much support the judicial federalism 
reading finds in Erie’s text, the extent to which the separation of powers 
concerns undergirding that reading predated Erie itself, and the ability of 
Erie’s principles to cohere with the contemporary structure of constitutional 
doctrine. 
2. Erie and the Legal Process School 
Rather than attacking the Legal Process scholars’ reading of Erie as a 
distortion of Justice Brandeis’s intentions, a different line of criticsm at-
tacks the Legal Process school head on.  In an important review of Profes-
sor Purcell’s book on Erie, Susan Bandes portrayed the Legal Process 
worldview as hopelessly out of touch with contemporary, pluralistic Ameri-
can legal culture.  Professor Bandes is hardly the only contemporary critic 
of Legal Process thinking; her critique is representative of a broader uneas-
iness in the Federal Courts field about whether that field’s founding juris-
prudential paradigm remains viable in our current legal and intellectual 
environment.372  Given the close relation between Erie and Legal Process 
thinking about federalism, it is worth pausing to consider her arguments. 
“In attempting to impart a systemic coherence to the field, and to fed-
eralism as its central organizing principle,” Professor Bandes writes, “the 
legal process approach advocated an insularity that sought to exclude a 
whole host of influences and contingencies—political, cultural, historical, 
and practical.”373  One pictures a faded black and white photograph of a 
staid law school faculty lounge taken sometime in the 1950s, featuring a 
bunch of rumpled old white men in out-of-date suits.  Similarly, she asserts 
that the Legal Process school “mask[ed] the assumptions and value judg-
ments that inevitably shape decisionmaking,” and that its emphasis on “ab-
stract norms insulat[ed] those judgments from public debate.”374 
Part of the problem with this line of argument is its heavy reliance on 
critical characterizations of the Legal Process scholars’ views rather than 
letting those scholars speak for themselves.  Professor Bandes does not ac-
tually quote Legal Process scholars “advocat[ing] an insularity that sought 
to exclude a whole host of influences and contingencies.”375  It is rare for 
  
 372 See, e.g, Michael Wells, Busting the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 
557 (1995) (arguing that the Legal Process approach to Federal Courts law should be rejected in favor of 
“pragmatism”); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 993 (1994) (lots of angst). 
 373 Bandes, supra note 237, at 830. 
 374 Id. at 869. 
 375 Instead, Professor Bandes cites articles by two other critics of the Legal Process school.  See id. 
at 830 n.4.  That in itself might suggest a bit of insularity among that school’s critics. 
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scholars to actually argue for insularity, and it is unsurprising that she is 
unable to catch Henry Hart or Herbert Wechsler doing so—in word or even 
in practical effect.  It is equally hard to find Legal Process scholars actually 
arguing for “an abstract and timeless logic of federalism.”376  Bandes would 
do better to focus on the positions that the Legal Process school actually 
took.377 
Professor Bandes’s rather tendentious characterization of the Legal 
Process jurisprudence is at odds with the role those scholars played in the 
development of American jurisprudence.  Any defense—as well as any 
critique—of the Legal Process school must begin by recognizing that that 
the label encompasses a variety of strands, emphases, and tendencies.  As 
Neil Duxbury has shown, “[p]rocess jurisprudence was never packaged as a 
discrete theory”; it lacked a single “grand, initiating text”; and it constituted 
less a theory than “a particular attitude towards law.”378  Although process 
jurisprudence originated more or less at the same time as Legal Realism,379 
it remains fair to say that it embodied a response to the Realist critique of 
law as political and indeterminate.  One aspect of that response, which 
Bandes seems to emphasize, was a reaffirmation of the primary role of rea-
son in the law.380  But at least the strands of Legal Process thinking that I—
and many contemporary Federal Courts scholars—take to be most im-
portant was neither as formalist nor as rationalistic as Bandes suggests.381  
  
 376 Id. at 832.  Professor Bandes offers no citations on this point.  And Professor Wechsler’s semi-
nal reorienting of federalism theory toward the operation of the national political process, although 
grounded in arguments reaching back to the Federalist papers, was quite different from federalism 
theory in the nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Young, Puzzling Persistance, supra note 283 (contrasting 
dual federalism and process federalism).  Wechsler certainly did not think that federalism had an “ab-
stract and timeless logic.” 
 377 Professor Bandes’s attack on the Legal Process school appears to be motivated primarily by 
disdain for the Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism” decisions—such as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)—which she sees as replicating the 
Legal Process school’s sins.  See Bandes, supra note 237, at 869–78.  This is not the place for an analy-
sis or defense of those decisions.  See, e.g., Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 305.  But it is hard to 
see how Bandes can derive any “formalist” notion of “an immutable obvious boundary between the 
truly national and the truly local,” Bandes, supra note 237, at 873, from what the opinions actually say 
and do.  Tellingly, she relies primarily on characterizations of those opinions by the dissenters.  See id. 
at 873 n.238–40. 
 378 DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 206–07.  Although Henry Hart’s and Albert Sacks’s textbook, 
The Legal Process, is often cited as the “classic work” of this school, Professor Duxbury points out that 
“process-oriented legal thought was already fairly well established in the United States” when that work 
appeared in the mid-1950s.  Id. at 207. 
 379 See id. at 205. 
 380 See Bandes, supra note 237, at 863 (arguing that “Legal process theory attempted to maintain 
the rule of law despite the unavoidable fact of judicial discretion” by emphasizing “reasoned elabora-
tion”  as the key constraint on judicial imposition of values); see also DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 205, 
225–28. 
 381 Far from slavish devotion to formalism and abstract theory, process jurisprudence injected a 
strong emphasis on prudence.  See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 278–86 (describing Alexander 
 
File: Young Proofs Created on:  1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM 
84 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY [VOL. 10:1 
Critically, process reasoning was directed to a functional analysis of the 
most promising allocation of institutional authority.382 
Process jurisprudence thus did not presuppose a consensus on values 
in society; rather, it aspired to bridge social cleavages on substantive values 
by securing widespread agreement on legitimate processes for the resolu-
tion of disputes.  As Richard Fallon puts it, 
In a post-Realist world, legal norms are frequently indeterminate. Moreover, in a demonstra-
bly pluralistic society, we cannot expect consensus about appropriate answers to many urgent 
questions of substantive justice. But most of us, Hart and Wechsler assume, are prepared to 
accept the claim to legitimacy of thoughtful, deliberative, unbiased decisions by government 
officials who are reasonably empowered to make such decisions. On this assumption rest our 
hopes for the rule of law.
383
 
Hence the principle of “institutional settlement,” which lies at the heart 
of the Legal Process vision.384  Modern, pluralistic society gives rise both to 
disputes and to differing ideas about how those disputes should come out.  
Under these conditions, “[t]he alternative to disintegrating resort to violence 
is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision.”385  
The principle of institutional settlement reflects the respect that members of 
the society owe to the outcome of these agreed-upon procedures; as Henry 
Hart and Albert Sacks put it, institutional settlement “expresses the judg-
ment that decisions which are the duly arrived-at result of duly established 
procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole 
society unless and until they are duly changed.”386 
Legal Process thinkers urged that institutional settlement of authority 
to make decisions should be undertaken based on judgments about compar-
ative institutional competence.387  These judgements were highly functional 
  
Bickel’s contributions to process jurisprudence); Anthony Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of 
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (same).  Nor was process jurisprudence indifferent to substantive 
justice.  As Professor Duxbury explains, “it [was] Hart and Sacks’s belief that, so long as judges respect 
the principle of institutional competence, they ought to engage in the reasoned elaboration of principles 
as actively as possible in order to achieve substantive justice for the parties to any particular dispute.”  
DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 264. 
 382 See infra notes 387–90 and accompanying text. 
 383 Fallon, supra note 296, at 964. 
 384 DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 255–56. 
 385 HART. & SACKS, supra note 296, at 4. 
 386 Id.; see also Fallon, supra note 296, at 970 (“The Legal Process school, with its principle of 
institutional settlement and its theories of comparative institutional competences, furnished a theory of 
law and provided a structure for distinctively legal analysis; it substantially addressed the threat of 
judicial subjectivity introduced by Legal Realism, but without relying on the metaphysical pretenses that 
had brought moral and political philosophy into bad repute.”). 
 387 See HART & SACKS, supra note 385, at 158 (taking as central questions, “What is each of these 
institutions good for?  How can it be made to do its job best?  How does, and how should, its working 
dovetail with the working of the others?”). 
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in character and often grounded in social science,388 which makes it hard to 
understand how Professor Bandes can charge process jurisprudence with 
formalism or insularity.  To be sure, the constitutional scheme of federalism 
and separation of powers was part of this institutional allocation; hence, 
institutional settlement had to rest in part on the “reasoned elaboration” of 
constitutional text and principle.389  But consider the notion at the heart of 
the Legal Process view of Erie—that is, that if Congress must legislate in 
order to make federal law, then forces of inertia and political conflict will 
maintain a large realm of autonomy for the states.  This view is far more 
functional than formal, and it draws considerably on social science insights 
about how government actually works.390 
When politically progressive scholars like Professor Bandes insist that 
“federalism” involves a value choice, they generally seem to mean that fed-
eralism is going entrench antiprogressive notions against nationally driven 
reform.391  “Federalism,” Bandes writes, “is a term that serves as an indeli-
ble reminder of the dangers of jurisdictional principle deployed as a socially 
acceptable cover for the insulation of unacceptable substantive ends.”392  
But a Legal Process-style emphasis on allocation of legitimate deci-
sionmaking can also advance progressive causes.  Just last term, for exam-
ple, in United States v. Windsor,393 principles of federalism played a critical 
role in protecting individual states’ recognition of same-sex marriage from 
the national government’s effort to impose a more socially conservative 
solution.394  As Windsor and other cases have shown, we have little reason 
to assume that federalism will undermine substantive justice, even from a 
progressive perspective.395  Federalism protects minorities’ rights both to 
  
 388 See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 208–09, 235, 255. 
 389 See DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 259–60 (discussing reasoned elaboration); Fallon, supra note 
296, at 966 (same). 
 390 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441 (2008) (playing out the implications of an interstitial view of federal law with functionalist, social 
science tools). 
 391 Bandes, supra note 237, at 871 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions 
“have tended to create barriers to federal governmental protection of the rights of individuals”).  That is 
a particularly strange claim to make in the Erie context, given the broad consensus that the pre-Erie 
general common law was inimical to progressive causes and individual remedies against national corpo-
rations. 
 392 Bandes, supra note 237, at 868–69. 
 393 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act). 
 394 See generally Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United 
States v. Windsor, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117 (2013). 
 395 See also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (upholding individual tort claim against a 
pharmaceutical company against a federal preemption defense); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 
(2006) (rejecting federal preemption of Oregon’s law legalizing physician-assisted suicide); Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (rejecting federalism-based argument that would have invalidated federal 
prohibition on individuals’ use of medicinal marijuana).  If one were inclined to be snarky, one might 
even cite United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996), which vindicated the claim of an individual 
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exit from oppressive regimes and to implement their own norms in smaller 
communities where they may constitute a majority; in this way, it may sys-
tematically promote reform.396 
Even if the Legal Process scholars did rely on unacknowledged as-
sumptions about the importance of federalism and separation of powers as 
constitutional values, it hardly follows that those values should be aban-
doned.  They should be defended explicitly.  The present article is long 
enough without also essaying a general defense of federalism and separa-
tion of powers values, but the topic is not neglected in the literature.397  In-
deed, Professor Bandes is more than content to rely on her own presupposi-
tions; she never undertakes any sort of argument why federalism intrinsical-
ly tends toward “unacceptable substantive ends.”  Nor does she articulate 
how a legal culture that was more oriented toward “substantive justice” 
would actually operate in a world of pervasive disagreement on what justice 
entails. 
A more on-point criticism of the Legal Process vision of federalism 
might be that the world of intergovernmental relations has changed to the 
point that this vision no longer can provide effective protection for state 
autonomy.  For example, to the extent that federal law is no longer intersti-
tial and federal bureaucracies now dominate the regulatory landscape, the 
judicial federalism model of Erie might be largely beside the point.398  We 
might do better to focus on approaches like Heather Gerken’s and Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen’s model of “uncooperative federalism,” in which the im-
plementing role (and resulting “agency slack”) of state officials operating 
within federal bureaucratic structures provides a primary safeguard of state 
autonomy.399  But this model, too, fits comfortably within the Legal Process 
tradition: it brackets substantive policy disagreements and focuses on the 
institutional settlement of authority to decide in particular officials and pro-
cesses, and it does presuppose that limiting national authority is a legitimate 
  
criminal defendant.  See generally Baker & Young, supra note 305, at 152–153 (contesting the view that 
federalism is inherently anti-progressive). 
 396 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J. 37, 37–38 
(2012), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=1; 
Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY (forthcoming 2013); Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: 
Lessons from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2014). 
 397 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 
1–9 (1999); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federal-
ism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); McConnell, supra note 167; Ernest A. Young, The Conservative 
Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874 (2006). 
 398 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 460 (suggesting, in the 2009 edition, that “federal 
law appears to be more primary than interstitial in numerous areas”). 
 399 Jessica Bulman–Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 
(2009); see also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 
427 (2013). 
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constitutional value.  In any event, the imperative to develop alternative 
models that fit certain aspects of the current regulatory environment hardly 
denies the importance of judicial federalism in those areas where state law 
still has a central role to play.  
3. Are Judicial and Legislative Powers Coextensive? 
Arguing against the Legal Process school’s judicial federalism reading 
of Erie, Professor Sherry relies heavily on “the views of the founding gen-
eration,” which “assumed that the powers of the various departments of the 
federal government were co-extensive with regard to the states.”400  This 
original understanding, she says, refutes any notion “that federal courts 
have more limited power than the federal legislature.”401  Professor Purcell 
attributes this notion to Justice Brandeis himself.402  In either case, the sup-
port for this principle is thin, and to the extent it exists at all it does not un-
dermine Erie’s judicial federalism argument. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that the Constitution itself says nothing 
about coextensive powers.  Its basic structure belies the notion, carefully 
denoting the powers of each branch largely without reference to the others.  
They are coextensive in a sense, in that action by each branch may provide 
the occasion for action by the others.  Whenever Congress passes a law on 
any subject, for example, the Executive acquires the responsibility to exe-
cute that law,403 and the Judiciary may hear cases arising under it.404  But 
even in this sense, the coextensivity is imperfect and not automatic.  The 
federal courts cannot even hear cases—much less make law—without statu-
tory jurisdiction, and for much of our history both the lower federal courts 
and the Supreme Court have lacked jurisdiction over important classes of 
federal question cases.405  The rules of standing, political questions, and 
limits on judicial review abroad406 all create situations in which judicial 
power is not coextensive with the powers of the legislative and political 
branches. 
  
 400 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 145. 
 401 Id. 
 402 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172. 
 403 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
 404 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . aris-
ing under . . . the laws of the United States”). 
 405 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 275–76; Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and 
Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1585–86 (1990). 
 406 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224 (1993) (political questions); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 78 (1950) (holding that the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an enemy alien detained abroad); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
244, 285–86 (1901) (rejecting the notion that the Constitution always follows the flag). 
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To be sure, the Founding Generation did from time to time suggest 
that the federal branches’ powers were coextensive.407  The Founders’ doc-
trine of coextensive powers, however, cannot do the work that Professor 
Sherry needs it to do.  First, it was deployed by James Madison and others 
to reject the notion that the federal courts had broad federal common law 
powers.  Writing against the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison warned that 
accepting the Federalist argument that the Constitution had endowed the 
federal courts with broad power to declare common law crimes would legit-
imize federal legislative intrusion into any area that the common law could 
reach, thereby destroying the whole notion of a government of limited and 
enumerated powers.408  The election of 1800 arguably ratified the Jefferso-
nian position on this issue,409 and in any event, the Supreme Court adopted 
it in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,410 which rejected the very notion 
of federal common law crimes.411 
As Madison’s position makes clear, the coextensivity argument was 
often used to say that Congress could legislate wherever the courts could 
adjudicate.  So, for instance, many maritime statutes were justified on the 
ground that Congress’s legislative jurisdiction piggybacked on the federal 
courts’ ability to decide cases under general maritime law.412  As the admi-
ralty example makes clear, however, we need to be careful about the infer-
ences we draw from that notion of coextensivity.  At the Founding and 
throughout the nineteenth century, prior to Jensen, the federal courts did not 
treat judge-made maritime law as federal law within the meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause,413 and even thereafter the Court held that admiralty cas-
es did not fall within the federal question jurisdiction.414  Most important, it 
does not follow, as Louise Weinberg has suggested, that “[t]he judiciary 
  
 407 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., Wesleyan Universi-
ty Press 1961); Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1242. 
 408 See Report on Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799–1800, Concerning Alien and 
Sedition Laws, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 381 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1906) (“[T]he consequences 
of admitting the common law as the law of the United States, on the authority of the individual States, is 
as obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be para-
mount to the Constitutions and laws of the States, the admission of it would overwhelm the residuary 
sovereignty of the States, and by one constructive operation new model the whole political fabric of the 
country.”). 
 409 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 611 (“Many historians believe that a backlash 
against federal-common law crimes helped to elect Jefferson in 1800.”). 
 410 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34  (1812). 
 411 See generally Gary Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 
the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 
(1992); Jay, Part One, supra note 91, at 1111–13. 
 412 See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360–61 (1959); GRANT GILMORE & 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-16, at 47 (2d ed. 1975).  I think it’s generally fair 
to say that these statutes would be better grounded in the Commerce Clause today. 
 413 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 319–22. 
 414 See Romero, 358 U.S. at 363–68. 
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must have presumptive power to adjudicate whatever the legislature and the 
executive can act upon.”415  The originalist assumption that courts can act 
wherever the political branches can act could sensibly be taken to mean 
simply that the federal courts always have the presumptive authority to re-
view, interpret, and apply any federal legislation or order promulgated by 
those branches.416  But nothing in that assumption implies the further propo-
sition that federal courts have the authority to go first and act in an area 
where the national political branches potentially could act, but have not.417 
Edward Purcell imputes an assumption of coextensive powers not to 
the Founders but rather to Justice Brandeis himself.  As I have already dis-
cussed, coextensivity of legislative and judicial powers was one of the “two 
related principles” upon which, in Purcell’s view, Brandeis rested Erie.418  
Purcell’s account is ambiguous, however, as to what Brandeis meant by 
coextensivity or what constitutional authority he rested that assumption 
upon.  Purcell suggests that Brandeis developed his views on coextensive 
powers from his pre-Erie experience with state legislative jurisdiction.419  
But that issue, which involved constitutional issues on state choice of law, 
establishes only that Brandeis believed state legislative and judicial powers 
must be considered coextensive.  That view would reflect the widespread 
assumption that state courts share lawmaking authority with legislatures420 
but it hardly translates without controversy to federal courts.421  Similarly, 
Brandeis’s correspondence with Justice Reed during the deliberations in 
Erie relied on the coextensive powers of state legislatures and courts: 
“Since [the Swift doctrine] admits that the state rule must be followed if 
  
 415 Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 266, at 813. 
 416 See Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1242 (noting that, according to James Wilson, the principle 
that “the judicial [powers] were commensurate with the legislative powers [and] went no further” both 
limited judicial authority and provided “the means of making the provisions” of congressional laws 
“effectual over all that country included within the Union”) (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 515 (J. Elliot ed. 1836)). 
Even so, the coextensivity proposition would be subject to the important qualification that the federal 
courts may act only where Congress confers jurisdiction upon them by statute.  See supra note 405 and 
accompanying text. 
 417 See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 61 (1981) (“[N]or does the 
existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common 
law to govern those areas until Congress acts.”). 
 418 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172; see supra text accompanying notes 352–61 (discussing Purcell’s 
argument). 
 419 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 185 (observing that Brandeis’s concept of state legislative juris-
diction “also implied that the scope of that allowable lawmaking should be no broader for one branch of 
a government than for its other branches”). 
 420 See supra text accompanying notes 211–214. 
 421 See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state courts, 
are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own 
rules of decision.”). 
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declared in a [state] statute,” Brandeis wrote, “it admits that [the state rule] 
is not a matter within the authority of Congress.”422 
If this is the key point, then it is a very odd one.  We cannot, for the 
reasons already discussed, impute to Justice Brandeis the view that Con-
gress could not have legislated a rule to deal with mishaps along railroad 
rights-of-way.423  Professor Purcell seems to think the problem “was not that 
Congress lacked certain powers but that the federal courts ignored the rele-
vance of whatever those powers were.”424  In other words, Swift would sup-
port displacing state law even in situations that fell outside Congress’s 
commerce power.425  But if that is the point, then Erie (in which Congress 
plainly did have power to act) was an odd case in which to overrule Swift.426  
And Purcell’s reading seems flatly inconsistent with Brandeis’s statement 
that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be 
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”427  If Brandeis were con-
cerned about the scope of Congress’s legislative jurisdiction, he would 
hardly choose topics fitting plainly within that jurisdiction—such as com-
mercial law—as examples of unconstitutional federal action. 
As I have already suggested, the language just quoted is best read as 
insisting that Congress actually pass substantive statutes in order to displace 
state law; it cannot simply order federal courts to apply the common law in 
disregard of state jurisprudence.428  And the more natural implication from 
the coextensivity of state legislative and judicial powers would be that state 
decisional law can be displaced only by the same sorts of federal action that 
displace state statutes—that is, federal statutes and constitutional provi-
sions.  Brandeis himself wrote that “[m]y own opinion had been that it was 
wise (1) to treat the constitutional power of interstate commerce as very 
broad and (2) to treat acts of Congress as not invading State power unless it 
clearly appeared that the federal power was intended to be exercised exclu-
  
 422 Quoted in PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173. 
 423 See supra text accompanying notes 273–288. 
 424 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173. 
 425 See Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 288 (construing Brandeis to mean that “federal general 
common law as a whole was illegitimate because it exceeded the power of Congress, not necessarily on 
the special facts of the case before the Court, but in a broad range of other cases”). 
 426 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 613.  If the question in Erie were really whether Con-
gress had the requisite power, then under modern practice Swift would have been constitutional “as 
applied” to the facts of Erie, and there would surely have been sufficient constitutional applications for 
the doctrine to survive a “facial” challenge as well.  See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987) (facial challenges can succeed only when there is “no set of circumstances” under which the 
challenged action would be valid).  Professor Green thinks this point shows why Erie was wrong.  My 
own view is that it demonstrates that both Green and Purcell have misinterpreted what Brandeis was 
driving at. 
 427 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 428 See supra text accompanying note 337. 
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sively.”429  On this reading, Purcell’s two principles—the coextensivity 
principle and its “prudential” corollary—are really the same idea.  In any 
event, as I have already pointed out,430 the supposedly prudential reasons for 
that corollary limiting judicial displacement of state law to situations in 
which Congress has already acted are sufficiently strong to warrant treating 
it as a constitutional principle in its own right—and that is how it has been 
treated by subsequent courts and commentators.431 
The Sherry/Weinberg position requires a still further and even more 
radical step—that is, it asserts that the federal courts’ supposed authority to 
adjudicate any issue that the national political branches could act upon also 
presupposes the power to make law on such issues.  Beginning with the 
proposition that when “the national interest so requires, Congress has power 
to federalize a matter previously governed by state law,” Professor Wein-
berg concluded that it “would seem that that basic power must also inhere 
in its courts.”432  Even if one assumes that all diversity cases involve inter-
state commerce and therefore involve matters upon which Congress could 
potentially legislate,433 that coextensivity would not itself answer the ques-
tion of what law the federal courts must apply in such cases, or whether 
those courts have the power to fashion common law rules of decision with 
the force of federal law.434  Coextensivity, at most, establishes the federal 
courts’ power to adjudicate in situations where Congress might legislate, 
but it begs the most important question: Does power to adjudicate neces-
sarily include the power to make law?435 
  
 429 Quoted in PURCELL, supra note 9, at 174. 
 430 See supra text accompanying notes 356–369. 
 431 See, e.g., Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303; Clark, Erie’s Source, supra note 90.  In Ather-
ton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997), for example, the Court said that “when courts decide to fashion rules 
of federal common law, ‘the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy 
or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically shown.’”  Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. 
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).  This language, to my mind, suggests a stronger 
limitation than a merely prudential test. 
 432 WEINBERG, supra note 229, at 20.  As Professor Purcell notes, “Weinberg’s views did not seem 
to persuade most legal scholars.”  PURCELL, supra note 9, at 402 n.47.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, 
Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 NW. U. L. 
REV. 853, 858–59 (1989) (concluding that Weinberg’s approach is flatly inconsistent with the Rules of 
Decision Act). 
 433 This assumption is likely incorrect.  For example, a citizen of one state might bring a diversity 
suit against an out-of-stater for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the out-of-stater brought a 
gun to school and frightened him, but it would not follow that schoolyard gun possession is within 
Congress’s regulatory authority.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 434 See generally BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63 (arguing that the point of the diversity 
jurisdiction was to provide a neutral forum that would apply general principles of commercial law 
arising out of customary dealings among merchants). 
 435 For example, Professor Purcell cites the 1969 American Law Institute’s Study of the Division of 
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts as relying “most fundamental[ly]” on the principle that 
“the judicial and legislative powers should be coextensive.”  PURCELL, supra note 9, at 273.  But the 
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A recent case may help to illustrate this cluster of arguments.  In Zivo-
tofsky v. Clinton,436 parents of a child born in Jerusalem sued the Secretary 
of State requesting that their child’s passport list “Israel” as his place of 
birth.  They invoked a federal statute, § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, providing that “[f]or purposes of the 
registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of 
a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, 
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the 
place of birth as Israel.”437  The Secretary refused, pursuant to Department 
policy recognizing that whether Jerusalem is legitimately part of Israel is a 
hotly disputed issue and asserting that Congress’s attempt to resolve that 
question interfered with the Executive’s constitutional authority to conduct 
foreign affairs.438  The lower courts concluded that Zivotofsky’s claim pre-
sented a nonjusticiable political question.439  The Supreme Court reversed, 
and its reasoning may help illustrate what it may and may not mean for 
legislative, executive, and judicial power to be “coextensive.” 
Even if the Founders and Justice Brandeis thought that the three 
branches possess “coextensive” powers, Zivotofsky demonstrates that that 
cannot be true in any simple, straightforward sense.  The Executive branch, 
to start with, took the position (1) that only it could determine the U.S. posi-
tion on the status of Jerusalem, (2) that Congress’s attempt to do so was 
flatly unconstitutional, and (3) that the judicial branch lacked even the pow-
er to determine who was right about (1) and (2).440  On this view, power 
would be coextensive only in the sense that Congress would have authority 
to legislate and appropriate money in support of the Executive’s position on 
the matter, and the judiciary might have occasion to interpret and apply 
those directives.  No one thought that some broad notion of coextensive 
powers required categorical rejection of the Executive’s claims. 
The Court’s rejection of the political question argument, moreover, il-
lustrated two important distinctions: (1) between courts “going first” and 
following action by another branch in a particular area, and (2) between the 
power to make law and the power to resolve disputes.  If Congress had not 
acted on the question of Jerusalem’s status, then it seems likely that the 
  
ALI relied on that principle to condemn diversity jurisdiction for rendering “the state’s judicial power . . 
. less extensive than its legislative power,” and to suggest that “federal courts should be ‘concentrated 
upon the adjudication of rights created by federal substantive law.’”  Id. (quoting American Law Insti-
tute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, at 99 (1969)).  Neither of 
these points comes close to establishing that federal courts may make substantive rules of decision on 
any issue upon which Congress could legislate. 
 436 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
 437 116 Stat. 1350, 1366. 
 438 Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1425–26. 
 439 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d 1227, 
1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 440 See 132 S. Ct. at 1428. 
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Court would have found that status to pose a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion—after all, the Court seemed to acknowledge that the Constitution may 
commit the recognition of foreign sovereigns to the political branches and 
that, in any event, courts lack “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” for resolving recognition questions.441  But, Chief Justice Rob-
erts noted, “there is, of course, no exclusive commitment to the Executive 
of the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute,” and concerns 
about a lack of standards “dissipate . . . when the issue is recognized to be 
the more focused one of the constitutionality of 214(d).”442  This is thus a 
case where the judiciary’s power to act may well have depended on the fact 
that Congress had acted first. 
Even more obviously, the judiciary’s power to resolve a dispute about 
who had the power to establish the U.S. position on Jerusalem hardly 
equated with a judicial power to make law itself on that question.  The 
Chief Justice distinguished between two questions: “whether Jerusalem is 
the capital of Israel,” and “whether Zivitofsky may vindicate his statutory 
right, under § 214(d), to choose to have Israel recorded on his passport as 
his place of birth.”443  The D.C. Circuit erred, he said, when it “treated the 
two questions as one and the same.”444  Answering the first would have re-
quired the federal courts “to supplant a foreign policy decision of the politi-
cal branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of what United 
States policy toward Jerusalem should be”—in other words, it would have 
invited the courts to make law on their own.445  But in order to answer the 
second question, “the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky's interpretation of 
the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional.  This is a 
familiar judicial exercise.”446  Adjudication of disputes under preexisting 
law, whether statutory or constitutional, is distinct from lawmaking, and the 
judiciary’s power to do one is not necessarily coextensive even with its own 
power to do the other.447 
Professors Sherry and Weinberg assert not simply that legislative and 
judicial powers are coextensive in scope, but also that they are the same 
  
 441 Id. at 1428. 
 442 Id. 
 443 Id. at 1427. 
 444 Id. 
 445 Id. 
 446 Id. 
 447 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (stating that 
“instances [of federal common lawmaking authority] are ‘few and restricted’”) (quoting Wheeldin v. 
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).  As discussed earlier, none of this is to deny that every adjudication 
may involve a sort of Heisenbergian element of lawmaking. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying 
text.  I do deny that this element is the same as deliberate formulation of rules of federal common law. 
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thing.448  There is no evidence that either the founding generation or Justice 
Brandeis ever thought that, and abundant evidence that they did not.  If they 
had, then to what end did the Founders make specific and distinct provision 
for the jurisdiction and operating procedures of each branch?  And why did 
Brandeis insist that, in practice, judicial power was much narrower than 
legislative power?  In any event, we certainly do not equate judicial and 
legislative powers under contemporary law, and it would be strange to re-
ject Erie based on anachronistic assumptions if it coheres with current doc-
trine. 
4. Proving Too Much and Too Little: Judicial Lawmaking and the 
Administrative State 
Michael Greve offers a different argument against the judicial federal-
ism interpretation of Erie.  Although conceding that this account “provides 
a plausible constitutional rationale,” he complains that “in substance, the 
argument proves both too little and too much.”449  Too little, because Justice 
Story could both read the Supremacy Clause and appreciate the importance 
of federal lawmaking procedures.  And too much, because “a Supremacy 
Clause understanding that is sufficiently rigorous to provide firm ground for 
Erie also casts doubt on practices and institutions wholly outside its am-
bit—for starters, the administrative state, whose raison d’etre is to make 
law outside the constitutional strictures of bicameral approval and present-
ment.”450  Both objections are plausible, and considering them will help 
flesh out the implications of the judicial federalism position. 
Arguments beginning from a premise along the lines of “Justice Story 
made an obvious mistake” generally are—and should be—met with consid-
erable skepticism.451  But that is not my claim.  My own view has always 
been that, under the circumstances that each court faced at the time, both 
Swift and Erie were rightly decided.452  The explanation has to do with 
changes in the content of both state law and general law over the course of 
the nineteenth century.  The latter began as a narrow category of principles 
derived from the customary practices of merchants engaged in primarily 
cross-border transactions.453  But as the nineteenth century wore on, the 
  
 448 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 145 (asserting that because the Founders “assumed that the 
powers of the various departments of the federal government were co-extensive,” it followed that “none 
denied the power of federal courts to declare the common law”); Weinberg, supra note 266, at 813. 
 449 Greve, supra note 4, at 375. 
 450 Id. 
 451 One might also, however, say the same of Justice Brandeis. 
 452 See also Bellia & Clark, supra note 49, at 687–88, 701 (taking a similar view). 
 453 As I have noted, scholars debate whether the law merchant was ever as customary or as uniform 
as it is sometimes made out to be.  See, e.g., Kadens, supra note 246, at 1168–81 (arguing that it was 
not).  That dispute is beyond my scope here, although it does have implications for related issues today.  
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Court extended it to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written 
instruments,454 tort cases,455 and even cases involving deeds of land.456  This 
radical expansion of Swift’s scope coincided with erosion of the strong 
norm of deference to state courts on construction of state statutes and con-
stitutions.457 
The result was that the general common law came to apply in areas 
that not only had a more local flavor, but also that were more strongly nor-
mative in character.  Justice Story’s general commercial law had sought 
simply to capture the actual practices of merchants and involved issues up-
on which it was often more important that rules be settled than that they be 
settled right; areas like tort law, by contrast, implicated much sharper con-
flicts over justice and fairness, upon which local political communities were 
more likely to insist on their own way.458  Federal courts could not, as a 
result, continue to take for granted the state choice of law rule that I have 
argued was crucial to Swift’s reasoning—that is, that the state itself had 
determined that general law should govern the relevant class of cases.459  
Nor could general law be regarded as customary or “bottom–up” law, based 
on the actual practices of merchants—instead, it embodied top–down nor-
mative commands like any other form of law.  Both developments made it 
imperative to identify the sovereign source of the general law and the feder-
al courts’ power to apply it. 
Professor Greve is thus right to focus on why Swift “got out of hand 
and eventually prompted [federal] judges to substitute their own views of 
sound public policy on the states.”460  The answer is that a doctrine that 
originally reflected state policy—New York’s own decision to apply the 
  
See, e.g., Kadens & Young, supra note 77 (arguing that customary international law cannot rest on 
analogy to the customary law merchant). 
 454 Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464, 476 (1845). 
 455 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893); Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 
Black.) 418, 428 (1862). 
 456 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 360–62 (1910). 
 457 See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 184 (1863) (refusing to follow a 
state court’s construction of the state constitutional provisions governing defaulted municipal bonds, 
declaring that “[w]e shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has erected 
the altar and decreed the sacrifice”); Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 521 (1855) (“[A]ny 
state law or regulation, the effect of which would be to impair the rights [under and defined by the 
general commercial law] . . . or to devest the federal courts of cognizance thereof . . . must be nugatory 
and unavailing.”).  Michael Collins has argued that the federal diversity courts even developed a “gen-
eral” body of constitutional law that they applied in cases construing state constitutions during the latter 
end of this period.  Michael Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of 
General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263 (2000); see also Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for 
Substantive Due Process: the Municipal Bond Cases, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 738, 745–47 (1975). 
 458 See FREYER, supra note 30, at 23–25; Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1513. 
 459 See Baugh, 149 U.S. at 377–78; Robbins, 67 U.S. at 428–29; supra text accompanying notes 
116–120. 
 460 GREVE, supra note 4, at 375. 
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general law merchant to cases like Swift—had become a tool by which fed-
eral judges limited state policy in order to benefit interstate businesses.461  
Professor Greve may or may not be right that such limits are salutary and 
necessary—what cannot be denied, however, is that they require a different 
constitutional justification than a decision, like Justice Story’s in Swift, to 
follow state preferences.  In Erie, Justice Brandeis found that this more 
difficult constitutional case simply could not be made. 
Does the judicial federalism rationale prove too much?  It is morally 
satisfying to pound on the table and insist that “Only Congress can make 
federal law!”—but that principle is often honored in the breach.  As Gary 
Lawson has depressingly explained, “the demise of the non-delegation doc-
trine . . . allows the national government's now-general legislative powers 
to be exercised by administrative agencies.”462  This development, moreo-
ver, “has encountered no serious real-world legal or political challenges, 
and none are on the horizon.”463  Justice White thus famously observed that 
“[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by the agencies has far 
outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional 
process.”464  If we accept that development, then why not accept judicial 
lawmaking, contra-Erie? 
It does seem to me that it is one thing to admit that we have a massive 
administrative state and that it is too late in the day to return to a simpler 
model where Congress makes all the laws, but quite another to say that the 
administrative state should become our template for reasoning in cases 
where the burdens of historical inertia do not exist or point in a different 
direction.465  Moreover, there are significant differences between adminis-
trative agencies and federal courts as lawmaking agents.  Agencies are sub-
ject to extensive congressional oversight and budgetary controls that, if 
applied to the federal courts, we would consider a serious threat to judicial 
independence.466  Most importantly, one can still argue that although federal 
agencies plainly “make law” in an important sense, considerably more 
stringent limits exist on their capacity to displace state law.  Current doc-
trine continues to stress that such displacement must be traceable to Con-
gress’s intent in an authorizing statute,467 and the Court has proven willing 
to limit the preemptive force of agency decisions in a number of important 
  
 461 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792; Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 212–14. 
 462 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241 
(1994). 
 463 Id. 
 464 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
 465 See, e.g., Stuart M. Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative 
Federalism without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2113 (2008) (rejecting the “‘in for a penny, in for a 
pound’ approach to the modern administrative state”).  If Professor Greve is actually arguing otherwise, 
then perhaps he should worry about having his American Enterprise Institute membership card revoked. 
 466 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.19; see also supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 467 See Benjamin & Young, supra note 465, at 2147. 
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ways.468  Although no viable doctrinal proposal can avoid taking the admin-
istrative state into account, the way remains open to make process federal-
ism arguments against broad administrative preemption analogous to the 
judicial federalism argument in Erie.469 
The more serious version of Professor Greve’s “too much” argument 
focuses instead on the extensive use of federal common law after Erie.470  
As Judge Friendly famously observed, Erie hardly put an end to federal 
common law: 
By banishing the spurious uniformity of Swift v. Tyson . . . and by leaving to the states what 
ought to be left to them, Erie led to the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of na-
tional concern that is truly uniform because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in eve-
ry forum, and therefore is predictable and useful as its predecessor, more general in subject 
matter but limited to the federal courts, was not.  The clarion yet careful pronouncement of 
Erie, ‘There is no federal general common law,’ opened the way to what, for want of a better 
term, we may call specialized federal common law.
471
 
Federal common law rules thus fill in the interstices of federal statutes, 
and they dominate certain legal enclaves even in the absence of statutory 
guidance or authorization.472  Judge-made federal law plays a critical role, 
for example, in admiralty,473 disputes between states,474 foreign relations 
law,475 labor–management relations,476 and matters involving the proprietary 
relations of the United States government.477  Professor Greve argues that 
  
 468 See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (“Although we defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an agency’s ultimate conclusion about 
whether state law should be pre-empted.”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–80 (2009) (refusing to 
defer to agency preamble asserting broad preemptive effect to federal drug approvals); Solid Waste 
Auth. of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (refusing to defer to 
agency rule operating at the outer limit of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority); see generally 
Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 280–81 (discussing doctrinal limits on agency preemption). 
 469 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE 
THEORY, LAW, AND REALTY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 192 (William Buzbee ed., 2009); Nina 
A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 699 (2008); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 769–79 (2008); 
David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy? 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1188–90 (2012); Young, Execu-
tive Preemption, supra note 7. 
 470 GREVE, supra note 4, at 375. 
 471 Friendly, supra note 57, at 405. 
 472 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 616–26 (discussing the development of the 
“new federal common law” after Erie). 
 473 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 474 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
 475 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 476 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1947). 
 477 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
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“the structural Supremacy Clause argument runs up hard against well-
recognized enclaves of federal common law.”478 
I think it is fair to say, however, that Judge Friendly’s “new federal 
common law” is—as the judge insisted—very much a creature of Erie’s 
world, not Swift’s.  Notwithstanding revisionist academic theories arguing 
for a general federal common law power in the federal courts,479 each en-
clave of federal common lawmaking has been developed and justified as an 
exception to Erie’s rule, with special attention to why a departure from the 
presumptive rule of congressional primacy is warranted.480  Reasonable 
people disagree about whether all the existing instances of federal common 
lawmaking can be justified in this way.  My own view is that filling in the 
gaps of federal statutes is so close to—and difficult to distinguish from—
statutory interpretation as to be relatively unproblematic;481 that most of the 
foreign affairs rules can be justified as self-imposed prudential limitations 
on judicial review;482 that the Clearfield line of cases is not obviously nec-
essary but may be largely assimilated to notions of conflict preemption;483 
that state versus state cases may be a legitimate uses of “general” law where 
states are not competent to legislate;484 and that freestanding federal com-
mon law in admiralty is unconstitutional.485  But, the important point is that 
the new federal common law must be grounded in a plausible interpretation 
  
 478 GREVE, supra note 4, at 375. 
 479 See, e.g., Field, Sources of Law, supra note 55; Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 
266.  But see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 618 (observing that “[f]ew decisions or commenta-
tors support the broad view” of federal common law).  For rejections of the broad view, see, e.g., 
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (“[J]udicial creation of a special federal 
rule . . . is limited to situations where there is a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or 
interest and the use of state law.’”) (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 
(1966)); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 213 (1997) (same). 
 480 See, e.g., Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303 (exploring the different domains and justifica-
tions of federal common lawmaking from this perspective). 
 481 See, e.g., Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity, 
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331–36 (1980) (arguing that statutory interpretation and federal common law-
making are indistinguishable). 
 482 See Ernest A. Young, The Story of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: Federal Judicial 
Power in Foreign Relations Cases, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 436–37 (Vicki Jackson & Judith 
Resnik eds., 2010). 
 483 See Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1655–67.  Importantly, the Court has 
backed away considerably from Clearfield since the New Deal.  See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell 
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 628 (noting that con-
temporary case law under Kimbell Foods incorporates “a preference for incorporation of state law 
absent a demonstrated need for a uniform federal rule of decision”). 
 484 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 699, 711 (2008) (suggesting that “many of the ‘federal common law’ 
rules that fall within these enclaves do not actually constitute ‘federal judge-made law’ because they 
consist of background principles derived from the law of nations that are necessary to implement basic 
aspects of the constitutional scheme”). 
 485 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 306; Young, Just Water, supra note 329. 
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of the Supremacy Clause; no courts, and few scholars, are willing to gener-
alize from these enclaves to a rejection of judicial federalism. 
Importantly, these enclaves do not rest on a judgment that they some-
how implicate the most important or fundamental aspects of our constitu-
tional scheme.  Rather, they generally rest on arguments about congression-
al authorization486 or claims that applying state law would thwart particular 
federal interests that cannot otherwise be easily protected.487  Professor 
Greve’s argument that the law governing interstate business must necessari-
ly be governed by federal common law because it is a “basic aspect of the 
constitutional scheme,”488 thus, misses the mark.  That argument also repre-
sents a strange inversion of our scheme of government, which was con-
cerned to empower Congress—not courts—to deal with the most critical 
matters for national unity and prosperity.  As such, Professor Greve’s desire 
for federal courts to rescue interstate business from the grasping clutches of 
state law489 echoes Erie’s liberal critics, like Professors Sherry and Green, 
who seek to empower courts to protect human rights through expansive 
constitutional interpretation and importation of international law.490  As I 
suggest in Part IV, all of these arguments reflect a basic loss of faith in the 
political branches to solve national problems.  Whether or not that loss of 
faith is warranted by the current performance of our national political 
branches, it finds little support in the Constitution. 
  
 486 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457–58 (1947). (finding a 
delegation of common lawmaking authority in § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1947); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualiza-
tion of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367 (2000) (reading the 1948 Judiciary Act and the Admiralty 
Extension Act as delegating authority to federal courts to make federal common law in admiralty cases). 
 487 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510–12 (1988) (developing a federal 
common law defense for government military contractors sued in tort, based on the likelihood that 
damages awards would be passed through to the government and an analogy to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act).  Professor Sherry argues that “it is at least plausible to read the grant of diversity jurisdiction as an 
authorization to develop federal common law.”  Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 146.  Why?  Sherry 
offers no explanation, and the text of the diversity grant says no such thing.  And even under Swift, the 
Rules of Decision Act was not interpreted to authorize federal common law.  See Fletcher, supra note 
90, at 1514 (distinguishing federal common law from general common law).  In any event, I submit that 
such an unbounded delegation of lawmaking to the federal courts—without any intelligible principle to 
guide their decisions—would violate even the vestigial nondelegation doctrine that persists today.  See 
Young, Just Water, supra note 329, at 485–90. 
 488 GREVE, supra note 4, at 376. 
 489 Id.; see also Gasaway & Parrish, supra note 4, at 969. 
 490 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 623–35; Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 152–53; see 
also Koh, supra note 276, at 1831–33 (reading Erie narrowly to permit recognition of customary inter-
national law norms as federal common law); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 433–38 (1997) (same). 
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D. Erie’s Premises: The State Courts’ Power and Inclination to Make 
Law 
This section deals with a quite different critique of Erie’s constitution-
al argument developed by Caleb Nelson and Michael Green.491  Professor 
Nelson’s critique proceeds from the notion that, in at least some cases under 
Swift, federal courts did not purport to apply general law as an alternative to 
state law, but rather, saw themselves as applying state law but exercising 
independent judgment as to the content of that law.492  On this view, the 
important holding of Erie is that “federal courts [must] follow state-court 
precedents on all questions that lay within the states’ legislative compe-
tence, even if those questions would previously have been classified as mat-
ters of ‘general’ law.”493  That makes sense, Nelson allows, if we conceive 
of state courts as having been delegated power to make state law under state 
constitutions.494  The trouble, in his view, is that it remains unclear that state 
constitutions do any such thing.495 
Professor Green’s worry, by contrast, is less about power than inclina-
tion.  Assuming that state courts have the authority to bind federal courts to 
follow their decisions on common law matters, Green asks, what if state 
courts don’t want to bind the federal courts?496  What if, in other words, a 
particular state remains committed to Swift’s notion of general law and be-
lieves that all courts should reach an independent determination of the 
meaning of that law?  Green reads at least one state—Georgia—as persist-
ing in the Swiftian view; if correct, his concern would amount to considera-
bly more than a theoretical quibble.497  In any event, the basic point is that 
Erie’s holding did not appear to allow for the continued possibility that 
state courts would cling to the general law. 
These are both thoughtful objections, and it is worth considering them 
in some detail.  At the end of the day, however, I conclude that there are 
good reasons for federal courts to follow the decisions of state supreme 
  
 491 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 929; Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1113. 
 492 See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text. 
 493 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 950.  Louise Weinberg seems to read Erie this way when she says 
that  
Erie held, precisely, that the nation lacks power to make state law.  State law is reserved to 
the states.  The power of the nation is to make federal law only.  There was, of course, no 
conflict between federal and state law in Erie.  The Court struck down no federal law or rule.  
It struck down only an independent view of what state law ought to be. 
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 266, at 812. 
 494 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 981. 
 495 Id. at 984. 
 496 See Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1112–13. 
 497 See id. at 1123–27, n.89.  I remain quite skeptical about Professor Green’s reading of Georgia 
law.  See infra notes 533–547 and accompanying text. 
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courts irrespective of the content of state law concerning the role of a par-
ticular state’s courts. 
1. Lawmaking Power and Deference to State Courts  
Professor Nelson reads Erie as requiring federal courts to defer to state 
court interpretations of state law.498  The trouble with Erie, on this reading, 
is that it is not obvious where this obligation of deference comes from.  As 
Professors Nelson and Green both point out,499 Justice Holmes attempted an 
answer in the Taxicab case: 
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of general law the decisions of the 
highest Court should establish the law until modified by statute or by a later decision of the 
same Court, I do not perceive how it would be possible for a Court of the United States to re-
fuse to follow what the State Court decided in that domain.  But when the constitution of a 
State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication does make that declaration as clearly as if 
it had said it in express words, so far as it is not interfered with by the superior power of the 
United States.  The Supreme Court of a State does something more than make a scientific in-
quiry into a fact outside of and independent of it.  It says, with an authority that no one de-
nies . . . that thus the law is and shall be.  Whether it be said to make or to declare the law, it 




These critics agree that “if one starts from the premise that state con-
stitutions do indeed allocate authority to prescribe state law in the way that 
Justice Holmes believed, then one might well arrive at the bottom line that 
Justice Brandeis reached in Erie.”501  As Brandeis pointed out, “whether the 
law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its 
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”502  On this 
view, there could be no federal authority to disregard a state’s allocation of 
lawmaking authority to its courts.503  Deference to the state court’s interpre-
tations of state law would be mandatory on grounds analogous to the strong 
theory of Chevron deference in administrative law, which reads congres-
sional ambiguity in statutory drafting as an outright delegation of lawmak-
  
 498 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 950. 
 499 See Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1126; Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 950. 
 500 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 
518, 534–35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 501 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 981. 
 502 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also id. at 79 (quoting Holmes’s Taxicab 
dissent); Hart, supra note 10, at 512 (stating that “the need of recognizing the state courts as organs of 
coordinate authority with other branches of the state government in the discharge of the constitutional 
functions of the states” was “the essential rationale of the Erie opinion”). 
 503 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 981 (suggesting that an effort to “interfere with state govern-
ance” on this point might well be unconstitutional). 
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ing authority to the agency to fill in the gaps.504  Deference occurs, in other 
words, because the primary interpreter—there, the agency; here, the state 
court—is actually vested with authority to “say what the law is.” 
The worry is that “no state constitution actually includes such an ex-
plicit allocation of the state’s lawmaking authority to the state’s highest 
court.”505 And although “Holmes believed that this allocation was implicit 
in each and every state constitution,”506 Professor Nelson argues that that 
premise “is at least contestable and may be false”:507 
The typical state constitution certainly does not give the state supreme court the same sort of 
direct authority to prescribe state law that it gives the legislature.  Subject only to constitu-
tional limits, legislatures can announce whatever legal rules they like, and those automatical-
ly are the law of the state.  What courts do is different.  In many cases, the rules that they can 
legitimately articulate are constrained either by pre-existing written laws or by pre-existing 
sources of unwritten law (such as real-world customs).  Even after the state supreme court 
has issued an opinion, moreover, people might say that the opinion is wrong about the true 
content of state law.  One could not make the same statement about a state statute.
508
 
If this is right, then “Erie’s claim that practice under Swift violated the 
Federal Constitution may well have rested on a debatable interpretation of 
each and every state constitution.”509 
I do not want to concede the premise—that is, while I do think Erie 
requires federal courts to defer to state courts on the meaning of state law, 
there were also cases under Swift—including Swift itself—in which the fed-
eral courts plainly applied general law rather than state law, and Erie held 
that practice to be unconstitutional.  I will have more to say about this at the 
end of this section, but for now I want to examine Professor Nelson’s ar-
gument on its own terms.  Nelson is surely right that state courts do not 
enjoy the same lawmaking powers that state legislatures do.  But is that the 
relevant question? 
It may help to be more specific about the different faces of judicial 
lawmaking.  Writing about the lawmaking function of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Fred Schauer has distinguished between a “backward looking” and a 
“forward looking” aspect of judicial decisions.510  The former concerns “the 
sources of the norms for making decisions in cases”; “[t]o the extent that its 
decision is based on norms not already embodied in authoritative legal ma-
  
 504 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); see also Nina 
A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 743–44 n.25 (2004). 
 505 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 980. 
 506 Id. 
 507 Id. at 984. 
 508 Id. at 982. 
 509 Id. at 984. 
 510 Frederick Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 1, 1–2 (1983). 
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terials, the Court is accused of, or praised for, making law.”511  State courts 
are sometimes thought to have lawmaking authority in this sense—for in-
stance, they are often thought to have greater latitude to translate policy or 
moral views into binding legal norms than do federal courts, which are typ-
ically seen as limited to the interpretation of authoritative statutory or con-
stitutional materials.  If this view is correct, then state courts would be enti-
tled to the strong form of Chevron-style deference described earlier: Having 
been delegated authority to make law, it would not be possible for the state 
supreme court to be “wrong” about the content of state law, and federal 
courts should defer accordingly. 
We do often think about state courts in this way, particularly when 
they are operating within the scope of the common law tradition.512  Alt-
hough there are no express delegations of lawmaking authority in the state 
constitutions, most states do have positive enactments—either in their state 
constitutions or in statutes—“receiving” the common law of England,513 and 
it seems fair to interpret those enactments not only as receiving the substan-
tive law but also endorsing the judge-driven method by which it was 
made.514  Indeed, a significant subset of those reception statutes explicitly 
endorse the state courts’ role in applying and developing the common 
  
 511 Id. at 1. 
 512 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS 
L.J. 881, 896–97 (1989) (“Unlike their federal counterparts, state courts continue to play an avowedly 
generative role in the growth of American law.  As the energy of state courts in forging new common 
law rules in areas as diverse as products liability and corporate take-overs attests, state courts are im-
bued with the power and creative ethos of the common law tradition.”); WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS 
SOCIETY, 1760–1830, 171 (1975) (“By the early nineteenth century judicially administered change had 
become an abiding and unavoidable feature of the legal system, and for judges to have said that they 
were merely applying precedent in bringing about such change would have been to ignore reality.”). 
 513 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to 
or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the 
rule of decision in all the courts of this State.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-1 (“All such parts of the 
common law as were heretofore in force and use within this State, or so much of the common law as is 
not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this State and 
the form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or 
in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this 
State.”); see generally Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United 
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951) (describing the process of reception throughout the country).  Those 
states lacking a positive reception provision have generally adopted the common law by judicial deci-
sion.  See, e.g., Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168, 181 (1851) (“We have, in our judicial practice, adopt-
ed so much of the common law as was operative as law, in the father-land, when our ancestors left it, 
and which was adapted to the new state of things here, under our colonial condition.  This was our 
inheritance.”). 
 514 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 513, at 800 (observing that, regardless of the wording of particular 
reception statutes, state courts enjoyed wide latitude in determining the content of the common law in 
force); see also id. at 823–24 (pointing out that judges possessed an arguably legislative discretion to 
determine which common law rules were “inapplicable” to the circumstances of the new states). 
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law.515  Even those states that have chosen to codify their common law, 
such as California, continue to accept a leading role for the state courts in 
the evolutionary development of that law.516  And in the key area of com-
mercial law, the Uniform Commercial Code—adopted with relatively little 
formal variation in most states—seems plainly to envision that state court 
judges will continue to develop the relevant law.517 
So there is more positive support for backward-looking state court 
lawmaking authority than Professor Nelson has acknowledged.  And I have 
already discussed the practical arguments for deference to state courts as to 
the content of state law.518  Nonetheless, I think he is right to question 
whether Erie’s constitutional holding can be rested entirely on this ground.  
It remains intelligible, as Nelson points out, to insist that a state court is 
“wrong” about the content of state law, even state common law.519  If that is 
  
 515 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (“The common law of England, as ascertained by English and 
American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as 
otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the 
State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage . . . .”); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 77-109 (“The common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions, 
and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the General Statutes of this 
state . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 5 (“[T]he Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of 
England . . . and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seven-
teen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and 
other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equi-
ty . . . .”); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (“The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, 
judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general 
statutes of Oklahoma . . . .”); WYO. STAT. § 8-1-101 (receiving “[t]he common law of England as modi-
fied by judicial decisions”).  The most explicit endorsement of judicial lawmaking comes from the great 
state of North Dakota, which provides that “[t]he will of the sovereign power is expressed” not only by 
the constitution and statutes of the state, but also by “[t]he decisions of the tribunals enforcing those 
rules, which, though not enacted, form what is known as customary or common law.”  N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 1-01-03. 
 516 The codification of much of California’s common law did not, after all, prevent its most famous 
Chief Justice from insisting that judges retain “the major responsibility for lawmaking in the basic 
common-law subjects.”  Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Word Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 
618 (1961). 
 517 U.C.C. § 1-103 (providing that the UCC “must be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies, which are . . . to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; . . . to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and . . . to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions”).  Comment 1 to this section then makes clear that the U.C.C. “is intended to be a semi-permanent 
and infrequently-amended piece of legislation” and to “provide its own machinery for expansion of 
commercial practices.  It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to be applied by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.”  
See also Bank of New York v. Amoco Oil Co., 35 F.3d 643, 660 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying this section 
pursuant to New York state law). 
 518 See supra text accompanying note 215–222. 
 519 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 979. 
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true, then we may need a different argument to support a categorical rule of 
deference. 
On the other hand, it also seems relatively clear that backward-looking 
lawmaking authority is not, in fact, the critical variable in Swift or Erie.  
After all, state courts hardly enjoy such authority vis-à-vis state statutes or 
constitutional provisions, and yet even under Swift the federal courts had 
generally considered themselves bound to follow state courts’ interpreta-
tions of those positive enactments.520  In other words, the critical point was 
not whether the state courts were making law as opposed to interpreting 
some source of law with an objective existence outside their chambers.  
What the federal courts seem to have deferred to is the state courts’ forward 
looking authority—that is, their authority to “set[] forth a standard, or prin-
ciple, or rule that is to be followed and applied by those to whom it is ad-
dressed.”521  This aspect of state lawmaking authority thus focuses on the 
ability of state courts to settle the meaning of state law going forward. 
I submit that once we agree that federal courts sitting in diversity are 
applying state law to any question not governed by federal positive law, 
then Erie’s rule of deference is fully supported by the necessity that some 
court must have final authority to settle the meaning of state law.  Ultimate 
authority to determine that meaning, of course, resides in the state legisla-
ture or the people of the state (who may generally intervene through refer-
enda and constitutional amendment more easily than the people of the Unit-
ed States may do so at the federal level).522  But that is true at the federal 
level, too, where Congress may ultimately determine the meaning of federal 
statutes through amendment.  That fact has never, however, kept courts and 
commentators from emphasizing the importance of having one Supreme 
Court to resolve disputes about the meaning of federal law.523  A single ju-
dicial forum to settle the meaning of state law is no less important to the 
persons who must take that law as a guide to their own conduct.  Absent 
such a forum, persons subject to state law would experience “the debilitat-
ing uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs” that Erie was designed 
to prevent.524 
That forum has to be the state supreme court.  As the Court said long 
ago in Murdock v. City of Memphis, “[t]he State courts are the appropriate 
tribunals . . . for the decision of questions arising under their local law, 
  
 520 See supra text accompanying notes 102–104. 
 521 Schauer, supra note 510, at 2. 
 522 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE 332-33 (2012) (discussing the high amendment rate of state constitutions). 
 523 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (stressing the importance of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s function in ensuring the uniformity of federal law); Leonard G. Ratner, Con-
gressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201–
02 (1960) (asserting that “maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law” is the “essential 
constitutional function[]” of the Supreme Court). 
 524 Ely, supra note 1, at 710–11. 
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whether statutory or otherwise.”525  Murdock held that the U.S. Supremes 
lack jurisdiction to review state supreme court decisions on questions of 
state law, and the Court suggested that that statutory bar may have constitu-
tional underpinnings.526  That holding is significant for at least two reasons: 
First, it means that the federal courts cannot unify the meaning of state law, 
because no federal tribunal has the authority to correct erroneous state in-
terpretations.527  Second, and more fundamentally, as Martha Field has ex-
  
 525 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874). 
 526 See id. at 631 (interpreting Section 25 of the Judiciary Act to limit Supreme Court review of 
state supreme court decisions to federal questions); see also id. at 633 (reserving judgment as “whether, 
if Congress had conferred such authority [to review state law questions], the act would have been consti-
tutional”); see also Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 197, at 355 (“Murdock rests in 
part on constitutional qualms.”).  John Harrison has argued that “Justice Miller’s misgivings, however, 
almost certainly derived in large part from substantive premises about the federal structure that were 
dominant at the time but that do not derive straightforwardly from the text and that I think are unfound-
ed.”  Id.  In particular, Professor Harrison argues that Murdock rested on notions of “dual federalism,” 
but not the principle of separate and exclusive fields of regulatory authority that I discussed earlier, 
supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text, but rather a notion that “interactions between the two 
governments, and especially regulation of one level of government by the other, [are] strongly disfa-
vored.”  See Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 197, at 355.  I am not even sure that 
this notion is properly viewed as part of “dual federalism,” as opposed to simply a postulate of Ameri-
can sovereignty common to most models of federalism doctrine.  See generally Young, Puzzling Persis-
tence, supra note 283 (describing the dual federalist model as I understand it).  But without regard to 
taxonomy, it is clear that this non-regulation or non-interference principle has a lot more life in it today 
than does the model of separate and exclusive spheres of authority to regulate private actors.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (striking down the Affordable Care Act’s 
expansion of Medicaid on the ground that it coerced state governments); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491 (2008) (striking down an attempt by the President to issue commands to the state courts); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not “commandeer” state executive 
officials); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not 
subject states to damages liability in suits by individuals pursuant to federal law); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that neither the state nor the federal government presump-
tively may regulate the relationship between the people and their elected representatives in the other 
government, except as the Constitution expressly permits); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992) (holding that Congress may not require state legislates to enact laws implementing a federal 
statutory program); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“‘It is obviously essential to the 
independence of the States, and to their peace and tranquility, that their power to prescribe the qualifica-
tions of their own officers . . . should be exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far as 
plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.’”) (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 
570–71 (1900)); cf. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 
947 (2001) (identifying serious constitutional objections to federal regulation of the state courts).  In any 
event, it may not matter whether Murdock is constitutionally-grounded. Professor Field points out that, 
despite Murdock’s avowed reliance on statutory construction, its rule has become “such a fundamental 
part of our way of thinking about the boundary between state and federal power that many of our suppo-
sitions, constitutional and otherwise, are built upon it.”  Field, supra note 55, at 920.  The critical point 
is that much of our judicial system now rests on a presupposition that the state courts are the last word 
on state law. 
 527 Even if there were no such bar, I have already suggested that it is doubtful that the Court would 
be willing to hear the volume of state law cases that that it would take to unify conflicting interpretations 
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plained, if the federal Supreme Court were allowed to substitute its own 
view of state law for that of the highest state court, “it would not be possi-
ble to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’  It is thus because of Murdock 
that the whole concept of state law as distinct from federal law is a mean-
ingful one.”528 
What I hope to have established is that Erie’s rule of deference to state 
courts on the construction of state law need not rest solely on the supposi-
tion that state courts do something fundamentally different from federal 
courts in deciding cases.  That rule may also arise from recognizing that the 
functions of the two judicial systems are fundamentally similar.  That is, 
both the U.S. Supreme Court and the state supreme courts share similar 
responsibilities for settling the meaning of the bodies of law within their 
respective charges.  As I tell my students each year, that is why they call 
them the state “supreme” courts.  It would be hard to identify any good 
reason to impute this function to the U.S. Supreme Court on the federal side 
without also allowing it to the state supreme courts on the state side.  And 
to the extent that a state’s constitutional regime vests this responsibility in 
the state courts, a federal court’s decision to set aside the state courts’ inter-
pretation of state law must be construed as an attempted act of federal su-
premacy and measured by the lawmaking criteria of the Supremacy 
Clause.529 
  
of state law.  See supra note 197 and accompanying text.  Of course, it is also true that we lack an appel-
late mechanism for state supreme courts to review federal applications of state law under Erie.  The U.S. 
Supremes will occasionally vacate federal circuit court decisions and remand them for reconsideration 
in light of state precedents, see, e.g., Thomas v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 519 U.S. 913 (1996), and the 
Court has also encouraged certification of questions on the meaning of state law to the state courts.  See 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 80 (1997).  But this situation seems less chaotic 
than that which would exist were federal courts disobliged of their obligation to follow state decisions. 
 528 Field, supra note 55, at 922; see also Dogan & Young, supra note 213, at 119–23 (discussing 
the significance of the Murdock rule).  A limited exception to Murdock allows the U.S. Supreme Court 
to review a state court’s decision of a state law question for the purpose of ensuring that the state court is 
not manipulating state law in order to undermine or thwart a federal right.  See, e.g., Fairfax’s Devisee v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812) (reviewing the Virginia Court of Appeal’s construction 
of state property law in order to ensure that the state courts had not construed that law so as to defeat 
rights under the federal Treaty of Peace ending the Revolutionary War); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
66, at 457–58 (discussing the concept of “antecedent” state law grounds).  Most of these cases are ex-
plainable by the presence of federal constitutional guarantees that, while not precluding the state from 
changing its law (even through judicial decision) do prevent retroactive changes or require that those 
changes be compensated.  See, e.g., State of Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) 
(reviewing state court’s decision as to the existence of a contract under state law as a predicate to the 
plaintiff’s federal claim for impairment under the Contracts Clause); Dogan & Young, supra note 213, 
at 120–30 (discussing this exception in the context of claims that a state court’s change in state law has 
effected a judicial taking).  In any event, even this exception incorporates a significant degree of defer-
ence to the state courts’ construction of state law.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 485–86. 
 529 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 314 n.199 (1984) 
(explaining that “there is no general federal judicial power to displace state law”). 
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The Supreme Court adopted this view in Green v. Neal’s Lessee.530  As 
already mentioned, Green held that federal courts must defer to state courts’ 
construction of state statutes.  The case involved a Tennessee statute of 
limitations that the U.S. Supreme Court had construed in a prior case; sub-
sequent decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court, however, had adopted a 
contrary construction.  The Green Court explained that it would follow the 
Tennessee decisions in order to avoid a conflict “arising from two rules of 
property within the same state” that would be “deeply injurious” to the 
state’s citizens.531  This rationale is consistent with what Professors Brid-
well and Whitten describe as the basic purpose of the diversity jurisdiction 
itself—that is, to protect the settled expectations of private parties.532 
On this reading, Erie does rest on a premise about state constitutional 
law.  That premise, however, is simply that state constitutions, by vesting 
the judicial power of the state in the state supreme courts, entrust those 
courts with the authority to settle the prospective meaning of state law until 
that meaning is altered by the legislature or other democratic processes of 
the state.  This assumption strikes me as a somewhat safer, or at least less 
controversial, assumption than the one that Justice Holmes made and that 
Professor Nelson criticizes. 
2. What if State Courts Don’t Want Federal Deference? 
The role of state courts in settling the meaning of state law also re-
sponds to Professor Green’s objection, which is that we cannot take for 
granted that state courts want to bind the federal courts.  Green’s argument 
is not so much a critique of Erie as an effort to play out its implications: If 
Erie requires federal courts to follow state courts on matters not governed 
by positive federal law, he argues, then whether or not to defer to state court 
interpretations of the common law would seem to depend on whether state 
courts want deference.533  It is at least logically possible that they do not.  If 
a state should choose to stick with Swift and view the common law as “gen-
eral” law shared by all American jurisdictions, then Erie provides no obvi-
ous reason why federal courts should defer to the state courts’ construction 
of that law.534  I think Green’s argument, while ingenious, ultimately under-
rates the reasons compelling federal court deference to state court decisions. 
  
 530 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832); see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 111 (discussing 
this case). 
 531 Green, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 300. 
 532 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 67–68. 
 533 See Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1135–36. 
 534 Professor Green ultimately concludes that Erie is right, because if a state’s supreme court’s 
decisions are binding on the inferior courts of a state (which they are) then a principle of “nondiscrimi-
nation” requires that they also be binding on federal courts.  See id. at 1147.  I agree that the role of the 
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As an initial matter, I am not at all convinced that any American juris-
diction continues to view the common law as “general” in nature or to ac-
cept the holding of Swift that federal diversity courts should not defer to 
state courts on the meaning of that law.  Professor Green points to the Great 
State of Georgia, and he begins by citing the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
statement reaffirming Swift in Slaton v. Hall:  
The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American states where it prevails.  
Though courts in the different states may place a different construction upon a principle of 
common law, that does not change the law.  There is still only one right construction.  If all 
the American states were to construe the same principle of common law incorrectly, the 
common law would be unchanged.
535
 
Green acknowledges, of course, that Slaton came down nine years be-
fore Erie.  He points out that such a late reaffirmation of Swift sets Georgia 
apart from the numerous states that had condemned Swift by that late date.  
And it is true that if Erie was right about the federal courts’ lack of consti-
tutional power to dictate to the states on matters of common law, then Jus-
tice Brandeis could hardly impose his views on legal positivism on an un-
willing state.  But the notion that the general common law retains some sort 
of Platonic existence irrespective of the decisions of the courts in all fifty 
states is so far from contemporary understandings of jurisprudence that one 
would want to see a pretty clear statement from the modern Georgia courts 
indicating that this remains their view. 
Professor Green does not have one.536  And, aside from the few odd 
conflicts cases Green cites, Georgia seems to behave pretty much like any 
  
state supreme court vis-à-vis other state courts is a critical factor, but I think the reasons for federal court 
deference are more fundamental than a principle of nondiscrimination. 
 535 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929) (quoted in Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1123). 
 536 Green infers the notion that Georgia adheres to Swift entirely from some state conflict of laws 
decisions in which Georgia courts have reached an independent judgment as to the content of a sister 
state’s law.  Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1126–27, n.89 (citing Trs. of Jesse Parker 
Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 811 (1940); Calhoun v. Cullum’s Lumber Mill, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 
41, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Leavell v. Bank of Commerce, 314 S.E.2d 678, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).  
Slaton itself was a case of this type.  See id. at 1123 (“[S]trictly speaking [Slaton] held only that Ala-
bama decisions could be ignored when interpreting the common law of Alabama.”).  Green reads these 
cases to say that “if the matter is governed by the common law (including apparently local common 
law), [Georgia courts] come to their own judgment about what this common law is.  This suggests that 
they do not think that their own common-law decisions bind sister-state—or federal—courts.”  Id. at 
1126–27.  Green acknowledges a far more likely possibility, however: “One might read these cases as 
simply applying Georgia common law to events in sister states.”  Id. at 1126 n.89.  He acknowledges 
that “[a] few cases do put the matter this way,” id. (citing White v. Borders, 123 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1961)), but he characterizes that possibility as “an inaccurate description of Georgia’s ap-
proach,” id. at 1126 n.89.  Green’s point is simply that ignoring a sister state’s tort rules would be incon-
sistent with Georgia’s conflict of laws principles.  Id.  That may be so, but this sort of inconsistency 
seems far more likely than a covert adherence to Swift.  After all, the only authority on Georgia conflicts 
rules that Professor Green cites states the Georgia rule in exactly the way that Green characterizes as 
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other state with regard to its common law.  Georgia has, in fact, adopted the 
U.C.C. (which would be unnecessary if Swift’s general commercial law 
were still operative), and the state legislature—like other legislatures—
continues to tweak its provisions.537  Scholars have written about the extent 
to which Georgia has or has not adopted this or that aspect of the U.C.C.,538 
but if Swift v. Tyson were still good law in Georgia one would expect to see 
some mention of that fact in these legislative debates or scholarly discus-
sions.  One does not.  Likewise, Georgia conflicts of laws cases talk about 
the state’s rejection of the Second Restatement and the applicability of 
Georgia common law,539 both of which would be odd things to do if those 
courts thought a Swiftian general law governed conflicts or other common 
law subjects.  It would be a surprising thing indeed if any American state 
persisted in the view that common law is general, so that other jurisdic-
tions’ courts need not defer to that state’s courts in interpreting the law of 
that jurisdiction.  What is unsurprising is the lack of any evidence for that 
phenomenon. 
In any event, I do not think that Erie leaves the federal courts obliga-
tion of deference up to the state courts.  I have argued that federal courts 
should defer to state courts on the meaning of state law for reasons analo-
gous to the grounds of deference in administrative law: state courts have 
greater expertise with respect to state law;540 they are more democratically 
accountable to the state electorate;541 and state law typically delegates law-
making authority to state courts.542  Professor Green’s argument questions 
only the third of these grounds, but the first two are sufficient to provide 
strong pragmatic justifications for deference. 
One might object that, if a state really does view the common law as 
unitary and general, then the relevant law is not state law at all.  On this 
  
“inaccurate.”  See John B. Rees, Jr., Choice of Law in Georgia: Time to Consider a Change?, 34 
MERCER L. REV. 787, 789–90 (1983) (“When no statute is involved, the common law of Georgia con-
trols; the other jurisdiction's decisions construing its own common law will be ignored.”). Tellingly, 
Green cites no language whatsoever from a contemporary Georgia court explicitly endorsing a view that 
is anything like Slaton’s pre-positivist manifesto. 
 537 See, e.g., Bryan Cave Alert, Recent Legislative Action Regarding Changes to Article 9 of Geor-




 538 See, e.g., Albert H. Conrad, Jr. & Richard P. Kessler, Jr., Proposed Revisions to the Georgia 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Status Report, 43 MERCER L. REV. 887 (1992) (not mentioning it). 
 539 See, e.g., Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. 2003) (refusing to follow a contractu-
al law-selection clause “[b]ecause the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws has never been adopted in 
Georgia, and because we continue to refuse to enforce contractual rights which contravene the policy of 
Georgia”). 
 540 See supra notes 216, 219–220 and accompanying text. 
 541 See supra notes 217, 221 and accompanying text. 
 542 See supra notes 501–504 and accompanying text. 
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view, as the Georgia Supreme Court put it in Slaton, “[t]he common law is 
presumed to be the same in all the American states where it prevails.”543  If 
that is true, then any given state’s courts could claim no special expertise or 
democratic connection to that general law.  But it is not true.  In the nine-
teenth century, courts applying the general commercial law could ground 
that law in a shared body of commercial custom that virtually all jurisdic-
tions had agreed to respect.  But outside of commercial law, principles of 
general law lacked any comparable positive grounding.  To the extent that 
general law exists today, it is a collection of general principles and “best 
practices”—such as the American Law Institute’s “Restatements”—that all 
agree require positive acts by particular jurisdictions in order to confer on 
them the force of law.544  And when individual jurisdictions do adopt those 
principles, they inevitably do so with particular variations reflecting the fact 
they have been adopted as state law.545 
There is, however, an even more fundamental reason that the Constitu-
tion mandates federal court deference to state court decisions.  I have ar-
gued that whether or not state courts have a “backward-looking” lawmaking 
function, they surely have a “forward-looking” one.546  That is, they have 
the authority and the obligation to settle the meaning of state law—at least 
unless and until the legislature intervenes—whether or not they have the 
authority to “make” that law in the first instance.  The federal courts cannot 
perform that function; for reasons already discussed, it is exclusively dele-
gated to the state courts.  And because there is no “mystic over-law”547 to 
apply as an alternative, federal courts can only apply the state law adminis-
tered by the state courts. 
 
* * * 
 
Erie affirms the definitive power and obligation of state courts to settle 
the meaning of state law, and that is sufficient to answer both Professor 
Nelson’s and Professor Green’s objections.  But I doubt that this proposi-
tion about state law is all that Erie stands for.  If Erie simply means that 
“the nation lacks power to make state law,” as Professor Weinberg puts it, 
then “[n]othing in that holding qualifies national power to make federal 
law.”548  And yet Erie said that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
  
 543 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929). 
 544 See Nelson, General Law, supra note 74, at 505 (“In modern times, rules of [general law] are 
rarely thought to govern legal questions of their own force; they apply only to the extent that custom or 
positive adoption has incorporated them into the law of a particular sovereign.”). 
 545 See, e.g., Conrad & Kessler, supra note 538 (describing the variations in Georgia’s adoption of 
the U.C.C.). 
 546 See supra notes 510–532 and accompanying text. 
 547 The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (Holmes, J.). 
 548 Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 266, at 812. 
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law of the state . . .  There is no federal general common law.”549  Erie thus 
spoke not only to how federal courts ascertain the meaning of state law, but 
also to where state law and federal law respectively apply.  It is the latter 
point that is critical for most of our contemporary debates about Erie, be-
cause those debates focus on federal courts’ power to fashion federal com-
mon law or to apply common-law-like norms such as customary interna-
tional law.550  The remainder of my discussion focuses on this aspect of 
Erie. 
IV. ERIE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, AND THE NEW DEAL SETTLEMENT 
This last part briefly addresses Erie’s place in the architecture of con-
temporary federalism doctrine.  That doctrine is largely a child of the New 
Deal, which put an end to the old dual federalism model and ushered in an 
era of largely concurrent federal and state regulatory authority.551  This shift 
from separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory jurisdiction to largely 
overlapping ones preceded a parallel shift in the way that federalism is en-
forced.  Under dual federalism, courts had drawn lines between the two 
regulatory worlds and invalidated measures, state or federal, that over-
stepped into the other government’s territory.  Contemporary federalism 
doctrine, by contrast, emphasizes the political and institutional safeguards 
of federalism—especially the representation of the states in Congress and 
the procedural difficulty of making federal law.552  Although the leading 
case associated with this latter shift—Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority553—is also associated with judicial abdication,554 it has 
become clear since that Garcia’s notion of “process federalism” can be 
enforced with significant bite.555  Although the Court continues to enforce 
some sort of outer bound to Congress’s authority,556 the most important 
cases have to do with what goes on within the realm of Congress’s enumer-
  
 549 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 550 See, e.g., Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 623 (identifying customary international law as 
the true issue). 
 551 See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 257–61; Gardbaum, supra note 105, at 486. 
 552 See Wechsler, supra note 290 (stressing political safeguards); Clark, Procedural Safeguards, 
supra note 306. 
 553 469 U.S 528 (1985). 
 554 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 
(1985). 
 555 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–22 (1997) (relying in part on process 
arguments to hold that Congress may not commandeer state executive officials); see generally Young, 
Two Cheers, supra note 292; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Juris-
prudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341 (anticipating this development). 
 556 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School 
Zones Act as outside Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
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ated powers—powers which, after all, now largely overlap with those of the 
States.557 
Where does Erie fit in all this?  A significant school of thought holds 
that it doesn’t fit at all.  Kurt Lash asserts that Erie “had nothing to do with 
nationalism, redistribution, or any other part of the New Deal political 
agenda.”558  As Edward Purcell puts it, Erie “bore an oblique and problem-
atic relationship to the jurisprudence of the ‘Roosevelt Court.’”559  And Su-
zanna Sherry, invoking the Court’s expansion of federal authority in cases 
like Wickard v. Filburn560 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin,561 as well as its 
undermining of state sovereignty and “exclusive territoriality” in cases like 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,562 asserts that “[t]he Erie Court’s 
solicitude for state sovereignty, and its reliance on ‘pre-New Deal federal-
ism,’ is inexplicable in the midst of this march toward federal domi-
nance.”563 
I have already rejected the notion that Erie relied on “pre-New Deal 
federalism,”564 but I now want to press the further claim that Erie actually 
fits rather well with post-New Deal federalism jurisprudence.  In fact, it is 
fair to say that Erie is the archetypal case of that jurisprudence.  I do not 
claim that Erie is a product of the New Deal jurisprudence or quarrel with 
Professor Purcell’s account of Erie as a specimen of Brandisian progressiv-
ism.565  As Susan Bandes has noted, “[t]he age that gave rise to the Erie 
decision was ending as the decision was issued, dramatically altering many 
of the social concerns and political assumptions on which the decision had 
been based.”566  I do claim that Erie, despite being a product of an earlier 
era, fit beautifully with the federalism doctrine that would emerge after the 
New Deal. 
The statements from Professor Sherry and others quoted above take an 
unfortunately simplistic view of what the New Deal and the New Deal 
Court accomplished.  The point, as Stephen Gardbaum has well demon-
strated, was not simply to achieve “federal dominance” but to liberate gov-
ernment at both the state and national levels from the constraints imposed 
  
 557 See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 261–65. 
 558 Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Juris-
prudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 461 (2001). 
 559 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 3. 
 560 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 561 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 562 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 563 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 148 (quoting Green, supra note 5, at 607); see also Bandes, 
supra note 237, at 850 (arguing that Erie’s federalism—at least as understood by its Legal Process 
school defenders—was completely cut off from its historical roots). 
 564 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 565 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 114. 
 566 BANDES, supra note 237, at 849. 
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on it by the Old Court.567  Those constraints included not only a more lim-
ited affirmative commerce power, but also notions of economic substantive 
due process and a rigorously enforced dormant Commerce Clause that kept 
the states from regulating pursuant to their view of the public interest.568  
After the New Deal, both the national and the state governments enjoy 
broad regulatory scope, and attention necessarily shifts to the modes of re-
solving conflicts that may arise between their efforts.569 
Erie’s place in this post-New Deal vision stands out in the preface to 
the first edition of the famous Hart & Wechsler casebook on federal juris-
diction, published in 1953.  That preface compares the “[p]roblems of fed-
eral and state legislative competence” that generally arise in “elementary 
courses in constitutional law” with the problems to be addressed in the new 
book.570  The former sort of problems, which “arise in clear-cut instances of 
conflict” and call for “adjudication of competing claims of power,” “touch 
only the beginnings of the problems.”571  Rather, 
[f]or every case in which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal 
legislative authority, there are many more in which the allocation of control does not involve 
questions of ultimate power; Congress has been silent with respect to the displacement of the 




The latter sort of case is, of course, Erie.  No federal statute had sought 
to set a railroad’s duty of care to a passerby, and thus the case presented no 
question of “ultimate power”; instead, the federal diversity court faced a 
difficult “choice of law” problem in judging between the general common 
law and the law of the state.  In a world of largely concurrent jurisdiction, 
Professors Hart and Wechsler insisted, these would be the most important 
problems.573 
The judicial federalism rationale of Erie also fits comfortably with the 
process federalism that dominates contemporary federalism doctrine.  Jus-
tice Blackmun explained in Garcia that “the principal means chosen by the 
  
 567 Gardbaum, supra note 105, at 486 (“[W]hat occurred in many areas was not a shift from exclu-
sive state authority to concurrent federal and state authority, but a shift from a regulatory vacuum to 
concurrent powers: both federal and state governments were constitutionally enabled to regulate a large 
number of areas of social and economic life that previously they had both been prohibited from regulat-
ing.”). 
 568 See id. at 564–65. 
 569 See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 261–62. 
 570 Quoted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at vi. 
 571 Id. 
 572 Id. 
 573 See Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1686 (arguing that Erie is of profound constitutional signifi-
cance whether or not Congress could override it, because “it rests on premises related to the basic nature 
of our federal system which are presupposed to govern in the absence of clear congressional determina-
tion to change and reallocate power within that system”). 
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Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the 
structure of the Federal Government itself.”574  Separation of powers at the 
national level, in other words, is the key to federalism.  Hence, as Brad 
Clark has recognized, “the Constitution prescribes precise procedures to 
govern the adoption of each source of law recognized by the Supremacy 
Clause as ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’” and “all of these procedures 
assign responsibility for adopting such supreme law solely to actors subject 
to the political safeguards of federalism.”575  And whatever doubts one 
might have about the efficacy of political safeguards standing alone,576 
“federal lawmaking procedures continue to constrain federal lawmaking 
simply by establishing multiple ‘veto gates,’ and thus effectively creating a 
supermajority requirement.”577  In the later stages of the Swift regime, fed-
eral courts had begun to displace state law by formulating effectively feder-
al rules of decision without regard to this system of structural safeguards.578  
By insisting that federal courts may not make federal law outside the consti-
tutionally ordained legislative process, Erie became the central decision of 
modern process federalism.579 
Professor Purcell offers a different view near the conclusion of his 
book on Erie.  He contends that “[a]lthough Erie constrained the federal 
courts in some ways, it also channeled them in new directions where they 
could enjoy freedom and, eventually, even greater power.”580  He worries 
that Justice Brandeis’s judicial federalism “corollary” has become “of un-
certain import” in contemporary jurisprudence, “because the social and 
institutional trajectory of the twentieth century challenged the corollary’s 
wisdom and utility, and hence its power to command judicial allegiance.”581  
“[I]n an age of accelerating interstate and international integration,” he 
writes, judges “could not deny the compelling need for effective national 
ordering in those areas they valued most highly and thought most essential 
to the nation’s well-being.”582  Purcell supports this concern by noting a 
scholarly literature asserting that “[t]he Rehnquist Court . . . actively made 
  
 574 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). 
 575 Clark, Erie’s Source, supra note 90, at 1304. 
 576 See, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, supra note 305, at 1459 ; Baker & Young, supra note 305, at 106–33. 
 577 Clark, Erie’s Source, supra note 90, at 1304–05. 
 578 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 115–27; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, 
at 556–58; Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General 
Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1319 (2000). 
 579 This is not lost on all of Erie’s critics. GREVE, supra note 4, at 242 (“[T]he true protection for 
the ‘states as states’ is not their representation in Congress.  Rather, it is the certainty that Congress will 
consistently fail to enact, and federal courts will under Erie refuse to supply, federal rules of decision in 
a specified domain—the state exploitation of interstate commerce.  So viewed, Erie’s legacy dovetails 
with the New Deal’s ambivalent preemption doctrine.”) (emphasis in original). 
 580 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 300. 
 581 Id. at 302. 
 582 Id. 
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law implementing its values, sometimes ignoring or setting aside congres-
sional actions in the process.”583 
It is hard to say, however, that the Rehnquist Court’s activism—such 
as it was—cut against Erie’s principle of judicial federalism.  That Court 
continued an earlier tendency to restrict federal common law with respect to 
both primary obligations and implied federal remedies.584  The Court’s 2004 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain585 provides an important example.  In 
its first significant encounter with human rights suits under the Alien Tort 
Statute,586 the Court wrote that “[a] series of reasons argue for judicial cau-
tion when considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement 
the jurisdiction conferred by the early statute.”587  Prominent among these 
reasons were the conception of law affirmed in Erie and that decision’s 
“significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making [common 
law].”588  Whether or not Sosa resolved the longstanding dispute about the 
status of customary international law in domestic courts,589 it left little doubt 
about the continuing importance of Erie as a restraint on judicial lawmak-
ing. 
Moreover, Professor Purcell’s assurance that the future belongs to na-
tional power may itself be out of date.  In 1937, at the height of the New 
Deal (and a year before Erie), a significant majority of Americans favored 
concentration of power in the federal government as opposed to the 
  
 583 Id. at 406 n.85. 
 584 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (narrowing the implied 
right of action under the Alien Tort Statute to exclude wholly extraterritorial cases); Alexander v. Sand-
oval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (restricting federal common law implied rights of action under federal stat-
utes); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83–86 (1994) (holding that state law governed the 
liability of a failed bank’s former law firm in a suit brought by a federal agency as receiver); United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (establishing a balancing test for federal common 
lawmaking that presumptively tips in favor of state law); but see Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500 (1988) (establishing a federal common law “military contractor defense” in products liability ac-
tions, even though the United States was not a party).  For an overall assessment, see generally HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 629 (stating that “characteristic[s] of the Court’s current approach to 
federal common lawmaking” include “careful analysis of the asserted need for uniformity, concern that 
federal rules of decision will generate intrastate disuniformity, and a preference for incorporation of 
state law absent a demonstrated need for a uniform federal rule of decision”). 
 585 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 586 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts in a “civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations”).  On the ATS, see generally HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 679–85. 
 587 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 588 Id.  Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, would have gone 
further and eliminated altogether judicial discretion to recognize customary international law claims 
under the ATS, based on “Erie’s fundamental holding that a general common law does not exist.”  Id. at 
744 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (emphasis in original). 
 589 See, e.g., Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 16 (addressing this question); Ernest A. 
Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 28–35 
(2007), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/young.pdf (same). 
File: Young Proofs Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM 
2013] A GENERAL DEFENSE OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS 117 
states;590 however, a recent overview of opinion research observed that 
“trust in the federal government has declined since the 1960s,” while “atti-
tudes toward subnational governments have held steady or even im-
proved.”591  A survey in April of 2013 found that 57% of Americans viewed 
state governments favorably while only 28% viewed the federal govern-
ment favorably.592  Because our system rests, as Alexander Hamilton point-
ed out, on intergovernmental competition for “the confidence and good will 
of the people,” these opinion trends matter.593 
These trends in public opinion correspond to changes in institutional 
reality.  As Alice Rivlin has observed, “[t]he dissatisfaction with state gov-
ernment that reached a crescendo in the 1960s not only prompted an explo-
sion of federal activity, it also brought a wave of reform to the states them-
selves. . . .  [S]tates took steps to turn themselves into more modern, re-
sponsive, competent governments.”594  The result is an increasingly stark 
contrast between political gridlock at the national level and policy innova-
tion in the states.  States have led the way on gay rights, with the federal 
government acting primarily as a brake on reform.595  Individual states have 
  
 590 See Megan Mullin, Federalism, in, PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 209, 
217 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan, eds. 2008).  In the 1937 poll, Americans favored 
the federal government by 46 to 34 percent; in polls with the same wording taken in 1981 and 1995, 
those numbers had reversed to 28 to 56 percent and 26 to 64 percent, respectively.  Id. 
 591 Id. at 214 (collecting opinion studies from 1976 to 2006). 
 592 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 17.  By October, in the midst of the latest round of gov-
ernment shutdown and debt ceiling follies, the federal government’s favorable had declined further to 19 
percent.  See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, Trust in Government Nears Record 
Low, But Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably (October 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-18-13%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf.  The 
October poll does not appear to have addressed confidence in state governments.  See also Chris Cilizza 
& Aaron Blake, Are We in the End Times of Trust in Government, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/02/07/are-we-in-the-end-times-of-trust-in-
government/ (lamenting a steep and lasting decline in trust in the federal government, but ignoring data 
on robust public trust in the states). 
 593 The Federalist No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), at 109 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also Robert A. 
Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1669 (2007) (arguing that trust levels 
affect the federal balance of power). 
 594 ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES & THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 102 (1992); see also PHILIP W. ROEDER, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY 
LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN STATES 24-27 (1994) (collecting studies indicating that state govern-
mental capacity has improved significantly in recent decades); Van Horn, supra note 17, at 2–3 (de-
scribing a “quiet revolution” as a result of “changes in representation, government organization, and 
managerial competence” at the state level, with the result that “[s]tate officials are far more willing and 
able to carry out significant responsibilities”). 
 595 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (striking down the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages, as applied to a cou-
ple married under the laws of New York; the Court emphasized that “[t]he State’s decision to give this 
class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import”); Letter 
from Dayna K. Shah, Managing Assoc. Gen. Cousnel, GAO, to Senators Tom Harkin, Susan Collins & 
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developed their own policies to combat global warming even while pressing 
a reluctant federal government to take action.596  States have played a simi-
lar role on immigration reform, taking action on their own while also stimu-
lating a national debate on the subject.597  Even healthcare reform, the cur-
rent administration’s signature national policy innovation, seems to have 
dubious prospects at the national level while individual states continue to 
pursue more radical reforms.598 
It is thus far from obvious that, as Professor Purcell contends, our “so-
cial and institutional trajectory” continues to undermine the “wisdom and 
utility” of Erie’s view of federalism.  Many lawyers and academics formed 
their views about federalism in an earlier era, when state autonomy seemed 
both technologically outdated and morally retrograde.599  Whether or not 
that view was ever fair, a lot has happened since then, and Purcell’s view 
  
Jeff Merkely, Re: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Employment Discrimination: Overview of 
State Statutes and Complaint Data (Oct. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10135r.pdf (“Although federal law does not prohibit discrimination in 
employment on the basis of sexual orientation, 21 states and the District of Columbia provide such 
protection in their statutes.”). 
 596 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding the standing of a group of 
states to challenge the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s refusal to issue regulations governing 
greenhouse gas emissions); Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19258, at *13 
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2013) (upholding California’s Low Carbon Fuels Standard against a dormant Com-
merce Clause challenge and noting that “California's role as a leader in developing air-quality standards 
has been explicitly endorsed by Congress in the face of warnings about a fragmented national market”); 
see also REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) 
(agreement by nine northeastern and mid-Atlantic states to establish a regional cap and trade program 
for electric generating plants). 
 597 See generally David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264483; Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance 
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008). 
 598 Compare, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, Healthcare.gov: How political fear was pitted 
against technical needs, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/challenges-have-dogged-obamas-health-plan-since-
2010/2013/11/02/453fba42-426b-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html?hpid=z1 (documenting “the 
disastrous rollout of the new federal health insurance marketplace”); Susan Page, USA Today/Pew Poll: 
Health care law faces difficult future, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/16/usa-today-pew-poll-health-care-law-
opposition/2817169/ (“53% disapprove of the health care law, the highest level since it was signed; 42% 
approve.  By an even wider margin, intensity favors the opposition; 41% of those surveyed strongly 
disapprove while just 26% strongly approve.”), with Zach Howard, Vermont Single-Payer Health Care 
Law Signed by the Governor, REUTERS (May 26, 2011, 2:44 PM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/26/vermont-health-care-reform-lawsingle-
payer_n_867573.html. 
 599 See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACADE. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
66, 67 (2001) (“In my formative years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 1970s, 
[federalism] was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent racial oppression, 
political persecution, and police misconduct.”). 
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now seems, well, so sixties.600  In an era of resurgent and innovative states, 
accompanied by national gridlock, Erie’s concern for preserving state au-
tonomy is more relevant and more critical than ever. 
It is Erie’s limitation of judicial lawmaking that may ultimately moti-
vate some of the more violent attacks on its holding.  According to Profes-
sor Sherry, “that new myth [Erie’s judicial federalism rationale] has lent 
support to a distorted view of what judges do and what they are supposed to 
do, in ways that are detrimental to our constitutional democracy.”601  Sherry 
thus complains that “Erie has been drafted into service in the war against 
judicial ‘activism.’”602  Erie’s real victim, this view suggests, was not so 
much Swift v. Tyson as Roe v. Wade.603  The consequences, moreover, are 
dire and far-reaching: According to Sherry, 
We are now enjoying the benefits of Erie’s dichotomy [between “legitimate judicial interpre-
tation and illegitimate judicial lawmaking”] in the form of a highly politicized judicial nomi-
nation process, and academic calls either to abandon judicial review and substitute popular 
constitutionalism or to constrain judicial discretion by means of some utopian grand theory 




This is all a bit overheated for me.  In the years that Erie has been un-
derstood primarily as a limitation on judicial lawmaking, the Supreme 
Court has decided not only Roe but also Lawrence v. Texas,605 Roper v. 
Simmons,606 Citizens United v. FEC,607 and Bush v. Gore.608  The Court hard-
  
 600 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 396 (extolling a “new progressive federalism”). 
 601 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 150. 
 602 Id. at 151. 
 603 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 604 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 152–53.  Each of these specific claims is highly suspect.  It is 
not clear that the nomination process is any more “politicized” than in the past, at least for supreme 
court justices.  And I doubt the fights over the lower federal courts have much to do with federal com-
mon law.  Academic calls to ‘take the Constitution away from the courts’ enjoyed barely fifteen minutes 
of prominence before going back out of style, thanks to the appointment of some liberal justices more to 
the academy’s liking and, possibly, some pretty devastating reviews.  See, e.g., Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Are 
“the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (2005) (reviewing 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
and demonstrating that the most plausible historical instance of “popular constitutionalism” was the 
South’s “massive resistance” to school desegregation).  And while originalism has become more main-
stream as a theory of constitutional interpretation, that is owing largely to its becoming less “utopian”—
that is, originalists have loosened the constraints that it purports to impose on judges.  See, e.g., Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (embracing a “fainthearted” brand 
of originalism); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (pushing a brand of “originalism” that is 
basically the same as living constitutionalism). 
 605 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 606 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 607 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
 608 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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ly seems deterred either from addressing the great issues of the day or from 
exercising considerable creativity in doing so.  And I doubt that the critics 
of those decisions will pack up their tents and go home if Erie can be 
shown to be in error.  Debates about the proper latitude of construction for 
constitutional provisions and statutes did not start with Erie, and they will 
persist long after Erie has been forgotten. 
Putting aside the abundant evidence that the Court is doing just fine in 
terms of its “independence and its ability to lead,”609 it is a monstrous leap 
to lay current threats to judicial legitimacy at Erie’s door.  What Erie did 
help to do, however, was to divert federalism doctrine from the highly con-
frontational track that it had been on prior to the New Deal.  Instead, we 
now have a federalism doctrine that is largely deferential to the political 
process, stepping in where necessary to remedy distortions or circumven-
tions of that process.610  I have argued elsewhere at length that this sort of 
role not only plays to judicial competence, but also avoids the risk of dam-
aging institutional confrontations that characterized the era of dual federal-
ism.611 
Similarly, Craig Green’s contempt for Erie seems to be motivated by 
the impediment it poses to his generation’s equivalent to Professor Sherry’s 
substantive due process: customary international law (CIL).612  The Erie 
doctrine is hardly the only problem with CIL613 or with current international 
human rights litigation in American courts,614 but Erie does provide the 
most compelling argument against the federalization of CIL norms through 
federal judicial decisions.615  It is hard to think of many instances nowadays, 
however, where such federalization is actually important to the agenda of 
international human rights,616 and Congress retains the power to federalize 
  
 609 Manoj Mate & Matthew Wright, The 2000 Presidential Election Controversy, in PERSILY, 
CITRIN & EGAN, supra note 590, at 333, 348–49 (concluding, based on extensive studies of polling data, 
that the Supreme Court retained broad public support even after the controversy over Bush v. Gore). 
 610 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (refusing to invalidate 
the “individual mandate” to purchase health insurance under the national Affordable Care Act, but 
limiting Congress’s ability to coerce state participation in the Medicaid expansion and leaving states to 
make the ultimate judgment about whether to expand their benefit programs). 
 611 See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 305, at 65–121. 
 612 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 623–24. 
 613 See, e.g., Kadens & Young, supra note 77 (arguing that CIL is not actually customary); Kelly, 
supra note 76, at 463-65 (arguing that CIL is not even law). 
 614 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (concluding that the Alien 
Tort Statute does not apply to extraterritorial claims). 
 615 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–26 (2004); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 243, at 827; Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 493–96. 
 616 For many years, the central examples advanced by human rights advocates of CIL norms that 
might trump state law involved international law limits on the death penalty.  See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, 
Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 
322–26.  But these arguments have become largely moot as the Supreme Court has significantly ex-
panded Eighth Amendment limitations on capital punishment.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
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customary norms by statute.617  Significantly, the federal courts have assert-
ed the power to make federal common law in foreign affairs cases, but they 
have generally used that power to avoid making broad statements about 
international law norms.618  That tendency suggests that caution would pre-
vail concerning the federalization of CIL norms even if Erie had come out 
differently.  In any event, Erie’s limits on CIL are plainly in step with the 
contemporary Court’s caution about international law generally.619 
Far from being out of step with the jurisprudence of its era, then, Erie 
has proven critical to the New Deal Settlement.  As Professor Purcell ulti-
mately acknowledges, Erie “established an essential foundation for the con-
tinued operation of legal federalism in a new age of centralization, national-
ization, and globalization.”620  If the current American correlation of politi-
cal forces tells us anything, it is that contemporary pressures to centralize 
coexist with resurgent vitality at the state level, even as national governance 
seems in crisis.  Erie’s interstitial vision of federal law is thus more central 
than ever.  This is not because subsequent interpreters have twisted Erie to 
suit their own purposes, but rather because Justice Brandeis recovered what 
the Founders had known all along—that federalism and separation of pow-
ers are integrally related, and that the processes by which laws are made 
may often be more important than substantive constraints on those laws.  In 
so doing, Erie put constitutional law on a better footing to deal with the 
bewildering complexity of modern governance.  That is why Erie deserves 
to be understood as the central case of contemporary American federalism. 
CONCLUSION 
Michael Greve is no doubt right that, as a practical matter, Erie stands 
“unassailable” today.621  The decision’s correctness and rationale remain 
worth debating, however, if only because they provide a useful practical 
  
551 (2005) (striking down the juvenile death penalty).  It is not obvious what will replace the juvenile 
death penalty as a doctrinal flashpoint for the CIL issue.  Ironically—from Professor Green’s perspec-
tive—the best candidate may involve CIL limits on expropriation of private property, which property 
rights advocates might invoke to ratchet up scrutiny in takings cases. 
 617 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (conferring power on Congress “[t]o define and punish . . . offenses 
against the law of nations”). 
 618 See, e.g., Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (explaining the 
Court’s reluctance to apply controversial CIL norms of expropriation). 
 619 See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (warning about “the danger of unwarranted judicial inter-
ference in the conduct of foreign policy”); Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 334 (2006) (refus-
ing to defer to the International Court of Justice on a question of treaty interpretation); Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding that an International Court of Justice judgment ordering 
reconsideration of a domestic capital conviction of a foreign national was not self-executing and thus 
could not be enforced absent action by Congress). 
 620 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 299. 
 621 GREVE, supra note 4, at 373. 
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frame for some of the most fundamental questions of jurisprudence and 
constitutional structure.  These include not only what we should understand 
judges to be doing when they decide cases, but also the division of lawmak-
ing power between the branches of the national government and the appro-
priate model for preserving the federal balance.  If Erie were otherwise, far 
more would change than the law applied in diversity cases. 
But as often happens, the conventional wisdom turns out to be correct: 
Erie was right, basically for the reasons given in the opinion.  The Rules of 
Decision Act requires federal courts to apply state law in the absence of 
positive federal law, not because of some dubious inference from the Act’s 
drafting history but because the kind of general common law that the states 
accepted during the Swift era no longer exists.  Erie’s insistence on vertical 
uniformity—that federal and state courts sitting in the same state should 
apply the same law—is far from perfect, but the alternative of horizontal 
uniformity among federal courts in different states is likely unattainable; in 
any event, the obstacle to that uniformity is not Erie but rather the lack of 
uniform and territorial choice of law rules.  Justice Brandeis’s nonconstitu-
tional arguments, in other words, remain sound today. 
It is Erie’s constitutional reasoning, however, that should claim it a 
place at the center of the structural canon.  If the Civil Procedure teachers 
will not teach it—an endemic problem in some law schools—then the Con-
stitutional Law faculty should.  Because “law in the sense in which courts 
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind 
it,”622 the displacement of state law must be traceable to the valid exercise 
of federal lawmaking authority.  Under the federal separation of powers, 
that authority generally belongs to Congress, which can legislate only by a 
difficult process in which the states are represented.  Outside the ambit of 
federal legislation (or, sometimes, uniquely preemptive federal interests), 
the state law background remains in force.  This interstitial view of federal 
law, with a broad national lawmaking jurisdiction circumscribed by politi-
cal and procedural safeguards, remains the most promising model for main-
taining our federal balance in the modern era. 
Attacks on Erie generally arise out of dissatisfaction with this model.  
Federalism is untidy.  When one has figured out the optimal legal answer to 
a pressing problem, it is hard to see why that solution ought not be adopted 
across the board.  Democracy is untidy, too, and it is always tempting for 
smart people to look to smart judges to fashion new rights or new solutions 
when the democratic process seems stalled or uninterested.  Against these 
impulses, Erie’s vision of federalism and separation of powers stands for 
humility.  Consensus eludes us on many important questions, and federal-
ism’s messy patchwork helps us generate new answers or, sometimes, agree 
to disagree. Likewise, history teaches us that federal judges have their own 
  
 622 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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foibles as lawmakers; our Constitution places its bet on a uniquely Ameri-
can form of mixed government. 
However “unassailable” Erie may be in its original context of choice 
of law in diversity cases, the decision’s import sweeps far more broadly.  It 
is, as I began by saying, the most important federalism decision of the 
twentieth century.  What remains is for courts and commentators to take 
Erie’s rationale more seriously in the important and related debates that 
continue to arise in the twenty-first.  These include matters of administra-
tive preemption, the domestic status of customary international law, and 
continuing controversies over the lawmaking authority of federal courts.  
Erie’s wisdom may be conventional, but it still has much to teach us. 
 
